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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation for this Study 
 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is the most earthquake prone area of the 
United States east of the Rocky Mountains.  The NMSZ is located in the central 
Mississippi Valley.  It is estimated that in the region, there is a 90% chance of a 
magnitude 6 or 7 event occurring in the next 50 years (Hildenbrand et al., 1996).  In 
the NMSZ, more than 3000 earthquakes have been recorded since 1974, the year 
network monitoring of seismic activity began.  Fortunately, none of these earthquakes 
exceeded a magnitude greater than 5.0, and most occurred unnoticed by citizens 
(Johnston and Schweig, 1996).  The underlying geology of the NMSZ is such that an 
earthquake of magnitude 7, an equal magnitude of the Loma Prieta earthquake in 
California, would affect an area many times larger than that affected in the Loma 
Prieta earthquake (Hildenbrand et al., 1996). 
 
Several historic, highly-damaging earthquakes have occurred in the Central and 
Eastern United States (CEUS).  The most notable are the 1886 Charleston, South 
Carolina Earthquake and the series of 1811-1812 New Madrid, Missouri earthquakes.   
 
The 1886 Charleston earthquake was one of the strongest earthquakes to occur in 
eastern North America.  The earthquake occurred on September 1, 1886 and had an 
estimated magnitude of 7.3.  It caused 60 deaths and damaged or destroyed nearly 
every structure in the City of Charleston and the surrounding area.  The event caused 
large fissures and craterlets to form in the ground.  The ground deformation caused 
extensive railroad track damage in the Charleston region.  The earthquake caused 
structural damage to buildings as far away as central Ohio and was felt as far away as 
Boston, Milwaukee, and Cuba (Stover and Coffman, 1993). 
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The most powerful earthquakes ever to occur in the continental United States took 
place in the NMSZ during the winter of 1811-1812.  This series of earthquakes 
consisted of three major events of magnitude 8.0 or larger and many aftershocks of 
significant magnitude.  The magnitudes of the 1811-1812 events were determined 
using historical accounts from witnesses both near and far from the earthquake 
epicenters, preserved effects from the earthquakes, such as liquefaction features, 
current seismicity, and the structure of the Earth’s crust in the 1811-12 fault zone 
(Johnston and Schweig, 1996).  The earthquakes destroyed much of what existed in 
the region around the NMSZ, and landscape still remains changed.  For example, the 
route of the Mississippi River was changed over a local area, and Reelfoot Lake in 
Tennessee was created because of these seismic events (Hildenbrand et al., 1996).   
 
In the early 1800s, the area surrounding the NMSZ had very few structures and was 
scarcely populated.  Today, the region is more densely populated, and the 
reoccurrence of an event similar to the 1811-12 earthquakes would devastate the 
region.  Current estimates of losses for the region are in the range of $60 billion to 
$80 billion in direct losses only. The safety of many people would be threatened, and 
the region would billions of dollars of damage.  It is important to study how the 
repeat of a similar event would affect the region near the NMSZ today so that states 
and localities can be prepared to react to such an event.  The results of this study will 
be used to determine vulnerability of the infrastructure in the State of Illinois, 
prioritize mitigation efforts in the state, quantify damage in economic terms, and aid 
in development of public awareness projects. 
 
1.2 Earthquake Loss Assessment 
 
Systematic loss assessment studies began after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake.  
The first studies focused on casualties, injuries, and the state of emergency health 
care as a result of a given scenario earthquake.  Recent loss assessment studies have 
been funded by insurance or government agencies.  Current loss assessment studies 
for government agencies emphasize the number of casualties and the damage and 
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functionality of lifeline systems, such as roads and utility systems.  These results aid 
in emergency response planning.  Studies performed for the insurance industry 
estimate losses to the general building stock and economic losses (FEMA, 1994).  
Today, loss estimation can be used to help predict the type and amount of emergency 
response required after an earthquake, to help develop post-earthquake recovery 
plans, and to help make decisions that can mitigate the effects of an earthquake 
(FEMA, 2006a). 
 
Several methodologies were developed previous to HAZUS to perform seismic loss 
assessments.  The methodologies were developed for different purposes, and 
therefore have a large variation in scale and complexity.  In 1972, a seismic loss study 
was performed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) in which 
losses to the San Francisco Bay area were assessed for the Federal Office of 
Emergency Preparedness (FOEP).  The results would be used for response and 
recovery planning, so this study primarily focused on injuries and losses to medical 
facilities.  This study contains many medical-related estimates, but does not mention 
the general building stock and contains very little information about losses to other 
types of emergency facilities.  Other studies contain no injury or medical facility loss 
estimates, such as a study performed in 1987 of Portland, Oregon, which focuses 
completely on water and wastewater utility systems (FEMA, 1994).   
 
Some aspects of loss estimation are relatively uniform across most studies.  A 
majority of studies have included the use of attenuation relationships, including the 
effect of site classes, to calculate the ground motion caused by a scenario earthquake.  
Many studies have ignored facilities with high potential losses, such as dams, 
refineries, and chemical plants.  Other studies have determined, for example, which 
dams are subjected to the most risk, but did not study the flooding and damage due to 
inundation.  Facilities containing hazardous materials have often been ignored 
(FEMA, 1994).   
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FEMA developed a list of key features that should be included in any regional loss 
study.  These features include a hazard model, site-soil effects, liquefaction, landslide, 
fault rupture, fire, flood, hazardous material release, general buildings, lifelines, high 
potential loss facilities, critical and emergency facilities, homelessness, economic 
impact, and complete inventory.  Very few previous loss estimation methodologies 
calculated ground motion internally.  A complete inventory is considered to be one 
that contains inventory in all three categories of dwellings, lifelines, and critical 
facilities.  FEMA’s loss estimation methodology HAZUS was developed based on 
these requirements (FEMA, 1994).    
 
 
1.3 HAZUS Overview 
 
HAZUS, which stands for hazards-U.S., is a loss estimation methodology.  HAZUS 
estimates social and economic losses to a user-defined region caused by a user-
defined scenario earthquake.  The scenario earthquake is an event defined by its 
magnitude and location.  The steps in estimating losses include inventory collection 
and hazard definition, which are followed by a hazards impact assessment.  The types 
of losses are quantitative estimates, estimated damage, estimated functionality losses, 
and effects of induced hazards.  Quantitative estimates include cost of damage to 
buildings, both structural and non-structural, costs due to loss of function, numbers of 
casualties and injuries, tons of debris generated, and displaced persons.  The damage 
is estimated as the probability that a facility, building, or class of buildings reaches 
the limit states of slight damage, moderate damage, extensive damage, or complete 
damage.  Loss of function estimates are the percent operational estimates for facilities 
and lifeline system components at several time periods following the scenario 
earthquake.  Induced hazards include fires, flooding, and hazardous material spills. 
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1.3.1  HAZUS Level 1 Analysis 
 
A HAZUS level 1 analysis involves using only the default models and data provided 
in the loss estimation tool.  The default databases in HAZUS include an inventory of 
the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation lifeline systems, utility 
lifeline systems, and high potential loss facilities.  The default data also contains 
population distribution data, repair costs for facilities and lifeline components, and 
some economic information for the study region.  Liquefaction and landsliding are 
ignored and it is assumed the study region consists of one uniform soil type.  
Uncertainty is large in a level 1 analysis, but this level of analysis requires very little 
user input because the user does not need to collect and implement improved 
inventory data or parameters.  The required user inputs for a HAZUS level 1 analysis 
are the study region definition (any combination of states, counties, or census tracts), 
scenario earthquake definition (magnitude and location), and requests for the desired 
outputs.  A level 1 analysis is most suitable for preliminary studies and basic 
comparisons between multiple regions.  The HAZUS level 1 analysis used in this 
study used all default inventory and parameters, but user-defined ground motion maps 
were used to define the hazard.  The implementation of these hazard maps can be 
found in the hazard definition section of this report. 
 
 
1.3.2  HAZUS Level 2 Analysis 
 
A HAZUS level 2 analysis involves the improvement of the default inventories and 
parameters.  The quality of loss estimation results depends highly on the quantity, but 
more importantly, the quality of user supplied data.  The data that can be input for a 
level 2 analysis includes soil map, which are be used to determine ground motion, 
liquefaction susceptibility maps, the distribution of floor area in each occupancy class 
in each census tract, the distribution of model building type in each occupancy class, 
essential facility inventory, utility and transportation lifeline inventory, local 
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construction costs, local economic data, demographic data, inundation maps, high 
potential loss facility inventory, and hazardous material facility inventory. 
 
1.3.3  HAZUS Modules 
 
The HAZUS methodology is made up of several interdependent modules.  The 
modules add flexibility to HAZUS because they allow the user to refine the data only 
in individual, selected modules, therefore giving flexibility the program and allowing 
for different levels of analysis.  The user can choose to only run the modules of 
interest when setting up the analysis.  The option to use only the necessary modules 
needed to produce the user-requested results can save significant program 
computation time.   
 
1.3.3.1 Potential Earth Science Hazard Module 
 
The potential earth science hazard module estimates ground shaking and ground 
failure, which includes liquefaction, landslides, and surface fault rupture, caused by 
the user-specified scenario earthquake.  The ground motion is estimated using 
attenuation relationships that are built into the loss estimation tool or that can be 
specified by the user or by built-in probabilistic ground motion maps.  The ground 
motion can also be defined by user-defined ground motion maps, which are used to 
define the hazard in all parts of this study. 
 
1.3.3.2 Inventory Module 
 
The inventory module contains data on the general building stock, essential facilities, 
transportation lifeline systems, utility lifeline systems, and high potential loss 
facilities.  The general building stock is composed of 36 model building types, which 
specifies the materials and construction of a building.  The buildings in HAZUS are 
assigned one of 33 occupancy classes, which define the building use, such as different 
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categories of residential, commercial, or industrial uses.  Data for individual buildings 
in the general building stock does not exist in HAZUS; instead, a square footage 
estimate for each building type-occupancy class combination is assigned to each 
census tract in the study region.  The inventory for essential facilities, such as 
schools, medical care facilities, and emergency response facilities contains data for 
each individual facility.  The data in HAZUS inventory for transportation lifeline 
systems includes the facilities and components of highway systems, railway systems, 
bus systems, ports, and airports.  Utility lifeline systems include electric power, waste 
and potable water systems, communications, and natural gas system components.   
 
1.3.3.3 Direct Damage Module 
 
The direct damage module uses output of the potential earth science hazard module 
and the data of the inventory module to estimate physical damage to the general 
building stock, essential facilities, transportation lifeline systems, utility lifeline 
systems, and high potential loss facilities.  The direct damage results are in the form 
of probabilities of each of the damage states (none, slight, moderate, extensive, and 
complete) for each type of building, facility, or system component.  For the general 
building stock, direct damage includes both structural and non-structural damage. 
 
1.3.3.4 Induced Damage Module 
 
The induced damage module estimates secondary events, such as fires, debris 
generated, and dam failure and the resulting inundation.  The debris estimate utilizes 
the damage results of the direct damage module and the building square footage of 
the inventory module.   
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1.3.3.5 Direct Social Losses Module 
 
The outputs of the direct social losses module are quantitative estimates of casualties, 
injuries, displaced households, and short-term shelter needs. The casualty and injury 
estimates are determined for the three earthquake event times: day, night, and 
commute time.  The results from this module are based on the results from direct 
damage module. 
 
1.3.3.6 Direct Economic Losses Module 
 
The direct economic loss module estimates direct economic consequences (repair and 
replacement costs) to repair the physical damage incurred to buildings and lifeline 
system components.  The economic loss estimates of this module depend on the 
damage estimated by the direct damage module. 
 
1.3.3.7 Indirect Losses Module 
 
The indirect losses module estimates the long-term economic consequences caused by 
the direct economic losses.  Such economic consequences include losses due to 
unemployment, reduced tax revenues, and lost income in the study region.  The 
estimates are based on a synthetic economy, which is an extremely simplified model 
of the regional economy.  The HAZUS Technical Manual recommends that changes 
to this module should involve input from an economist. 
 
1.3.4  Uncertainties in HAZUS Loss Estimation 
 
Every loss estimation methodology contains sources of uncertainty.  The uncertainties 
are due to approximations used for the analysis and the limited information known 
about earthquakes and the behavior of structures during such events.  Sources of 
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uncertainty in HAZUS include incomplete building, lifelines, or demographic 
inventories and estimated economic or fragility parameters.   
 
Large uncertainties are inherent in earthquake loss assessment; especially for the mid-
America region by any earthquake loss estimation methodology. This is because the 
available damage data from past earthquakes is all but nonexistent.  HAZUS has been 
calibrated using several earthquake scenarios in California.  In these cases, HAZUS 
has given reasonable estimates of total losses but has given less credible detailed 
results.  The detailed results are greatly affected by the accuracy of the inventory data.  
Although HAZUS can estimate damage to individual buildings, the damage results 
should be considered to be the average for a set of like buildings.  The default 
inventory for the lifelines are less complete than the inventory for the general 
building stock and are very simplified.  For example, there is no real pipeline data in 
the default utility system database.  The user must keep in mind that HAZUS may 
give more accurate loss estimates for some inventories than others (FEMA, 2006a). 
 
It is unlikely that the next earthquake to affect the region of interest will be the 
scenario earthquake that was utilized in any given loss estimation study. The 
magnitude, location, ground motions, and ground deformation will be different than 
what is predicted by a scenario event.  This is especially relevant in the study region 
of Illinois because events are very infrequent, and consequently the seismicity in the 
Mid-America region is not fully understood. 
 
Much uncertainty exists in the seismic resistance of the elements of the built 
environment in the study region.  The buildings and other structures were constructed 
over many years and consequently were designed under various building codes, 
which cause much uncertainty in the seismic resistance of the structures in the 
inventory.  The knowledge of building damage given ground motions is not complete, 
adding a level of uncertainty to the damage estimates.  In addition, the structural 
system (building type) is needed to assess damage.  In the case of the general building 
stock, in HAZUS, the number of buildings in each building type in a given census 
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tract are inferred from the number of buildings in each occupancy class.  The 
estimations in the conversion from occupancy class to building type with HAZUS add 
uncertainty to the damage estimates in this report.  
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2. Overview of the Inventory for the State of Illinois 
 
The State of Illinois contains 102 counties, 2,964 census tracts, and a land area 56,264 
square miles. The state has a population of over 12 million people and over 4.5 
million households.  HAZUS estimates that there are 3,551 buildings in the State of 
Illinois with a total building replacement value of $838 billion dollars, excluding 
contents.  Approximately 98.00 % of the buildings are associated with residential 
housing.  The replacement value of the transportation and utility lifeline systems is 
estimated to be $158 billion and $92.5 billion, respectively.  
 
2.1 General Building Stock 
 
Seventy-two percent of the general building inventory is of wood frame construction.   
The remaining 28% of the building inventory is distributed between the all other 
building types.  The distribution of the dollar exposure for the general building stock 
is shown in Table 1.  The replacement costs for residential, commercial, industrial, 
and institutional buildings were derived from RSMeans Square Foot Costs 2002 for 
(HAZUS TM Section 5.1.12.2).   
 
Table 1: Distribution of Building Stock Dollar Exposure 
Building Stock Dollar 
Exposure By General 
Occupancy (thousands of $) 
Residential 685,624,149 
Commercial 110,115,375 
Industrial 25,899,765 
Agriculture 1,843,178 
Religion 6,806,497 
Government 1,892,282 
Education 5,501,611 
Total 837,682,857 
 
 12
2.2 Critical Facilities 
 
HAZUS defines critical facilities in the two groups of essential facilities and high 
potential loss facilities.  Essential facilities include hospitals, medical clinics, schools, 
fire stations, police stations and emergency operations facilities.  High potential loss 
facilities include dams, levees, military installations, nuclear power plants and 
hazardous material sites.  
 
According to HAZUS, the State of Illinois has 227 hospitals in the region with a total 
bed capacity of 42,983 beds.  There are 5,283 schools, 1,007 fire stations, 866 police 
stations and 149 emergency operation facilities in Illinois. The HAZUS default 
inventory for the State of Illinois contains 1,255 dams. Of these, 154 of the dams are 
classified as ‘high hazard’. The HAZUS default dam database is from the National 
Inventory of Dams database (FEMA, 2006b).  The inventory also includes 4,870 
hazardous material sites and 7 nuclear power plants.  
 
The HAZUS default inventory for schools and medical facilities are shown for the 
State of Illinois in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.   
 
The HAZUS default inventory for fire stations and police stations are shown for the 
Figure 1: School Inventory 
 
Figure 2: Medical Facilities Inventory 
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State of Illinois in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.   
 
   
 
The HAZUS default inventory for facilities containing hazardous materials and 
emergency operation centers are shown for the State of Illinois in Figure 5 and Figure 
6, respectively.   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Fire Station Inventory 
 
Figure 4: Police Station Inventory 
 
Figure 5: Hazardous Materials Inventory 
 
Figure 6: Emergency Center Inventory 
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2.3 Lifeline Systems  
 
The lifeline inventory includes transportation and utility lifeline systems. The 
transportation system includes highways, railways, light rail, bus, ports, ferry and 
airports.  The utility system includes potable water, wastewater, natural gas, crude & 
refined oil, electric power and communications.  The total value of the lifeline 
inventory is over $250 billion.  The lifeline inventory includes approximately 23,285 
kilometers of highways, 22,854 bridges, and 530,795 kilometers of pipes.  When 
pipelines are not explicitly imported into the loss estimation tool, their length is 
calculated based on the total road length in the study region.   
 
2.3.1  Transportation Systems  
 
The transportation systems inventory is summarized in Table 2.  The highway 
transportation system contains nearly 23,000 highway segments and over 4,000 
highway bridges.  The highway system has the largest replacement value of all the 
transportation systems, followed by the airport transportation system.   
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Table 2: Transportation System Inventory 
Total 158,153.27 
Runways 705 24,321.65 
Subtotal 28,096.54 
Subtotal 983.49 
Airport Facilities 624 3,774.89 
Subtotal 2.42 
Port Facilities 438 983.49 
Subtotal 122.20 
Ferry Facilities 2 2.42 
Bus Facilities 101 122.20 
Tunnels 0 0.00 
Subtotal 129.67 
Facilities 0 0.00 
Segments 30 124.88 
Light Rail Bridges 38 4.80 
Tunnels 0 0.00 
Subtotal 12,645.61 
Facilities 285 689.64 
Segments 8,441 11,844.99 
Subtotal 116,173.34 
Railways Bridges 963 110.98 
Segments 4,333 95,066.33 
Tunnels 0 0.00 
Highway Bridges 22,854 21,107.01 
System # locations/
Component # Segments (millions of dollars)
Replacement value
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2.3.2  Utility Systems  
 
The utility systems inventory is summarized in Table 3.  No distribution lines or 
pipelines are included in the HAZUS default inventory for any of the utility systems.  
The largest and most costly of the utility systems is by far the wastewater system, 
which is followed by the electrical power system and the potable water system. 
 
Table 3: Utility System Inventory 
Subtotal 57.50 
Total 103,138.27 
Subtotal 18,681.30 
Communication Facilities 518 57.50 
Electrical Power Facilities 153 18,681.30 
Pipelines 0 0.00 
Subtotal 4.33 
Subtotal 2,198.20 
Oil Systems Facilities 39 4.33 
Facilities 62 75.01 
Pipelines 0 0.00 
Subtotal 67,943.95 
Natural Gas Distribution Lines NA 2,123.18 
Facilities 876 64,759.18 
Pipelines 0 0.00 
Subtotal 14,253.00 
Waste Water Distribution Lines NA 3,184.77 
Facilities 242 8,945.05 
Pipelines 0 0.00 
Potable Water Distribution Lines NA 5,307.95 
# Locations / Replacement value
System Component Segments (millions of dollars)
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3.  Hazard Characterization 
 
This chapter describes the scenario earthquake and the development of user-supplied 
ground motion maps that were used throughout this loss estimation study. 
 
3.1  Scenario Earthquake 
 
The scenario earthquake used 
for every section of this report 
was a magnitude 7.7 event and 
was located at 37.0597° N 
Latitude and 89.1212° W 
Longitude.  The top of the 
strike-slip rupture is at a depth 
of 5 km and the bottom of the 
rupture is at a depth of 15 km 
on the northeast fault segment 
(Cramer, 2006).  The scenario 
earthquake depth was taken to 
be the average of the top and 
bottom of rupture (i.e., 10 km).  
This scenario event location corresponds with the dot at the northern tip of the central 
theoretical fault in Figure 7.  This location was chosen because it is the closest 
location to the southern tip of Illinois on the theoretical faults; therefore is the likely 
to cause the most damage in the study region.   
 
 
Figure 7: Scenario Earthquake Location 
 18
3.2  Ground Motion Calculated by HAZUS 
 
HAZUS automatically cuts off the ground motion parameters (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 
second, and Sa at 1.0 second) to zero in all census tracts that are farther than 200 km 
from the earthquake epicenter in any deterministic scenario event.  Figure 8 illustrates 
the ground motion predicted by HAZUS using the scenario earthquake.  This cutoff 
does not follow the true behavior of the attenuation relationships.  The tracts with 
zero ground motion also contained errors in the estimated damage to essential 
facilities.  HAZUS estimated random damage probabilities to essential facilities for 
those tracts with zero ground motion.  Figure 8 illustrates the random damage pattern 
to essential facilities (police stations) in the census tracts with zero ground motion.  
The same random damage pattern occurred for all other types of essential facilities. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Ground Motion (PGA) Estimated by 
HAZUS 
Figure 9: Essential Facility (Police Station) 
Damage Estimated by HAZUS Using Ground 
Motion Estimated by HAZUS 
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3.3  Development of User-Defined Ground Motion Maps 
 
The issues of the 200 km attenuation cutoff and random damage patterns of the 
essential facilities far from the earthquake epicenter in HAZUS were solved by the 
development of user-defined ground motion maps.  The peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) resulting from the user-defined ground motion maps is shown in Figure 10, 
and the resulting damage to police stations is shown in Figure 11.  Note that the 
ground motion is greater than zero for the entire State of Illinois and that the damage 
to police stations is no longer random.  The damage prediction was corrected and 
follows the hazard.  The development of the user-defined ground motion maps is 
described in the following section of this report. 
 
A program was developed to create user-defined ground motion maps using the 
program MATLAB.  The inputs to the program were the census tract number, the 
distance from the earthquake to the centroid of the census tract, and the site class.   
The ground motion program was used to calculate the ground motion for the centroid 
of each census tract in Illinois.  The ground motion at the centroid was then applied to 
the entire tract and made into a map usable by HAZUS using ArcGIS.   
 
 
Figure 10: Ground Motion (PGA) using User-
Supplied Ground Motion Maps 
 
Figure 11: Essential Facility (Police Station) 
Damage using Ground Motion from User-
Defined Ground Motion Maps 
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3.3.1.1 Attenuation Relationships 
 
The CEUS Event attenuation relationship, as described in the Chapter 4 of the 
HAZUS Technical Manual was used (FEMA, 2006b).  The attenuation relationship is 
a weighted average of four individual relationships, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: CEUS Event Attenuation Relationships from HAZUS 
Atkinson and Boore (1997) 0.286
Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) 0.286
Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) 0.286
Campbell (2002) 0.142
CEUS Event
 
 
The resulting ground motions for each individual attenuation relationship in Table 4 
were compared with the ground motions produced by the same individual 
relationships in the HAZUS loss estimation tool.  The predicted ground motions from 
the program showed reasonable comparison with those from HAZUS, aside from the 
200 km cutoff used in HAZUS.  The individual attenuation comparisons are not 
presented in this report. 
 
The predicted ground motion for the combined CEUS Event attenuation relationship 
using the ground motion program was also compared to the ground motions predicted 
by HAZUS.  The comparison between the program and HAZUS for PGA, PGV, Sa at 
short periods, and Sa at 1.0 second periods are shown in Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 
14, and Figure 15, respectively.  Note that unlike the HAZUS ground motions, the 
user-defined motions do not drop to zero at the distance 200 km. 
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Figure 12: PGA for HAZUS vs. Ground Motion Program 
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Figure 13: PGV for HAZUS vs. Ground Motion Program 
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Figure 14: Sa at 0.3 Second for HAZUS vs. Ground Motion Program 
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Figure 15: Sa at 1.0 Second for HAZUS vs. Ground Motion Program 
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The short period spectral acceleration ground motion parameters for a period of 0.3 
second in HAZUS and for a period of 0.2 seconds in the ground motion program.  
This difference is due to the fact that HAZUS uses the spectral acceleration at 0.3 
second for short period 
response; however, the spectral 
acceleration at 0.2 second is 
readily available in the 
attenuation relationships that 
were used to develop the 
ground motion program. The 
response spectrum is flat 
between 0.3 and 0.2 seconds, as 
shown by the horizontal portion 
of the response spectrum in 
Figure 16.  Therefore, taking the spectral acceleration at a period of either 0.2 or 0.3 
second yielded equivalent results. The spectral acceleration at 0.2 seconds were used 
throughout this study. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Ground Motion Response Spectrum  
(FEMA, 2003) 
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3.3.1.2 Effects of Soil Site Condition 
 
A site class map was 
provided for the southern 
one-third of Illinois by the 
Illinois State Geological 
Survey (ISGS) (Bauer, 
2006).  The map specifies 
site classes A, B, C, D, E, 
and F.  All areas assigned to 
site class F were reassigned 
to site class E because 
HAZUS only uses site class 
A through E to modify ground motions.  The resulting site class map is shown in 
Figure 17.  The development of the site class map is discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
report. 
 
The user-defined ground motion program modifies the ground motions calculated by 
the attenuation relationships using the NEHRP site class factors for each site class.  
The NEHRP site class factors were used to modify the ground motions according to 
the following equations.  The procedure is a slightly modified version of that 
described in Chapter 3 of the NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2003). 
 
aBaSiaS FSS ,, =  
vBaia FSS ,1,1 =  
iaS
iaS
i STT
S
PGA ,
0
, 4.06.0 +=   is taken as iaSi SPGA ,4.0=  at T = 0 seconds. 
 
65.1/
2
4.386
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= aSPGV π  
 
Figure 17: Site Class Map Provided by ISGS 
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where: 
iaSS ,  = spectral acceleration at short periods at site class i 
BaSS ,  = spectral acceleration at short periods at site class B, given by 
attenuation relationships 
iaS ,1 = spectral acceleration at 1.0 second periods at site class i 
BaS ,1 = spectral acceleration at 1.0 second periods for at class B, given by 
attenuation relationships 
aF = short period site coefficient (NEHRP section 3.3.2) 
vF = long period site coefficient (NEHRP section 3.3.2) 
iPGA = peak ground acceleration at site class i 
 
 
3.4 Consideration of Liquefaction Effects 
 
Liquefaction maps input into 
HAZUS specify the liquefaction 
susceptibly for the study region.  
Liquefaction was not included in 
the ground motion program 
described in the previous 
sections.  The liquefaction 
susceptibility map used in this 
study is shown in Figure 18 
(FEMA, 2006c).  The 
liquefaction susceptibility 
indices, with increasing susceptibility to liquefaction, are “none”, “very low”, “low”, 
“moderate”, “high”, and “very high”.  HAZUS estimates permanent ground 
displacement using the liquefaction susceptibility index and the peak ground 
Figure 18: Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 
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acceleration in each census tract.  The procedure is outlined in Chapter 4 of the 
HAZUS Technical Manual.   
 
The liquefaction calculations described in the HAZUS Technical Manual were 
followed for a set of census tracts, and it was determined that the permanent ground 
displacement due to liquefaction is calculated correctly by HAZUS for all 
liquefaction susceptibility indices except “very low”.  For this index, HAZUS 
incorrectly estimates a permanent ground displacement of zero for any PGA value.  
To remedy this issue, all census tracts with a liquefaction susceptibility index of “very 
low” were assigned an index of “low”.  This slightly increased the liquefaction results 
in the affected tracts. 
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4. HAZUS Level 1 Analysis and Results 
 
A HAZUS level 1 analysis was completed using all default inventories and loss 
parameters; however the ground motion was improved and user-defined.  The 
analysis and results are described in the following sections. 
 
4.1 Seismic Hazard 
 
The user-defined ground motion was calculated using the method described in the 
Hazard Definition Chapter of this report.  The soil was assumed to be of uniform site 
class D throughout the entire study region.  This uniform soil condition is consistent 
with what HAZUS assumes for soils in a default analysis.  The maximum calculated 
values of PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.2 second, and Sa at 1.0 second in the study region are 
0.8395 g, 36.3875 inches/second, 2.0988 g, and 0.9763g, respectively.  The ground 
motion maps are shown in the figures below.  Figures 19 and 20 show maps of PGA 
and PGV, respectively. 
 
Figure 19: PGA from User-Supplied Ground 
Motion Maps 
Figure 20: PGV from User-Supplied Ground 
Motion Maps 
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Figures 21 and 22 show maps of Sa at a short period and 1.0 second period, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 21: Sa at 0.2 Second from User-
Supplied Ground Motion Maps 
Figure 22: Sa at 1.0 Second from User-
Supplied Ground Motion Maps 
 
 
4.2 Damage Estimates 
 
The damage estimated by HAZUS for the analysis with default inventories and 
parameters with user-supplied ground motion are described in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1  General Building Stock 
 
HAZUS estimates that about 51,537 buildings in the general building stock will be at 
least moderately damaged. This estimate is over 2% of the total number of buildings 
in the region. HAZUS estimated that 2,854 buildings in the State of Illinois that will 
be damaged beyond repair.  The estimated probabilities of reaching or exceeding the 
damage states of None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive, and Complete for each 
occupancy class in the HAZUS general building stock are given in Table 5.   
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Table 5: Expected Building Damage by Occupancy 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Agriculture 431 0.01 19 0.03 13 0.03 4 0.04 2 0.06
Commercial 40,504 1.29 676 1.18 510 1.39 174 1.45 37 1.29
Education 341 0.01 6 0.01 6 0.02 2 0.02 1 0.03
Government 1,367 0.04 44 0.08 36 0.10 12 0.10 5 0.17
Industrial 7,318 0.23 70 0.12 59 0.16 19 0.16 3 0.11
Other 368,538 11.73 16,501 28.92 21,785 59.43 8,100 67.33 1,544 54.08
Religion 2,120 0.07 51 0.09 39 0.11 16
Single Family 2,722,002 86.62 39,689 1,258 44.08
0.13 5 0.18
57,056 36,654
3,702 30.7769.56 14,206 38.76
12,030 2,854Total 3,142,619  
 
The estimated probabilities of reaching or exceeding the damage states for each 
general building type are given in Table 6.   
 
Table 6: Expected Building Damage by Building Type (All Design Levels) 
CompleteNone Slight Moderate Extensive
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Wood 2,322,418 73.90 24354 42.68 5,919 16.15 733 6.10 61 2.15
Steel 16,327 0.52 263 0.46 327 0.89 129 1.07 26 0.90
Concrete 31,102 0.99 832 1.46 738 2.01 239 1.99 34 1.18
Precast 5,450 0.17 71 0.12 91 0.25 47 0.39 8 0.29
RM 5,806 0.18 29 0.05 41 0.11 19 0.15 2 0.05
URM 660,813 21.03 16403 28.75 8,318 22.69 2,948 24.51 1,226 42.94
21,220 57.89 7,914 MH 100,703 3.20 15104 65.79 1,498 52.49
Total 3,142,619 57,056 36,654 12,030 2,854
26.47
 
 
4.2.2  Emergency Response and Essential Facilities 
 
The estimated damage and functionality for the default HAZUS inventory of essential 
facilities in the State of Illinois is summarized in Table 7.  The loss estimates for the 
individual types of essential facilities (i.e., medical facilities, schools, emergency 
centers, police stations, and fire stations) are described in the following sections. 
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Table 7: Expected Damage to Essential Facilities 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 227 16 7.0 1 0.4 206 90.7
Schools 5,283 91 1.7 9 0.2 5,127 97.0
EOCs 149 5 3.4 2 1.3 143 96.0
PoliceStations 866 36 4.2 6 0.7 805 93.0
FireStations 1,007 37 3.7 7 0.7 938 93.1
At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damate  > 50% on day 1
 With Functionality
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4.2.2.1 Medical Facilities 
 
HAZUS estimated that of the 227 hospitals 
in the State of Illinois, 16 would suffer at 
least moderate damage, and 21 of these 
hospitals would be less than 50% functional 
on the day of the earthquake.  Figure 23 
shows the probability of exceeding moderate 
structural damage and Figure 24 shows the 
estimated functionality for all medical 
facilities in Illinois.  The majority of damage 
and loss of functionality occur in the 
southern portion of the state. 
 
 
Of the estimated 42,983 hospital beds 
available for use in the State of Illinois, 
HAZUS estimates that about 80.5% of 
the total beds will be available for 
patients already in the hospitals and 
new patients that were injured by the 
earthquake on the day of the 
earthquake.  After one week, 86% of 
the beds were estimated to be back in 
service. By 30 days after the event, 
95% of the beds will be available.  Table 2 shows the number of beds available in 
Illinois at different time periods following the earthquake. 
 
Table 8: Expected Number of Hospital Beds Available in Illinois 
# of Beds % # of Beds % # of Beds % # of Beds % # of Beds %
34,597 80.5 34,650 80.6 37,015 86.1 40,763 94.8 41,680 97
At day 90
Number of Beds Available
At day 30At day 7At day 3At Day 1
 
 
Figure 23: Medical Facility Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Damage 
 
Figure 24: Medical Facility Functionality  
at Day 1 
 32
Figure 25 shows a plot of hospital bed recovery for the day of the earthquake, 3 days, 
7 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake. 
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Figure 25: Hospital Bed Availability Plot 
 
4.4.2.2 Schools  
 
HAZUS estimated that of the 
approximately 5,300 schools in the State of 
Illinois, 91 would suffer at least moderate 
damage, and about 160 of these schools 
would be less than 50% functional on the 
day of the earthquake.  Figure 26 shows 
the probability of exceeding moderate 
structural damage for schools in the State 
of Illinois.  Table 9 tabulates the 
functionality of schools on the day of the 
earthquake.  The majority of schools in northern Illinois were estimated to be 
Figure 26: School Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
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completely (100%) functional on the day of the earthquake because the ground 
motion is relatively small in the northern part of the state. 
 
Table 9 : Functionality of Schools at Day1 
Percent Functional Count Percent of Total
0 - 20% 99 1.9
20% - 40% 36 0.7
40% - 60% 62 1.2
60% - 80% 242 4.6
80% - 100% 4844 91.7
Functionality of Schools at Day 1
 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the restoration of school functionality.  The percent of the total 
number of schools with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of the earthquake, 3 
days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are plotted.   
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Figure 27: School Restoration Curve 
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4.2.2.3 Police Stations 
 
HAZUS estimated that of the 
approximately 870 police stations in the 
State of Illinois, 36 would suffer at least 
moderate damage.   About 60 of these 
police stations would be less than 50% 
functional on the day of the earthquake.  
Figure 28 shows the probability of 
exceeding moderate structural damage 
for police stations in the study region.  
Table 10 tabulates the functionality of 
police stations on the day of the 
earthquake.  Once again, nearly all of the police stations in northern Illinois are 
estimated to be fully functional on the day of the earthquake due to the small ground 
motions in the north. 
 
 
Table 10: Functionality of Police Stations at Day 1 
Percent Functional Count Percent of Total
0 - 20% 38 4.4
20% - 40% 14 1.6
40% - 60% 18 2.1
60% - 80% 53 6.1
80% - 100% 743 85.8
Functionality of Police Stations at Day 1
 
 
Figure 29 illustrates the restoration of police station functionality.  The percent of the 
total number of police stations with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of the 
earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
 
 
Figure 28: Police Station Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
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Figure 29: Police Station Restoration Curve 
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4.2.2.4 Fire Stations 
 
HAZUS estimated that of the 
approximately 1,007 fire stations in the 
State of Illinois, 37 would suffer at 
least moderate damage, and about 70 of 
these fire stations would be less than 
50% functional on the day of the 
earthquake.  Figure 30 shows the 
probability of exceeding moderate 
structural damage for fire stations in the 
State of Illinois.  Table 11 tabulates the 
functionality of fire stations on the day 
of the earthquake.  The fire stations that are by far the most likely to suffer damage 
and reduced functionality are those in the southern counties of the state because of 
their location relative to the earthquake epicenter. 
 
 
Table 11: Functionality of Fire Stations at Day 1 
Percent Functional Count Percent of Total
0 - 20% 40 4.0
20% - 40% 19 1.9
40% - 60% 21 2.1
60% - 80% 68 6.8
80% - 100% 859 85.3
Functionality of Fire Stations at Day 1
 
 
Figure 31 illustrates the restoration of fire station functionality.  The percent of the 
total number of fire stations with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of the 
earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
 
 
Figure 30: Fire Station Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
 37
Fire Station Restoration Curve
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time (days) after Earthquake
Pe
rc
en
t o
f F
ire
 S
ta
tio
ns
 a
t L
ea
st
 5
0%
 
Fu
nc
tio
na
l
 
Figure 31: Fire Station Restoration Curve 
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4.2.2.5 Emergency Centers 
 
HAZUS estimated that of the 149 
emergency centers in the State of 
Illinois, 5 would suffer at least moderate 
damage, and about 6 of these fire 
stations would be less than 50% 
functional on the day of the earthquake.  
Figure 32 shows the probability of 
exceeding moderate structural damage 
for fire stations in the State of Illinois.  
Table 12 tabulates the functionality of 
emergency centers on the day of the earthquake.  About three percent of the 
emergency centers in Illinois are expected to have significant damage, and about ten 
percent of the centers are expected to have significantly reduced functionality on the 
day of the earthquake. 
 
 
Table 12: Functionality of Emergency Centers at Day 1 
Percent Functional Count Percent of Total
0 - 20% 5 3.4
20% - 40% 1 0.7
40% - 60% 1 0.7
60% - 80% 10 6.8
80% - 100% 130 88.4
Functionality of Emergency Operation Centers at 
Day 1
 
 
Figure 33 illustrates the restoration of emergency center functionality.  The percent of 
the total number of emergency centers with a functionality of at least 50% on the day 
of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake 
are plotted.   
 
 
Figure 32: Emergency Center Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage
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Figure 33: Emergency Centers Restoration Curve 
 
 
4.2.3 Utility Systems 
 
The utility system facility damage, as estimated by HAZUS is summarized in Table 
13.  A relatively small number of utility system facilities—less than five percent of 
any utility inventory—suffer at least moderate structural damage, and no facilities are 
damaged beyond repair.  Nearly all of the utility system facilities are expected to be at 
least 50% functional one week after the earthquake.   
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Table 13: Expected Utility System Facility Damage 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 242 5 2.1 0 0.0 236 97.5 242 100.0
Waste Water 876 17 1.9 0 0.0 847 96.7 874 99.8
Natural Gas 62 3 4.8 0 0.0 59 95.2 62 100.0
Oil Systems 39 0 0.0 0 0.0 39 100.0 39 100.0
Electrical Power 153 2 1.3 0 0.0 151 98.7 153 100.0
Communication 518 6 1.2 0 0.0 517 99.8 518 100.0
After Day 7After Day 1
with Functionality > 50 %
At Least Moderate Complete Damate
 
 
 
Table 14 shows the total pipeline length, number of pipeline leaks, and number of 
pipeline breaks for the potable water, waste water, natural gas, and oil utility systems.  
Note that the HAZUS default inventory contains no oil pipelines, therefore no 
damage is estimated for that utility system in a HAZUS level 1 analysis. 
 
Table 14: Expected Utility System Pipeline Damage 
Number of 
BreaksLeaks
System Total Pipelines Number of
Potable Water 265,398 7825 1956
Length (kms)
Waste Water 159,239 6189 1547
Natural Gas 106,159 6616 1654
Oil 0 0 0  
 
The estimated performance of the potable water and electric power utility systems at 
various intervals after the earthquake is summarized in Table 15.  The performance of 
the water and electric systems are quantified by the number of households without 
service.  Less than 1% of the total households in Illinois are expected to be without 
potable water, and less than 1% of the households in the State are expected to be 
without electric power on the day of the earthquake.  The majority of repairs to the 
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water and electric utility system are estimated to be completed within one week of the 
earthquake.  These estimates are based on restoration curves within HAZUS. 
 
Table 15: Expected Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance 
Total # of 
Households
# of 
Facilities
% of 
Total
# of 
Facilities
% of 
Total
# of 
Facilities
% of 
Total
# of 
Facilities
% of 
Total
# of 
Facilitie
% of 
Total
Potable Water 13,141 0.29 5,836 0.13 1,761 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00
4,591,779
Electric Power 10,754 0.23 6,474 0.14 2,540 0.06 496 0.01 15 0.00
At Day 7At Day 3At Day 1 At Day 30 At Day 90
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4.2.3.1 Potable Water Utility System 
 
In addition to the potable water pipeline damage, the water facility damage was 
estimated.  The probability of exceeding moderate structural damage for each water 
facility in the study region can be seen in Figure 34, and the functionality of each 
facility on the day of the earthquake is shown in Figure 35.  The loss (repair cost), in 
thousands of dollars for each facility is shown on the map in Figure 36.  The total loss 
to the potable water facilities is estimated to be $87 million.  The estimated loss to the 
potable water distribution lines was $35 million.  This total estimated loss is less than 
one percent of the total value of the potable water utility system. 
 
 
Figure 34: Potable Water Facility Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
Figure 35: Potable Water Facility 
Functionality at Day 1 
 
Figure 36: Potable Water Facility Loss 
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Figure 37 illustrates the restoration of potable water facility functionality.  The 
percent of the total number of potable water facilities with a functionality of at least 
50% on the day of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after 
the earthquake are plotted.   
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Figure 37: Potable Water Facilities Restoration Curve 
 
4.2.3.2 Wastewater Utility System 
 
The estimated damage to wastewater facilities is illustrated.  The probability of 
exceeding moderate structural damage for each wastewater facility in the study region 
can be seen in Figure 38, and the functionality of each facility on the day of the 
earthquake is shown in Figure 39.  The loss (repair cost), in thousands of dollars for 
each facility is shown on the map in Figure 40.  The total loss to the wastewater 
facilities is estimated to be $880 million.  The total loss for the wastewater facilities 
distribution lines was estimated to be $27 million.  The total of these losses is 
approximately 1.3 percent of the total value of the wastewater utility system. 
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Figure 38: Wastewater Facility Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Figure 39: Wastewater Facility 
Functionality at Day 1 
 
Figure 40: Wastewater Facility Loss 
 
 
Figure 41 illustrates the restoration of waste water facility functionality.  The percent 
of the total number of waste water facilities with a functionality of at least 50% on the 
day of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the 
earthquake are plotted.   
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Waste Water Facility Restoration Curve
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Figure 41: Waste Water Facility Restoration Curve 
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4.2.3.3 Natural Gas Utility System 
 
The estimated damage to natural gas facilities is shown in the following figures.  The 
probability of exceeding moderate structural damage for each natural gas facility in 
the study region can be seen in Figure 42, and the functionality of each facility on the 
day of the earthquake is shown in Figure 43.  The loss (repair cost), in thousands of 
dollars for each facility is shown on the map in Figure 44.  The total loss to the 
natural gas facilities was estimated to be $1 million, and the total loss to the 
distribution lines was estimated to be $29 million.  These loss estimates sum to 
approximately 1.4 percent of the total value of the natural gas utility system. 
 
 
Figure 42: Natural Gas Facility Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
 
Figure 43:  Natural Gas Facility  
Functionality at Day 1 
 
Figure 44:  Natural Gas Facility Loss 
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Figure 45 illustrates the restoration of natural gas facility functionality.  The percent 
of the total number of natural gas facilities with a functionality of at least 50% on the 
day of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the 
earthquake are plotted.   
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Figure 45: Natural Gas Facility Restoration Curve 
 
4.2.3.4 Electric Power Facilities 
 
The estimated damage to electrical power facilities is shown in the following figures.  
The probability of exceeding moderate structural damage for each natural gas facility 
in the study region can be seen in Figure 46, and the functionality of each facility on 
the day of the earthquake is shown in Figure 47.  The loss (repair cost), in thousands 
of dollars for each facility is shown on the map in Figure 48.  The total loss to the 
electrical power facilities is estimated to be $101 million.  The damage to electric 
power lines are not estimated by HAZUS. 
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Figure 49 illustrates the restoration of electric power facility functionality.  The 
percent of the total number of electric power facilities with a functionality of at least 
50% on the day of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after 
the earthquake are plotted.   
 
Figure 46: Electric Power Facility Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Figure 47: Electric Power Facility 
Functionality at Day1 
 
Figure 48: Electric Power Facility Loss 
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Figure 49: Electric Power Facility Restoration Curve 
 
 
4.2.3.5 Communication Networks 
 
The estimated damage to the communication network facilities is shown in Figures 50 
through 52.  The probability of exceeding moderate structural damage for each 
communication facility in the study region can be seen in Figure 50, and the 
functionality of each facility on the day of the earthquake is shown in Figure 51.  The 
loss (repair cost), in thousands of dollars for each facility is shown on the map in 
Figure 52.  The total loss to the communication network facilities is estimated to be 
$0.5 million.  The damage to the communication lines is not estimated by HAZUS. 
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Figure 50: Communication Facility Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Figure 51: Communication Facility 
Functionality at Day 1 
 
Figure 52: Communication Facility Loss 
 
 
Figure 53 illustrates the restoration of communication facility functionality.  The 
percent of the total number of communication facilities with a functionality of at least 
50% on the day of the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after 
the earthquake are plotted.   
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Communication Facility Restoration Curve
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Figure 53: Communication Facility Restoration Curve 
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4.2.3.6 Total Losses to the Utility Lifeline System  
 
The total loss for the utility system inventory, including facilities and distribution 
lines, was estimated to be $1.16 billion.  The loss estimate was dominated by the 
$909 million loss to wastewater facilities and distribution lines.  This loss estimate for 
the wastewater system was much higher than that for any of the other utility systems 
because there are many more wastewater facilities than any other utility, and 
therefore much more inventory value for wastewater facilities, in the study region.  
Although the loss estimate for the wastewater system is so large, this estimate is only 
slightly over one percent of the total utility system inventory value.  This loss 
estimate is relatively low.  The loss ratios for all utility system components can be 
found in the direct economic losses section of this chapter. 
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4.2.4 Transportation Systems 
 
The estimated transportation system damage is summarized in Table 16.  Note that 
the damage for all road segments, railroad segments, and runways is zero.  The 
damage to road segments, as estimated by HAZUS, is based on the permanent ground 
deformation, which is a result of liquefaction.  The effect of liquefaction was not 
included in this preliminary HAZUS analysis, and the zero damage estimates to 
segments is due to the fact that liquefaction was not included.  The effects of 
liquefaction are discussed in Chapter 6 of this report. 
 
Table 16: Expected Damage to the Transportation System 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 4,333 0 0.0 0 0.0 4,269 98.5 4,269 98.5
Bridges 22,854 66 0.3 6 0.0 22,794 99.7 22,813 99.8
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Railways Segments 8,441 0 0.0 0 0.0 8,441 100.0 8,441 100.0
Bridges 963 0 0.0 0 0.0 963 100.0 963 100.0
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 285 3 1.1 0 0.0 282 98.9 285 100.0
Light Rail Segments 30 0 0.0 0 0.0 30 100.0 30 100.0
Bridges 38 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 100.0 38 100.0
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Bus Facilities 101 0 0.0 0 0.0 101 100.0 101 100.0
Ferry Facilities 2 2 100.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Port Facilities 438 11 2.5 0 0.0 427 97.5 434 99.1
Airport Facilities 624 2 0.3 0 0.0 623 99.8 623 99.8
Runways 705 0 0.0 0 0.0 705 100.0 705 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
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4.2.4.1 Highway Bridges, Segments, and Tunnels 
 
The estimated damage to highway 
bridges is shown on the map in Figure 
54 as the probability of exceeding 
moderate damage for each highway 
bridge in the inventory.  HAZUS 
estimates that 66 highway bridges 
suffer at least moderate damage.  The 
functionality of highway bridges is 
summarized in Table 17.  There are no 
estimates for highway tunnel damage because no tunnels exist in the HAZUS default 
inventory. 
 
Table 17: Functionality of Highway Bridges 
Percent Functional Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
60 - 70% 184 0.8 184 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
70% - 80% 0 0.0 0 0.0 184 0.8 184 0.8 0 0.0
80% - 90% 470 2.1 174 0.8 103 0.5 103 0.5 184 0.8
90% - 100% 22200 97.1 22496 98.4 22567 98.7 22567 98.7 22670 99.2
At Day 1
Functionality of Highway Bridges
At Day 90At Day 30At Day 7At Day 3
 
 
Figure 55 illustrates the restoration of highway bridge functionality.  The percent of 
the total number of highway bridges with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of 
the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
 
 
Figure 54: Highway Bridge  Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
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Highway Bridges Restoration Curve
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Figure 55: Highway Bridges Restoration Curve 
 
 
 
The damage to highway segments is 
shown on the map in Figure 56.  Note 
that the damage is zero for all highway 
segments because liquefaction was not 
included in this analysis.  The damage 
to roads depends only on the peak 
ground deformation, which is a result 
of liquefaction. 
 
 
The functionality of highway roads, as estimated by HAZUS, is shown in Table 18.  
A very small percentage of highways are not fully functional immediately after the 
earthquake.  The high functionality is due to the fact that liquefaction was not 
included in the level 1 analysis, and the peak ground deformation is estimated to be 
zero. 
 
Figure 56: Highway Segment Damage 
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Table 18 : Highway Road Functionality at Day 1  
Percent Functional km Percent of Total
60 - 70% 54 0.2
70% - 80% 0 0.0
80% - 90% 765 3.3
90% - 100% 22468 96.5
Highway Road Functionality at Day 1
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4.2.4.2 Railway Bridges, Segments, Tunnels, and Facilities 
 
The estimated damage to railway bridges is shown on the map in Figure 57.  The 
damage to railway segments is shown on the map in Figure 58.  HAZUS estimated 
that no railway bridges suffer at least moderate damage.  Note that the damage is zero 
for all railway segments because liquefaction was not included in this analysis.  This 
is similar to the roadway damage estimates.  There are no damage estimates for 
railway tunnel damage because no such tunnels exist in the HAZUS default 
inventory. 
 
 
Figure 57: Railway Bridge Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
 
Figure 58: Railway Segment Damage 
 
 
Figure 59 illustrates the restoration of railway facility functionality.  The percent of 
the total number of railway facilities with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of 
the earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
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Figure 59: Railway Facilities Restoration Curve 
 
4.2.4.3 Light Rail Bridges, Segments, Tunnels, and Facilities 
 
HAZUS estimates no damage to the components of the light rail transportation 
system because all segments are located in Northern Illinois in the Chicago 
Metropolitan area.  There are no damage estimates for light rail tunnels or light rail 
facilities because these are not included in the HAZUS default inventory. 
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4.2.4.4 Bus Facilities 
 
The estimated probability of exceeding 
moderate damage for all bus facilities 
in Illinois is shown in Figure 60.  
HAZUS estimated that no bus facilities 
will suffer at least moderate damage, so 
the bus transportation system will 
depend largely on the highway road 
and bridge conditions. 
 
 
4.2.4.4 Ports 
 
The estimated probability of exceeding 
moderate damage for all port facilities 
in Illinois is shown in Figure 61.  It was 
estimated that of the over 400 port 
facilities in the state of Illinois, 11 
facilities will suffer at least moderate 
damage. 
 
 
Figure 62 illustrates the restoration of port facility functionality.  The percent of the 
total number of port facilities with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of the 
earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
 
 
Figure 60: Bus Facility Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
 
Figure 61: Port Facility Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage 
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Figure 62: Port Facilities Restoration Curve 
 
 
 61
4.2.4.5 Airport Facility/Runway 
 
The estimated probability of exceeding 
moderate damage for all airport 
facilities in Illinois is shown in Figure 
63.  HAZUS estimated that two airports 
of the over 600 in the state of Illinois, 
two airports in the southern most part 
of Illinois would suffer at least 
moderate damage.  It was estimated 
there would be no runway damage 
because liquefaction was not included 
in this analysis, similar to the damage to highway segments and railway segments. 
 
Figure 64 illustrates the restoration of airport facility functionality.  The percent of the 
total number of airport facilities with a functionality of at least 50% on the day of the 
earthquake, 3 days, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are 
plotted.   
 
 
Figure 63: Airport Facility Damage 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
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Airport Facilities Restoration Curve
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Figure 64: Airport Facilities Functionality 
 
4.3 Social Losses 
 
4.3.1 Injuries and Casualties 
 
HAZUS gives estimates for four levels of injury severity.  The definition of the injury 
severities is given in Table 19.     
 
Table 19: Injury Severity Definitions in HAZUS (FEMA, 2006b) 
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Table 20 shows the number of injuries estimated to occur if the scenario earthquake 
occurred during the night (2 am), during the afternoon (2 pm), and during commute 
time (5 pm).  The total number of people estimated to seek medical aid (i.e., the 
number of people suffering from level 2 and level 3 injuries) is approximately 350 
people, 320 people, and 330 people if the scenario event occurred at 2 am, 2 pm, or 5 
pm, respectively.
 64
  
Table 20: Injury Estimates 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
2 AM Commercial 8 2 0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
0
Hotels 10 2 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
1
Other-Residential 666 124 11 20
Industrial 11 2 0
49
Total 1,506 314 37 70
Single Family 811 183 25
2 PM Commercial 614 131 16 31
Commuting 1 1 1 0
14
Hotels 2 0 0 0
Educational 231 53 7
4
Other-Residential 145 28 3 5
Industrial 83 18 2
13
Total 1,279 280 37 68
Single Family 204 48 7
5 PM Commercial 556 121 15 29
Commuting 10 13 22 4
2
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 36 7 1
3
Other-Residential 246 47 4 8
Industrial 52 11 1
20
Total 1,228 276 55 66
Single Family 325 76 11
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4.3.2 Uninhabitable Homes  
 
The number of uninhabitable homes is estimated using the number of displaced 
households as estimated by the loss estimation tool.  HAZUS estimated that over 
2,800 households would be displaced due to the scenario event and from these 
households, 860 people out of a total population of over 12 million would seek short 
term public shelter.  HAZUS assumes that a household consists of 2.5 people; 
therefore, about 12% of displaced people are expected to seek public shelter.  Table 
21 summarizes the shelter needs. 
 
Table 21: Shelter Needs 
Number % of Households Number % of Population
2,876 0.06 860 0.01
Shelter Needs
Displaced Households People Needing Short Term Shelter
 
 
 
4.3.3 Uninhabitable Commercial and Public Buildings  
 
Commercial and public buildings are those that are assigned the Commercial, 
Education, or Government HAZUS occupancy classes.  It was assumed that an 
uninhabitable building is a building in which the structural damage reaches or 
exceeds the Moderate Limit State.  The total number uninhabitable commercial 
buildings is 721, and total number uninhabitable public buildings is 63 (the total of 
Education and Government occupancy classes). 
 
Table 22: Uninhabitable Commercial and Public Buildings 
Occupancy 
# of 
Buildings
% of 
Occupancy 
# of 
Buildings
% of 
Occupancy 
# of 
Buildings
% of 
Occupancy 
# of 
Buildings
% of 
Occupancy 
Commercial 510 1.22 174 0.42 37 0.09 721 1.72
Education 6 1.69 2 0.56 1 0.28 9 2.53
Government 36 2.46 12 0.82 5 0.34 53 3.62
TotalCompleteExtensiveModerate
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4.4 Economic Loss Estimates 
 
The loss estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation 
systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
4.4.1 General Building Stock 
 
The building-related economic loss estimates include both income losses and capital 
stock losses.  Included in the income losses are wage losses, capital-related losses, 
rental losses, and relocation losses.  These losses include business interruption losses 
and the losses associated with inability to operate a business because of the damage 
sustained during the earthquake.  Similarly, included in the capital stock losses are 
losses due to structural damage, non-structural damage, content damage, and 
inventory damage.  These include estimated costs to repair or replace the damage 
caused to the building and its contents.  The income losses and capital stock losses for 
buildings are summarized in Table 23.  The losses are subdivided into occupancy 
classes.  The majority of income losses (about 70% of the total income loss) occur in 
the commercial occupancy class.  Most of the capital stock losses occur in the 
residential occupancies of Single Family Homes and Other Residential (about 60% of 
the total capital stock losses).  The greatest loss within the capital stock losses is the 
loss due to non-structural damage. 
 
Table 23: Building-Related Economic Loss Estimates 
(Millions of dollars) 
792.76 
Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Total
756.23 
Category Area Commercial Industrial Others
Income Loses
Wage 0.00 4.27 94.68 2.73 6.91 108.59 
Capital-Related 0.00 1.86 77.57 1.77 1.99 83.19 
Rental 32.87 31.59 42.19 0.95 3.16 110.77 
Relocation 3.66 1.34 2.73 0.11 0.99 8.83 
5.56 13.06 311.38 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 36.53 39.06 217.17 
Structural 152.78 107.22 99.66 14.93 28.10 402.69 
Non_Structural 464.03 294.61 180.90 29.32 57.61 1,026.47 
Content 139.42 52.16 73.08 17.19 25.43 307.28 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 3.10 3.76 0.66 7.52 
Subtotal 453.99 356.73 65.20 111.80 1,743.96 
Total 493.05 573.91 70.77 124.86 2,055.35 
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4.4.2 Lifeline Systems 
 
HAZUS does not compute losses due to business interruption due to lifeline outages 
for the transportation and utility systems. The loss estimation tool estimates only the 
repair costs for each transportation and utility lifeline system component.  This differs 
from the loss estimates for buildings.  The direct economic losses to the lifeline 
systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
4.4.2.1 Transportation Systems 
 
Table 24 summarizes the losses (repair costs) for the transportation system 
components, and Table 25 summarizes the losses (repair costs) for the utility system 
components.  The total loss for the transportation systems is estimated to be $211 
million.  The largest contribution to the total loss estimate is from the losses due to 
the damage of highway bridges.  The highway bridge losses dominate because of the 
significantly large number of bridges in the inventory.   
 
The loss to segments is very low because damage to segments depends on peak 
ground deformation, which results from liquefaction.  Liquefaction was not accounted 
for in the level 1 analysis.   
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Table 24: Transportation System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars) 
Total
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Loss Ratio (%)
Highway Segments 95,066.33 1.00 0.00
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss
Bridges 21,107.01 109.13 0.52
Tunnels 0.00 0.00 0.00
116173.34 109.13
Railways Segments 11,844.99 0.00 0.00
Bridges 110.98 0.18 0.16
Tunnels 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 689.64 11.02 1.60
12645.61 11.19
Light Rail Segments 124.88 0.00 0.00
Bridges 4.80 0.00 0.00
Tunnels 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 0.00 0.00 0.00
129.67 0.00
Bus Facilities 122.20 1.59 1.30
122.20 1.59
Ferry Facilities 2.42 2.42 100.00
2.42 2.42
Port Facilities 983.49 27.59 2.80
983.49 27.59
Airport Facilities 3,774.89 59.57 1.58
Runways 24,321.65 0.00 0.00
28096.54 59.57
158153.27 211.49
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4.4.2.2 Utility Systems 
 
The losses to the utility systems inventory in the State of Illinois are summarized 
below.  The total loss to the utility systems is estimated to be $1.16 billion, with over 
half of that coming from the wastewater utility system.  The estimated loss to all 
pipelines is zero because HAZUS does not assign a replacement cost to the pipeline 
inventories.  Table 25 summarizes the utility system economic losses.   
 
Table 25: Utility System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars) 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%) 
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 8,945.05 87.64 0.98
Distribution 5,307.95 35.21 0.66
Subtotal 14,253.00 122.85
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 64,759.18 880.60 1.36
Distribution 3,184.77 27.85 0.87
Subtotal 67,943.95 908.45
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 75.01 1.00 1.33
Distribution 2,123.18 29.77 1.40
Subtotal 2,198.20 30.77
Oil Systems Pipelines 0.00 0.00 0.00
Facilities 4.33 0.01 0.26
Subtotal 4.33 0.01
Electrical Power Facilities 18,681.30 101.59 0.54
Subtotal 18,681.30 101.59
Communication Facilities 57.50 0.52 0.90
Subtotal 57.50 0.52
Total 103,138.27 1,164.19  
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4.5 Indirect Losses 
 
HAZUS estimates the long-term economic impacts to the region for 15 years after the 
earthquake. The long-term economic impacts information is in terms of income and 
employment changes in the study region.  The economic impacts with outside aid are 
summarized in Table 26.  Values in parentheses indicate gains, as opposed to losses.  
HAZUS estimated that by five years after the earthquake, there would be no 
remaining negative income impact, and by six years after the earthquake, there would 
be no remaining negative employment impact. 
 
Table 26: Indirect Economic Impact with Outside Aid 
(Employment as # of people and Income in millions of $) 
LOSS Total %
First Year
Employment Impact 2,537,366 67.27
Income Impact 11,646 4.99
Second Year
Employment Impact 847,779 22.48
Income Impact 5,751 2.46
Third Year
Employment Impact 18,972 0.50
Income Impact 1,486 0.64
Fourth Year
Employment Impact 1,070 0.03
Income Impact 20 0.01
Fifth Year
Employment Impact 58 0.00
Income Impact (62) -0.03
Years 6 to 15
Employment Impact 0 0.00
Income Impact (67) -0.03  
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4.6 Induced Damage and Secondary Disasters 
 
4.6.1 Dam and Dike Failures  
 
Dam and dike failures are not analyzed by HAZUS unless inundation maps are 
provided.  Inundation maps have not been provided for this Level 1 analysis. 
 
4.6.2 Fire Following Earthquake 
 
HAZUS estimates that 
there will be 19 fire 
ignitions, and these 
fires will burn 
approximately 0.18 
square miles.  This area 
is less than 0.01% of 
the entire study region 
area.  The fire is 
expected to burn about 
$1.6 million of 
building value.  The 
results of the Fire Following Earthquake Module are summarized in Table 27 and 
Figure 65.   
 
Table 27: Fire Following Earthquake Module Results 
Fire Following Earthquake 
Number of Ignitions Population Exposed Value Exposed (thous. $) 
19 27 1,621 
  
 
 
Figure 65: Fire Demand (gpm) 
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4.6.3 Hazardous Material Release  
 
HAZUS does not estimate the likelihood of hazardous material spills unless a large 
amount of user-supplied data is provided.  According to the HAZUS Technical 
Manual, there exist no usable methodologies to predict hazardous materials release 
that could be incorporated into the HAZUS methodology. 
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4.6.4 Debris 
 
HAZUS estimates two types of 
debris generated by the scenario 
earthquake: 1) Brick, Wood and 
Others and 2) Concrete and Steel.  
This distinction is made because 
of the different types of material 
handling equipment required to 
remove the debris.  HAZUS 
estimates that it will require 
approximately 40,000 truckloads 
(at 25 tons/truck) to remove the debris generated by the scenario event.  The 
distribution of total debris is mapped in Figure 66.   
 
 
Table 28: Debris Totals 
Debris (thousands of tons) 
Brick,  Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total 
795 661 1,456 
 
 
Figure 66: Total Debris Distribution 
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4.7 Summary of Losses  
 
 
HAZUS estimated that the total economic loss to the State of Illinois caused by the 
scenario event is approximately $3.4 billion.  This total includes $1.74 billion in 
building-related capital stock losses, $311 million in building-related income losses, 
$212 million in transportation system direct economic losses, and $1.16 billion in 
utility system direct economic losses.   
 
The loss estimate for the utilities lifeline system is likely underestimated because the 
damage to pipelines was not calculated by this HAZUS level 1 analysis.  Similarly, 
the loss estimate for the transportation system is likely underestimated because 
HAZUS does not estimate damage to road or railway segments unless liquefaction is 
included in the analysis.  In addition, no tunnels or light rail facilities are contained in 
the HAZUS default transportation systems inventory.  The light rail system 
components that do exist in the HAZUS inventory are concentrated in the Chicago 
Metropolitan area, so it would be unlikely that an earthquake in the NMSZ would 
damage the light rail facilities even if they were included in the HAZUS default 
inventory.  The losses to the communication system are also likely underestimated 
because HAZUS does not estimate damage to electric power lines or any type of 
communication lines.  In addition, the losses to the telephone communication system 
were not estimated because they are not contained in the HAZUS default inventory.   
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5. Effects of Soil Site Condition 
 
This chapter describes a HAZUS analysis in which the effects of local site class were 
used in the ground motion calculations.  The resulting damage and loss estimates are 
also described. 
 
5.1 Soil Site Classes in Illinois 
 
A site class map for the southern 
one-third of Illinois was provided 
by the Illinois State Geological 
Survey (Bauer, 1999).  The map 
is pictured in Figure 67.  The 
mapped soil types are soft soils, 
stiff soils, very dense soils and 
soft rock, rock, and hard rock.  
The site classes were determined 
using shear wave velocities for 
the surficial soil materials.  Existing three-dimensional maps and base geological 
maps of the surficial soils, when available, were included in the study used to develop 
the soil maps (Bauer, 1999). 
 
The NEHRP site class factors were used to account for site class effects.  The factors 
were implemented into the ground motion program, as described in the hazard section 
of this report.   
 
Figure 67: Site Classes for Southern Illinois 
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Because the soil maps provided by 
ISGS specified site classes only 
the southern one-third of Illinois, 
the effect of the site class was only 
studied for counties lying within 
that region.  The counties that 
were studied for the effects of site 
class are pictured in Figure 68.   
 
 
 
5.2 Site Class Effects for Southern Illinois 
 
The size of this study region of 279 census tracts in southern Illinois is 12,982 square 
miles.  According to the HAZUS general building stock inventory, there are 
approximately 440,000 households with over 1.1 million people.  The total 
replacement cost in the HAZUS general building stock inventory is estimated to be 
approximately 60 billion dollars for over 360,000 total buildings.  A vast majority 
(99%) of the general building stock is residential housing.  The total value of the 
transportation systems and the utility systems are $30 billion and $22 billion, 
respectively. 
 
The HAZUS inventory of Essential Facilities contains 45 hospitals, 587 schools, 
188 fire stations, 154 police stations and 26 emergency operation centers.  The 
hospitals are estimated to have a capacity of 5,157 beds. 
 
Figure 68: Counties Studied for Site Class Effects 
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5.2.1 Ground Motion 
 
The ground motion program discussed in the Hazard Definition chapter of this report 
was used to calculate the PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second for each 
census tract in the study region.  This was done for both the study region with the 
local site classes and the study region with a uniform site class D because HAZUS 
assumes a uniform site class D for the entire study region as a default if no site class 
maps are imported.  The scenario with a uniform site class D mimics a HAZUS 
default analysis.  The ground motion maps (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 
1.0 second) for the study region with a uniform site class D are shown in Figures 69 , 
70, 71, and 72 respectively.   
 
Figure 69: PGA, Constant Soil Type D 
 
 
Figure 70: PGV, Constant Soil Type D 
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Figure 71: Sa at 0.3 Second, Constant Soil Type D 
 
Figure 72: Sa at 1.0 Second, Constant Soil Type D 
 
The ground motion was computed for the same study region using the local site 
classes provided by ISGS (Bauer, 1999).  The effects of site classes are compared 
with an analysis of a uniform site class D.  According to the NEHRP Provisions 
(FEMA, 2003), the ground motion amplification factors are higher for site class D 
than for site classes A, B, and C because these soil types are stiffer than type D.  The 
ground motion amplification factor is higher for site class E than for site class D 
because soil type E is less stiff than type D.  Therefore, only portions of the study 
region with site class E soils will have larger ground motion parameters than the 
default site class D analysis, and the portions of the study region with site classes A, 
B, or C will have smaller ground motion parameters than the default run.  Figure 73 
shows the locations of type E soils, and Figure 74 shows the locations of type A, B, or 
C soils.   
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Figure 73: Locations of Site Class E  
(Ground Motion Expected to Increase) 
Figure 74: Locations of Site Classes A, B, or C 
(Ground Motion Expected to Decrease) 
 
 
The resulting ground motion maps are shown in Figures 75, 76, 77, and 78 for PGA, 
PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second, respectively.  It was expected that 
damage reduced in the case that the site class effects were included because the 
ground motion was reduced over a majority of the study region. 
 
 80
Figure 75: PGA Accounting for Local Site Effects Figure 76: PGV Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Figure 77: Sa at 0.3 Second Accounting for 
Local Site Effects 
Figure 78: Sa at 1.0 Second Accounting for 
Local Site Effects 
 
Many census tracts contained soil of site class A, B, or C, so the ground motion was 
actually reduced for those tracts when compared with the default case with uniform 
site class D.  Therefore, many loss estimates are reduced due to the reduced ground 
motion. 
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5.2.2 Damage Estimates 
 
The damage estimates from HAZUS for the case with a uniform site class D and the 
case including the local site effects on the ground motion are compared in this 
section. 
 
5.2.2.1 General Building Stock 
 
The damage estimates for the general building stock are summarized in Tables 29 and 
30 for the HAZUS analyses excluding and including site class effects, respectively.  
The number of buildings that suffered no damage and complete damage increased by 
about 8% and 29%, respectively, when the effects of local site conditions were 
considered.  The number of buildings that were extensively damaged and moderately 
damaged decreased by about 48% and 27%, respectively, when the local site effects 
were considered.   
 
Table 29: Building Damage by Occupancy, Uniform Site Class D 
12,008 2,854Total 265,938 50,252 35,392
3,698 30.79 1,258 44.09
0.13 5 0.18
Single Family 245,034 92.14 36,656 72.94 13,941 39.39
0.09 38 0.11 16Religion 154 0.06 45
8,084 67.32 1,543 54.08
0.16 3 0.11
Other Residential 19,091 7.18 12,850 25.57 20,810 58.80
0.11 56 0.16 19Industrial 118 0.04 55
12 0.10 5 0.17
0.02 1 0.03
Government 77 0.03 37 0.07 35 0.10
0.01 6 0.02 2Education 15 0.01 6
174 1.45 37 1.29
0.03 2 0.06
Commercial 1,424 0.54 591 1.18 495 1.40
Count (% )
Agriculture 25 0.01 11 0.02 11 0.03 4
Count (% ) Count (% )Count (% ) Count (% )
Slight Moderate Extensive CompleteNone
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Table 30: Building Damage by Occupancy, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
6,267 3,685Total 286,937 44,849 24,706
2,306 36.80 1,646 44.66
0.13 6 0.17
Single Family 257,200 89.64 29,417 65.59 10,018 40.55
0.09 26 0.11 8Religion 176 0.06 41
3,834 61.18 1,979 53.70
0.17 4 0.11
Other Residential 27,577 9.61 14,752 32.89 14,236 57.62
0.10 38 0.16 10Industrial 153 0.05 45
6 0.10 4 0.11
0.02 1 0.04
Government 93 0.03 37 0.08 27 0.11
0.01 4 0.02 1Education 17 0.01 5
99 1.58 43 1.16
0.02 2 0.06
Commercial 1,685 0.59 542 1.21 351 1.42
Count (% )
Agriculture 36 0.01 8 0.02 5 0.02 2
Count (% ) Count (% )Count (% ) Count (% )
None Moderate CompleteSlight Extensive
 
 
5.2.2.2 Essential Facilities 
 
In the case that local site effects were considered, 5 fewer hospitals, 48 fewer schools, 
2 fewer emergency operation centers, 13 fewer police stations, and 15 fewer fire 
stations were expected to suffer at least moderate damage.  The reduction in damage 
to essential facilities occurred because the ground motion parameters for many census 
tracts reduced when the site class effects were included.  The ground motion reduced 
when soil site effects were included because the soil types in the majority of census 
tracts were A, B, or C (see Figure 74).  The ground motion reduced in these regions 
because the soils are stiffer than site class D, which is used in a default HAZUS 
analysis.  The expected damage to essential facilities is summarized in Tables 31 and 
32 for the uniform site class D and for the local site effects, respectively. 
 
Table 31: Damage to Essential Facilities, Uniform Site Class D 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 45 16 35.6 1 2.2 24 53.3
Schools 587 91 15.5 9 1.5 431 73.4
EOCs 26 5 19.2 2 7.7 20 76.9
PoliceStations 154 36 23.4 6 3.9 93 60.4
FireStations 188 37 19.7 7 3.7 119 63.3
 With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
With at Least With
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Table 32: Damage to Essential Facilities, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 45 11 24.4 1 2.2 28 62.2
Schools 587 43 7.3 18 3.1 434 73.9
EOCs 26 3 11.5 2 7.7 19 73.1
PoliceStations 154 23 14.9 8 5.2 105 68.2
FireStations 188 22 11.7 10 5.3 142 75.5
 With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
With at Least With
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5.2.2.3 Transportation Systems 
 
The number of highway bridges expected to suffer moderate damage and complete 
damage increased by 45 and 18 bridges, respectively, when local site effects were 
considered.  The number of railway bridges and facilities expected to be at least 
moderately damaged increased from zero to five and three to five, respectively, when 
site class effects were added.  The same number of port facilities and airport facilities 
were expected to suffer at least moderate damage in both cases.  Tables 33 and 34 
show the expected damage to the transportation system lifelines for the case in which 
site classes are not considered and the case in which site classes are considered, 
respectively. 
 
Table 33: Damage to Transportation Systems, Uniform Site Class D 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 816 0 0.0 0 0.0 807 98.9 807 98.9
Bridges 4,810 66 1.4 6 0.1 4,750 98.8 4,769 99.1
Railways Segments 1,658 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,658 100.0 1,658 100.0
Bridges 163 0 0.0 0 0.0 163 100.0 163 100.0
Facilities 55 3 5.5 0 0.0 52 94.5 55 100.0
Light Rail Segments 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Bus Facilities 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Port Facilities 92 11 12.0 0 0.0 81 88.0 88 95.7
Airport Facilities 81 2 2.5 0 0.0 80 98.8 80 98.8
Runways 99 0 0.0 0 0.0 99 100.0 99 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
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Table 34: Damage to Transportation Systems, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 816 0 0.0 0 0.0 807 98.9 807 98.9
Bridges 4,810 111 2.3 24 0.5 4,706 97.8 4,763 99.0
Railways Segments 1,658 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,658 100.0 1,658 100.0
Bridges 163 5 3.1 0 0.0 158 96.9 158 96.9
Facilities 55 5 9.1 0 0.0 52 94.5 55 100.0
Light Rail Segments 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Bus Facilities 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Port Facilities 92 11 12.0 0 0.0 81 88.0 92 100.0
Airport Facilities 81 2 2.5 0 0.0 80 98.8 81 100.0
Runways 99 0 0.0 0 0.0 99 100.0 99 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
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5.2.2.4 Utility Systems 
 
Tables 35 and 36 show the expected utility system damage when a uniform site class 
D is assumed and when local site effects are considered.  The number of potable 
water facilities, waste water facilities, natural gas facilities, and communication 
facilities that are expected to be at least moderately damaged due to the scenario 
event each decreased when local site effects were considered.  The number of oil 
system facilities and electrical power facilities that are expected to be at least 
moderately damaged remained the same between the two cases. 
 
Table 35: Utility System Damage, Uniform Site Class D 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 50 5 10.0 0 0.0 44 88.0 50 100.0
Waste Water 233 17 7.3 0 0.0 204 87.6 231 99.1
Natural Gas 14 3 21.4 0 0.0 11 78.6 14 100.0
Oil Systems 12 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 12 100.0
Electrical Power 22 2 9.1 0 0.0 20 90.9 22 100.0
Communication 99 6 6.1 0 0.0 98 99.0 99 100.0
with Functionality > 50 %
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With
 
 
 
Table 36: Utility System Damage, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 50 1 2.0 0 0.0 49 98.0 50 100.0
Waste Water 233 14 6.0 0 0.0 202 86.7 231 99.1
Natural Gas 14 2 14.3 0 0.0 12 85.7 14 100.0
Oil Systems 12 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 12 100.0
Electrical Power 22 2 9.1 0 0.0 19 86.4 22 100.0
Communication 99 5 5.1 0 0.0 98 99.0 99 100.0
with Functionality > 50 %
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With
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The expected utility system pipeline damage is shown in Tables 37 and 38 for the 
cases in which uniform site class D is assumed for the entire region and the local site 
effects are considered.  The number of expected leaks and breaks increased by about 
7.5% for each the potable water, waste water, and natural gas systems when site class 
effects are added to the analysis. 
 
Table 37: Utility System Pipeline Damage, Uniform Site Class D 
Natural Gas 22,945 5210 1303
Waste Water 34,418 4874 1219
Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 57,363 6163 1541
System
Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
  
 
 
Table 38: Utility System Pipeline Damage, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
System
Natural Gas 22,945 5603 1401
Waste Water 34,418 5242 1310
Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 57,363 6627 1657
Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
  
 
The number of households without potable water and electric power service one day, 
three days, seven days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are shown in Tables 
39 and 40.  The number of households without potable water on the day of the 
earthquake increases by approximately 7% when the site class effects are included in 
the ground motion calculations.  The number of households estimated to be without 
electric power decreased by about 17% when the effects of local soil conditions were 
considered. 
 88
Table 39: Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance,  
Uniform Site Class D 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 13,138 3.0 5,834 1.3 1,757 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0
438,310
Electric Power 10,754 2.5 6,474 1.5 2,540 0.6 495 0.1 15 0.0
Households without Service
At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30 At Day 90
 
 
 
Table 40: Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance,  
Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 14,081 3.2 11,051 2.5 7,088 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0
438,310
Electric Power 8,935 2.0 5,474 1.2 2,152 0.5 402 0.1 12 0.0
Households without Service
At Day 90At Day 30At Day 7At Day 3At Day 1
 
 
 
5.2.2.5 Fire Following Earthquake 
 
When a uniform soil type D was assumed, the Fire Following Earthquake (FFE) 
model in HAZUS estimated that 17 total ignitions will burn about 0.10 square mile of 
the study region’s total area.  The model also estimates that the fires will displace 
about 34 people.   When the local site effects were considered in the ground motion 
calculations, the FFE model estimated that 13 total ignitions will burn about 0.09 
square mile of the study region’s total area.  The model estimated that the fires will 
displace about 10 people.  The effects of fire were estimated to slightly decrease 
when site class effects were considered due to decreased PGA. 
 
5.2.2.6 Debris 
 
In the case that a uniform soil type D was assumed, HAZUS estimated that a 1.00 
million tons of debris will be generated. Of the total amount, Brick and Wood 
comprises 54% of the total, with the remainder being Concrete and Steel debris.  In 
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the case that the local site effects were used in the ground motion calculations, 
HAZUS estimated that the same amount of total debris would be generated, and 53% 
of that total would be brick and wood debris. 
 
5.2.3 Social Losses  
 
Social losses include the number of displaced households, people seeking public 
shelters, injuries, and casualties.  The social loss estimates from HAZUS are 
discussed in this section. 
 
5.2.3.1 Displaced Households 
 
In the case that a default site class D was assumed, HAZUS estimated that 2,875 
households will be displaced due to the scenario earthquake.  From these households, 
859 people were predicted to seek public shelter.  When site class effects were 
included, HAZUS estimated that 3,068 households will be displaced, and from these 
households, 894 people will seek public shelter.  The reason the number of displaced 
people increased when site class effects were added was because the number of 
completely damage buildings increased. 
 
5.2.3.2 Injuries and Casualties 
 
Tables 41 and 42 show the number of casualties estimated to occur by HAZUS when 
site class effects are ignored and when site class effects are considered, respectively.  
The injuries are estimated in the cases that the earthquake would occur at 2 AM, 2 
PM, and 5 PM.  For each earthquake occurrence time, the number of level 1 injuries 
decreased and the number of levels 2, 3, and 4 increased when the site class effects 
were added to the ground motions.  The number of level 1 injuries were estimated to 
decrease by 6.6%, 5.8%, and 5.6% at 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively, when 
local soil effects were considered.  The number of level 2 injuries increased by 8.0%, 
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8.6%, and 10.1% at the earthquake occurrence times 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, 
respectively.  The level 3 injuries were estimated to increase by 18.9% for both 2 AM 
and 2PM and were estimated to increase by 24.0% at 5 PM.  Finally, the number of 
casualties (level 4 injuries) were estimated to increase by 20%, 20.6%, and 21.2% at 
the earthquake occurrence times 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively, when local site 
effects were included in the loss estimation. 
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Table 41: Casualty Estimates, Uniform Site Class D 
20
Total 1,215 275 54 66
Single Family 322 76 11
3
Other-Residential 242 46 4 8
Industrial 51 11 1
2
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 36 7 1
15 29
Commuting 10 13 21 4
5 PM Commercial 551 121
13
Total 1,266 279 37 68
Single Family 202 48 7
4
Other-Residential 143 28 3 5
Industrial 82 18 2
14
Hotels 2 0 0 0
Educational 230 53 7
16 31
Commuting 1 1 1 0
2 PM Commercial 607 130
49
Total 1,489 313 37 70
Single Family 804 183 25
1
Other-Residential 656 124 11 20
Industrial 11 2 0
0
Hotels 10 2 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 8 2
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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Table 42: Casualty Estimates, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
25
Total 1,147 303 67 80
Single Family 327 88 14
5
Other-Residential 202 44 4 8
Industrial 61 16 2
1
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 20 4 1
19 35
Commuting 12 18 27 5
5 PM Commercial 522 132
16
Total 1,192 303 44 82
Single Family 199 54 8
7
Other-Residential 122 27 3 5
Industrial 98 26 4
18
Hotels 2 1 0 0
Educational 218 59 9
19 36
Commuting 1 1 1 0
2 PM Commercial 553 135
62
Total 1,390 338 44 84
Single Family 813 212 31
1
Other-Residential 548 118 11 20
Industrial 13 3 0
0
Hotels 9 3 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 7 2
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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5.2.4 Economic Loss Estimates 
 
The loss estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation 
systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
5.2.4.1 General Building Stock 
 
The building related economic losses are shown in Tables 43 and 44 for each site 
class scenario.  The economic losses decreased by about 16% when the site classes 
were considered in the ground motion estimates for each type of building related loss 
and each general occupancy class.   
 
Table 43: Building Related Economic Losses, Uniform Site Class D  
(Millions of Dollars) 
61.80 108.86 1,700.55 
Total 774.83 484.07 560.03 67.23 121.71 2,007.88 
Subtotal 738.67 445.32 345.90 
16.06 24.52 295.70 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 2.95 3.51 0.60 7.07 
Content 134.62 50.90 69.60 
14.54 27.46 394.84 
Non_Structural 454.26 289.29 175.43 27.69 56.27 1,002.94 
Structural 149.79 105.12 97.92 
5.43 12.85 307.33 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 36.16 38.76 214.13 
0.93 3.15 109.62 
Relocation 3.62 1.32 2.70 0.11 0.99 8.73 
Rental 32.54 31.35 41.65 
107.00 
Capital-Related 0.00 1.85 76.44 1.73 1.96 81.98 
Others
Wage 0.00 4.24 93.34 2.66 6.76 
Income Loses
Category Area Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Total Commercial Industrial
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Table 44: Building Related Economic Losses, Accounting for Local Site Effects  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Income Loses
61.75 95.91 1,455.57 
Total 687.16 375.72 443.85 65.58 105.49 1,677.81 
Subtotal 657.45 350.22 290.24 
17.58 24.22 273.39 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 2.77 3.84 0.55 7.16 
Content 120.11 46.68 64.80 
11.49 19.80 301.40 
Non_Structural 412.10 230.29 151.05 28.84 51.34 873.62 
Structural 125.23 73.25 71.63 
3.82 9.59 222.24 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 29.71 25.50 153.61 
0.67 2.25 80.35 
Relocation 2.96 0.92 1.83 0.09 0.74 6.54 
Rental 26.75 21.34 29.33 
75.81 
Capital-Related 0.00 0.98 55.76 1.22 1.57 59.53 
Others
Wage 0.00 2.26 66.69 1.84 5.02 
Category Area Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Total Commercial Industrial
 
 
 
5.2.4.2 Transportation Systems 
 
The economic losses to the transportation system, as estimated by HAZUS, are shown 
in Tables 45 and 46.  The economic losses increased for highway, railway, and port 
transportation systems when the site class effects were added to the analysis.  These 
economic losses increased because many highway bridges and railway components 
lie in census tracts where the ground motion increased with site effects. The economic 
losses to the bus and the airport transportation systems decreased when the site class 
effects were considered. The total economic losses of the transportation system have 
increased by 10%. 
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Table 45: Transportation System Economic Loss, Uniform Site Class D (Millions of Dollars) 
Subtotal 3905.39 44.51 
30469.65 187.62 Total
9.08
Runways 3,415.38 $0.00 0.00
Airport Facilities 490.01 $44.51 
12.79
Subtotal 206.58 26.43 
Port Facilities 206.58 $26.43 
7.37
Subtotal 18.15 1.34 
Bus Facilities 18.15 $1.34 
Subtotal 2783.73 10.66 
Facilities 133.09 $10.48 7.88
0.00
Bridges 19.59 $0.18 0.90
Subtotal 23554.03 104.68 
Railways Segments 2,631.05 $0.00 
0.00
Bridges 4,117.78 $104.68 2.54
Highway Segments 19,436.25 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% )
 
 
Table 46: Transportation System Economic Loss, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total
Subtotal 3905.39 34.80 
30469.65 207.67 
7.10
Runways 3,415.38 $0.00 0.00
Airport Facilities 490.01 $34.80 
14.10
Subtotal 206.58 29.13 
Port Facilities 206.58 $29.13 
6.12
Subtotal 18.15 1.11 
Bus Facilities 18.15 $1.11 
Subtotal 2783.73 13.16 
Facilities 133.09 $12.79 9.61
0.00
Bridges 19.59 $0.37 1.89
Subtotal 23554.03 129.47 
Railways Segments 2,631.05 $0.00 
0.00
Bridges 4,117.78 $129.47 3.14
Highway Segments 19,436.25 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% )
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5.2.4.3 Utility Systems 
 
The economic losses to the utility lifeline systems are shown in Tables 47 and 48.  
The estimated economic losses decreased when site class effects were added for all 
utility systems except the natural gas system. The total economic losses to the utility 
system decreased by approximately 17%.   
 
Table 47: Utility System Economic Loss, Uniform Site Class D  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total 24,082.89 $1,103.90 
4.52
Subtotal 10.99 $0.50 
Communication Facilities 10.99 $0.50 
3.58
Subtotal 2,686.20 $96.18 
Electrical Power Facilities 2,686.20 $96.18 
Subtotal 475.84 $24.42 
Distribution 458.90 $23.45 5.11
0.00
Facilities 16.94 $0.97 5.72
Subtotal 17,913.11 $873.11 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 688.36 $21.93 3.19
0.00
Facilities 17,224.76 $851.18 4.94
Subtotal 2,995.41 $109.69 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 1,147.26 $27.73 2.42
0.00
Facilities 1,848.15 $81.96 4.43
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% ) 
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Table 48: Utility System Economic Loss, Accounting for Local Site Effects  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total 24,082.89 $914.91 
3.71
Subtotal 10.99 $0.41 
Communication Facilities 10.99 $0.41 
3.48
Subtotal 2,686.20 $93.59 
Electrical Power Facilities 2,686.20 $93.59 
Subtotal 475.84 $26.02 
Distribution 458.90 $25.21 5.49
0.00
Facilities 16.94 $0.81 4.76
Subtotal 17,913.11 $706.77 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 688.36 $23.59 3.43
0.00
Facilities 17,224.76 $683.19 3.97
Subtotal 2,995.41 $88.10 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 1,147.26 $29.82 2.60
0.00
Facilities 1,848.15 $58.28 3.15
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% ) 
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5.3 Site Class Effects for Massac County 
 
The damage and loss estimates for the southern portion of Illinois decreased in 
general because the majority of the ground motion decreased when local site class 
effects were included.  A study of site class effects was performed on Massac County 
because the local site effects did not cause a decrease in ground motion in any census 
tract in the county.  The inclusion of site class factors caused the ground motion to 
increase in three out of the four census tracts in the county.  The ground motion 
remained the same in the third census tract.  The study of Massac County illustrates 
that when the site class effects increase the ground motion parameters, the estimated 
damage and losses also increase.   
 
The size of this study region of 4 census tracts in southern Illinois is 242 square 
miles.  According to the HAZUS general building stock inventory, there are 
approximately 6,000 households with over 15,000 people.  The total replacement cost 
in the HAZUS general building stock inventory is estimated to be approximately 
$762 million for approximately 5,000 total buildings.  A majority (84%) of the 
general building stock is residential housing.  The total value of the transportation 
systems and the utility systems are $7.3 billion and $4.2 billion, respectively. 
 
The HAZUS inventory of Essential Facilities contains 1 hospital, 10 schools, 
3 fire stations, and 3 police stations.   
 
5.3.1 Ground Motion 
 
The ground motion program discussed in the Hazard Definition chapter of this report 
was used to calculate the PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second for each 
census tract in the study region.  This was done for both Massac County with the 
local site classes and for the county with a uniform site class D because HAZUS 
assumes a uniform site class D for the entire study region as a default if no site class 
maps are provided.  The ground motion maps (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 
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1.0 second) for the study region with a uniform site class D are shown in Figures 79 , 
80, 81, and 82, respectively.   
 
 
 
Figure 79: Massac County PGA, Uniform Soil Type D Figure 80: Massac County PGV, Uniform Soil Type D 
 
Figure 81: Massac County Sa at 0.3 Second, Uniform 
Soil Type D 
Figure 82: Massac County Sa at 1.0 Second, Uniform 
Soil Type D 
 
 
The ground motion was computed for the same study region using the local site 
classes provided by ISGS.  The resulting ground motion maps are shown in Figures 
83, 84, 85, and 86 for PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second, respectively. 
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Figure 83: Massac County PGA, Accounting for Site 
Effects 
Figure 84: Massac County PGV, Accounting for Site 
Effects 
Figure 85: Massac County Sa at 0.3 Second, 
Accounting for Site Effects 
Figure 86: Massac County Sa at 1.0 Second, 
Accounting for Site Effects 
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The ground motions for the census tracts in Massac County with a uniform site class 
D, the ISGS site classes, and their percent differences are tabulated in Table 49.  The 
ground motion parameters increased for all but one census tract, so the damage and 
loss estimates were expected to increase. 
 
Table 49: Ground Motion Comparison 
Census Tract PGA (g) PGV (in/sec) Sa at 0.3 sec (g) Sa at 1.0 sec (g)
17127970100 0.337 16.278 0.843 0.437
17127970200 0.338 16.323 0.846 0.438
17127970300 0.273 13.409 0.682 0.36
17127970400 0.325 15.702 0.812 0.421
Census Tract PGA (g) PGV (in/sec) Sa at 0.3 sec (g) Sa at 1.0 sec (g)
17127970100 0.361 25.292 0.903 0.679
17127970200 0.362 25.359 0.905 0.68
17127970300 0.273 13.409 0.682 0.36
17127970400 0.351 24.413 0.877 0.655
Census Tract PGA PGV Sa at 0.3 sec Sa at 1.0 sec
17127970100 7.12% 55.38% 7.12% 55.38%
17127970200 7.10% 55.36% 6.97% 55.25%
17127970300 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
17127970400 8.00% 55.48% 8.00% 55.58%
Site Class D
Percent Difference
Accounting for Local Site Effects
 
 
5.3.2 Damage Estimates 
 
The damage estimates from HAZUS for the case with a uniform site class D and the 
case including the local site effects on the ground motion are compared in this 
section. 
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5.3.2.1 General Building Stock 
 
The damage estimates for the general building stock are summarized in Tables 50 and 
51 for the HAZUS analyses excluding and including site class effects, respectively.  
The number of buildings that suffered complete damage more than doubled when the 
effects of local site conditions were considered.  The number of buildings that were 
extensively damaged, moderately damaged, slightly damaged, and undamaged 
decreased when the local site effects were considered.  The number of buildings 
expected to be in the less severe damage states reduced because many moved up to 
the complete damage state when site factors were included. 
 
 
Table 50: Damage by Occupancy, Uniform Site Class D 
1,179 656Total 210 1,422 2,091
548 46.49 255 38.81
0.11 1 0.16
Single Family 207 98.41 1,370 96.37 1,752 83.81
0.04 1 0.05 1Religion 0 0.02 1
614 52.12 389 59.27
0.14 2 0.23
Other Residential 3 1.53 50 3.51 327 15.66
0.01 1 0.03 2Industrial 0 0.00 0
1 0.11 1 0.15
0.00 0 0.00
Government 0 0.00 0 0.01 1 0.03
0.00 0 0.00 0Education 0 0.00 0
12 1.03 9 1.38
0.00 0 0.00
Commercial 0 0.03 1 0.08 9 0.41
Count (%)
Agriculture 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0
Count (%) Count (%)Count (%) Count (%)
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
 
 
Table 51: Building Damage by Occupancy, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
929 1,324Total 166 1,180 1,959
472 50.75 577 43.58
0.06 2 0.17
Single Family 164 98.80 1,150 97.46 1,769 90.33
0.03 1 0.04 1Religion 0 0.01 0
448 48.18 719 54.27
0.07 3 0.24
Other Residential 2 1.18 30 2.50 186 9.51
0.00 0 0.01 1Industrial 0 0.00 0
1 0.07 2 0.17
0.00 0 0.00
Government 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.01
0.00 0 0.00 0Education 0 0.00 0
8 0.86 21 1.56
0.00 0 0.00
Commercial 0 0.00 0 0.01 2 0.11
Count (%)
Agriculture 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0
Count (%) Count (%)Count (%) Count (%)
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
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5.3.2.2 Essential Facilities 
 
In the case that local site effects were considered, the number of essential facilities 
expected to suffer at least moderate damage did not change—all of the essential 
facilities in Massac County were estimated to suffer at least moderate damage.  
However, 9 more schools, 2 more police stations, and 2 more fire stations were 
estimated to be completely damaged.  The expected damage to essential facilities is 
summarized in Tables 52 and 53 for the uniform site class D and for the local site 
effects, respectively. 
 
Table 52: Damage to Essential Facilities, Uniform Site Class D 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 1 1 100.0 1 100.0 0 0.0
Schools 10 10 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
PoliceStations 3 3 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
FireStations 3 3 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
 
 
Table 53: Damage to Essential Facilities, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 1 1 100.0 1 100.0 0 0.0
Schools 10 10 100.0 9 90.0 0 0.0
PoliceStations 3 3 100.0 2 66.7 0 0.0
FireStations 3 3 100.0 2 66.7 0 0.0
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
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5.3.2.3 Transportation Systems 
 
The number of highway bridges expected to suffer moderate damage and complete 
damage increased by 5 bridges and 1 bridge, respectively, when local site effects 
were considered.  The number of railway bridges and facilities expected to be at least 
moderately damaged increased from zero to 2 when site class effects were added.  
Tables 54 and 55 summarize the expected damage to the transportation system 
lifelines for the case in which site classes are not considered and the case in which 
site classes are considered, respectively. 
 
Table 54: Damage to Transportation Systems, Uniform Site Class D 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 18 0 0.0 0 0.0 18 100.0 18 100.0
Bridges 118 4 3.4 0 0.0 114 96.6 117 99.2
Railways Segments 56 0 0.0 0 0.0 56 100.0 56 100.0
Bridges 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 100.0 7 100.0
Facilities 2 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0
Port Facilities 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 5 100.0
Airport Facilities 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Runways 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
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Table 55: Damage to Transportation Systems, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 18 0 0.0 0 0.0 18 100.0 18 100.0
Bridges 118 9 7.6 1 0.8 110 93.2 112 94.9
Railways Segments 56 0 0.0 0 0.0 56 100.0 56 100.0
Bridges 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 100.0 7 100.0
Facilities 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0
Port Facilities 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 5 100.0
Airport Facilities 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Runways 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
 
 
 
 
5.3.2.4 Utility Systems 
 
Tables 56 and 57 show the expected utility system damage when a uniform site class 
D was assumed and when local site effects were considered.  The number of all types 
of utility facilities that are expected to be at least moderately damaged due to the 
scenario event remained the same when local site effects were added.   
 
Table 56: Damage to Utility System Facilities, Uniform Site Class D 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Waste Water 4 3 75.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 100.0
Natural Gas 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0
Electrical Power 1 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
Communication 4 2 50.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 4 100.0
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With with Functionality > 50 %
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Table 57: Damage to Utility System Facilities, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Waste Water 4 3 75.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 100.0
Natural Gas 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0
Electrical Power 1 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
Communication 4 2 50.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 4 100.0
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With with Functionality > 50 %
 
 
 
The expected utility system pipeline damage is shown in Tables 58 and 59 for the 
cases in which site class D is assumed for the entire region and the local site effects 
are considered.  The number of expected leaks and breaks increased for all types of 
utility systems containing pipelines. 
 
Table 58: Utility System Pipeline Damage, Uniform Site Class D 
Length (kms)
Natural Gas 378 320 80
Waste Water 568 299 75
Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 946 378 95
System Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
 
 
Table 59: Utility System Pipeline Damage, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
Length (kms) Leaks
Natural Gas 378 722 180
Waste Water 568 675 169
Breaks
Potable Water 946 854 213
System
Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
 
 
The number of households without potable water and electric power one day, three 
days, seven days, 30 days, and 90 days after the earthquake are shown in Tables 60 
and 61.  The number of households without potable water on the day of the 
earthquake increases by approximately 120%, and the number of households 
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estimated to be without electric power decreases by about 4% when the effects of 
local soil conditions are considered. 
 
Table 60: Potable Water & Electric Power System Performance, Uniform Site Class D 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 2,244 35.8 199 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
6,261
Electric Power 3,298 52.7 1,658 26.5 446 7.1 55 0.9 5 0.1
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
 
 
 
Table 61: Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance, Accounting for Local Site 
Effects 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 4,954 79.1 4,213 67.3 908 14.5 0 0.0 0 0.0
6,261
Electric Power 3,434 54.8 1,821 29.1 531 8.5 69 1.1 5 0.1
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
 
 
5.3.3 Social Losses  
 
Social losses include the number of displaced households, people seeking public 
shelters, injuries, and casualties.  The social loss estimates from HAZUS are 
discussed in this section. 
 
5.3.3.1 Displaced Households 
 
In the case that a default site class D was assumed, HAZUS estimated that 444 
households will be displaced due to the scenario earthquake.  From these households, 
118 people were predicted to seek public shelter.  When site class effects were 
included, HAZUS estimated that 926 households will be displaced, and from these 
households, 248 people will seek public shelter. The displaced households and shelter 
needs increased by a factor of approximately 2.1.   
 108
 
 
5.3.3.2 Injuries and Casualties 
 
Tables 62 and 63 show the number of casualties estimated to occur by HAZUS when 
site class effects are ignored and when site class effects are considered, respectively.  
The injuries are estimated in the cases that the earthquake would occur at 2 AM, 2 
PM, and 5 PM.  For each earthquake occurrence time and each injury level, the 
estimates increase when site classes were included. 
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Table 62: Casualty Estimates, Uniform Site Class D 
4
Total 186 52 9 14
Single Family 54 14 2
1
Other-Residential 29 7 1 1
Industrial 17 5 1
0
Hotels 1 0 0 0
Educational 2 1 0
4 7
Commuting 1 1 2 0
5 PM Commercial 83 23
3
Total 209 59 9 17
Single Family 35 9 1
2
Other-Residential 19 5 0 1
Industrial 27 8 1
3
Hotels 0 0 0 0
Educational 36 11 2
4 7
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 PM Commercial 92 26
10
Total 220 56 7 14
Single Family 134 35 5
0
Other-Residential 79 19 2 3
Industrial 4 1 0
0
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 0 0 0
0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 1 0
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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Table 63: Casualty Estimates, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
9
Total 341 107 22 31
Single Family 99 30 5
3
Other-Residential 49 13 1 3
Industrial 32 10 2
0
Hotels 2 0 0 0
Educational 4 1 0
7 14
Commuting 2 4 6 1
5 PM Commercial 152 47
6
Total 392 121 19 37
Single Family 65 20 3
5
Other-Residential 33 9 1 2
Industrial 52 17 3
8
Hotels 1 0 0 0
Educational 74 24 4
8 15
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 PM Commercial 167 51
23
Total 393 113 16 31
Single Family 246 73 11
1
Other-Residential 133 36 4 7
Industrial 7 2 0
0
Hotels 5 2 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 2 1
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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5.3.4 Economic Loss Estimates 
 
The loss estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation 
systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
5.3.4.1 General Building Stock 
 
The building related economic losses are shown in Tables 64 and 65 for each 
scenario.  The building-related economic losses increased when the site classes were 
considered in the ground motion estimates for each type of building related loss and 
each general occupancy class.  The total building-related economic losses were 
estimated to be 57% larger when site effects were included.   
 
 
Table 64: Building-Related Economic Losses, Uniform Site Class D  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Income Loses
Total 
15.85 12.18 213.47 
Total 106.95 48.13 54.59 16.45 13.15 239.27 
Subtotal 101.64 44.63 39.17 
4.89 2.77 36.59 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.12 0.08 1.56 
Content 14.51 5.61 8.82 
2.26 2.76 43.90 
Non_Structural 65.61 29.92 21.74 7.58 6.57 131.42 
Structural 21.52 9.11 8.26 
0.60 0.97 25.80 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 5.31 3.49 15.42 
0.12 0.25 10.76 
Relocation 0.54 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.91 
Rental 4.77 2.52 3.10 
7.38 
Capital-Related 0.00 0.26 6.14 0.17 0.16 6.74 
Others
Wage 0.00 0.61 6.01 0.29 0.47 
Category Area Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Commercial Industrial
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Table 65: Building-Related Economic Losses, Accounting for Local Site Effects 
 (Millions of Dollars) 
28.76 21.25 339.44 
155.86 74.94 92.90 29.58 22.59 375.88 
Subtotal 148.73 70.23 70.47 
9.29 5.33 63.37 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 0.68 2.11 0.15 2.94 
Content 21.45 9.85 17.44 
3.28 4.05 62.92 
Non_Structural 97.38 47.23 39.79 14.07 11.72 210.20 
Structural 29.89 13.14 12.55 
0.82 1.35 36.44 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 7.13 4.71 22.43 
0.16 0.35 14.52 
Relocation 0.73 0.13 0.22 0.02 0.12 1.21 
Rental 6.41 3.42 4.19 
10.73 
Capital-Related 0.00 0.35 9.16 0.24 0.23 9.98 
Others
Wage 0.00 0.82 8.87 0.40 0.65 
Income Loses
Category Area Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Commercial Industrial Total 
Total  
 
5.3.4.2 Transportation Systems 
 
The economic losses to the transportation system are shown in Tables 66 and 67.  The 
economic losses increased for each type of transportation system when the site class 
effects were included in the analysis.  The total estimated economic loss to the 
transportation system nearly doubled, and the losses to the highway system increased 
by a factor of almost 2.4.   
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Table 66: Transportation System Economic Loss, Uniform Site Class D  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total
Subtotal 40.55 1.71 
730.12 19.72 
28.34
Runways 34.50 $0.00 0.00
Airport Facilities 6.05 $1.71 
27.83
Subtotal 11.23 3.13 
Port Facilities 11.23 $3.13 
Subtotal 68.71 1.39 
Facilities 4.84 $1.38 28.49
0.00
Bridges 0.56 $0.01 2.56
Subtotal 609.64 13.48 
Railways Segments 63.31 $0.00 
0.00
Bridges 136.77 $13.48 9.86
Highway Segments 472.87 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%)
 
 
Table 67: Transportation System Economic Loss, Accounting for Local Site Effects  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Subtotal 40.55 1.86 
730.12 38.57 Total
30.67
$0.00 0.00
Airport Facilities 6.05 $1.86 
30.27
3.40 
Port Facilities 11.23 $3.40 
Runways 34.50 
11.23 Subtotal
Subtotal 68.71 1.56 
Facilities 4.84 $1.50 31.01
0.00
$0.06 10.12
Subtotal 609.64 31.76 
Railways Segments 63.31 $0.00 
0.00
$31.76 23.22
Highway Segments 472.87 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%)
136.77 Bridges
0.56 Bridges
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5.3.4.3 Utility Systems 
 
The economic losses to the utility lifeline systems are shown in Tables 68 and 69.  
The estimated economic losses increased when site class effects were added for all 
utility systems except the natural gas system.  The estimated economic loss to the 
utility system increased by about 16% with site class effects. 
 
Table 68: Utility System Economic Loss, Uniform Site Class D  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total 458.52 $79.44 
15.72
Subtotal 0.44 $0.07 
Communication Facilities 0.44 $0.07 
18.79
Subtotal 122.10 $22.95 
Electrical Power Facilities 122.10 $22.95 
Subtotal 9.99 $1.89 
Distribution Lines 7.57 $1.44 19.00
0.00
Facilities 2.42 $0.45 18.79
Subtotal 307.06 $52.83 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 11.35 $1.35 11.85
0.00
Facilities 295.70 $51.49 17.41
Subtotal 18.92 $1.70 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 18.92 $1.70 8.99
0.00
Facilities 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%) 
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Table 69: Utility System Economic Loss, Accounting for Local Site Effects  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total 458.52 $92.45 
16.82
Subtotal 0.44 $0.07 
Communication Facilities 0.44 $0.07 
20.92
Subtotal 122.10 $25.54 
Electrical Power Facilities 122.10 $25.54 
Subtotal 9.99 $3.76 
Distribution Lines 7.57 $3.25 42.92
0.00
Facilities 2.42 $0.51 20.92
Subtotal 307.06 $59.24 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 11.35 $3.04 26.77
0.00
Facilities 295.70 $56.20 19.00
Subtotal 18.92 $3.84 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 18.92 $3.84 20.31
0.00
Facilities 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%) 
 
 
 
5.4 Summary of Losses 
 
5.4.1 Southern Illinois Study Region 
 
In the large region of southern Illinois, much of the ground motion was of smaller 
magnitude when the site class effects were taken into account.  This was because 
most of the study region was comprised of soil of site classes A, B, or C, which have 
smaller amplification coefficients in the NEHRP Provisions than for soil type D.   
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The number of buildings estimated to experience complete damage increased by 
about 27% when the local site classes were affected.  The increase of the number 
completely damaged buildings took place in the census tracts with site class E, where 
the ground motion increased.  The damage estimates for essential facilities decreased 
because the overall ground motion magnitudes over the entire study region decreased.  
In addition, very few essential facilities are located in census tracts with site class E 
type soil, as shown in Figure 87. 
 
 
Figure 87: Locations of Essential Facilities with Respect to Site 
Class E Soils 
 
   
 
The number of highway bridges expected to suffer moderate damage and complete 
damage both increased.  The increase in damage estimates occurred in locations with 
site class E soils.    The number of railway bridges and facilities expected to be 
damaged also increased with the inclusion of site class effects.   
 
The number of utility facilities expected to be damaged either decreased or remained 
the same.  The number of pipeline leaks and breaks increased by about 7.5% for each 
of the potable water, waste water, and natural gas systems.  Households without 
potable water on the day of the earthquake increased by approximately 7%, and the 
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number of households estimated to be without electric power decreased by about 17% 
when the effects of local soil conditions were included. 
 
The number of fire ignitions, burned area, and resulting displaced people decreased 
when soil conditions were accounted for because the ground motion magnitude was 
smaller in the majority of the census tracts.   
 
The total economic losses for the general building stock deceased by about 16% when 
site classes were included.  The total economic losses to the transportation system 
increased by 10%, while the total economic losses to the utility system decreased by 
approximately 17%. 
 
5.4.2 Massac County Study Region 
 
The damage and loss estimates for the southern portion of Illinois decreased in 
general because the ground motion in the majority of census tracts decreased when 
local site class effects were included.  A study was performed using Massac County 
because the local site effects did not cause a decrease in ground motion in any census 
tract in the county.  The study of Massac County illustrates that when the site class 
effects increase the ground motion parameters, the estimated damage and losses also 
increase.   
 
The ground motion was estimated to increase in three of the four census tracts in 
Massac County, Illinois due to the fact that they are made of soil type E.  The 
increased ground motion caused increased damage and loss estimates in general.  The 
number of buildings in the general building stock estimated to experience complete 
damage more than doubled when the effects of local site conditions were considered.  
The number of essential facilities expected to be completely damaged increased for 
schools, police stations, and fire stations. 
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In the transportation system, the number of highway bridges and railway bridges 
expected to experience moderate and complete damage both increased.  The number 
of utility system facilities expected to be damaged remained the same when site class 
effects were included in the loss estimation. The leak and break estimates for the 
potable water, waste water, and natural gas systems became larger in magnitude when 
the site class effects were taken into account. 
 
The displaced households and shelter needs increased by a factor of approximately 
2.1.  The injury and casualty estimates also significantly increased when soil type was 
included in the ground motion calculations.   
 
The building-related economic losses were estimated to be 57% larger when site 
effects were included in the loss estimation.  The total estimated economic loss to the 
transportation system nearly doubled, and the losses to the highway system increased 
by a factor of almost 2.4.  The estimated economic loss to the utility system increased 
by about 16% with site class effects. 
 
In the Massac County study region, all of the damage and loss estimates either stayed 
the same or increased.  The results from the southern Illinois study region may 
mislead the reader to believe that site class effects always decrease damage estimates.  
The Massac County region was used illustrate that site class effects can also 
significantly increase damage and loss estimates. 
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6. Liquefaction Effects 
 
Liquefaction maps were imported into HAZUS, and a comparison was made of the 
damage and loss estimates in the cases for which the effects of liquefaction were 
included and not included.  The analysis and results are described in the following 
sections of this chapter. 
 
6.1 Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 
 
A liquefaction susceptibility map 
was taken from a HAZUS run 
that was conducted by FEMA 
(FEMA, 2006c).  The map is 
shown in Figure 88.  The map 
does not indicate real 
liquefaction susceptibility, but it 
is a site class map that was 
directly converted into a 
liquefaction map.  In the 
development of the liquefaction 
susceptibility indices, soil types were directly changed into liquefaction 
susceptibilities.  This is not a correct method to produce a liquefaction susceptibility 
map, so this map was used only to show the effects of imputing a liquefaction map 
into HAZUS.  The results of this chapter should not be taken as real damage and loss 
results caused by liquefaction. 
 
Figure 88: Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 
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6.2 Study Region  
 
The liquefaction susceptibility 
map shown in Figure 88 was for 
the southern one-third of Illinois 
only.  It completely covered 30 
counties in the state of Illinois, so 
the study region was formed from 
these 30 southern counties, as 
shown in Figure 89. 
 
6.3 Ground Motion 
 
The input ground motion was calculated using the user-supplied ground motion maps 
that were developed using the ground motion program as described in the Hazard 
Definition chapter of this report.  It was assumed that the study region was of uniform 
soil type D for both cases in this chapter.  The ground motion maps, shown in Figures 
90 through 93, and the liquefaction susceptibility map were imported into HAZUS 
and the analysis was run.  The analysis results were permanent ground deformations, 
damage estimates, and loss estimates, which are discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 89: Counties for Analysis with Liquefaction 
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Figure 90: PGA, Uniform Soil Type D 
Figure 91: PGV, Uniform Soil Type D 
Figure 92: Sa at 0.3 Second, Uniform Soil Type D Figure 93: Sa at 1.0 Second, Uniform Soil Type D 
 
6.4 Permanent Ground Deformation 
 
The permanent ground deformation maps, as predicted by the PESH module in 
HAZUS, are shown for liquefaction spreading and liquefaction settlement in Figures 
94 and 95, respectively.   
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Twenty-two of a total 279 census tracts were estimated to have greater than zero PGD 
due to liquefaction spreading, and the same 227 census tracts experienced PGD due to 
liquefaction settlement. 
 
The liquefaction calculations in HAZUS were checked outside of the loss estimation 
tool, as described in the Hazard Definition chapter of this report.  The liquefaction 
calculations were correct for all cases, except for census tracts with” very low” 
liquefaction susceptibility.  To correct the error, the tracts with “very low” 
liquefaction susceptibility were changed to have “low” liquefaction susceptibility.  
This change of liquefaction susceptibility slightly overestimated the PGD values from 
the PESH module and is conservative. 
 
 
6.5 Damage Estimates 
 
The damage estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, 
transportation systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
Figure 94: PGD due to Liquefaction Spreading Figure 95: PGD due to Liquefaction Settlement 
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6.5.1 General Building Stock 
 
Tables 70 and 71 show the expected building damage by occupancy class for the 
study region for the cases including and not including the effects of liquefaction, 
respectively.  The addition of liquefaction increased the number of buildings 
estimated to suffer extensive damage by a factor of 2.4.  The number of buildings 
expected to suffer all other damage states reduced with the addition of liquefaction.  
The increase in the number of buildings suffering complete damage occurs in the 
census tracts estimated to have PGD.  A large number of the buildings in the zones 
with PGD were estimated to experience complete damage.   
 
Table 70: Expected Building Damage by Occupancy, with Liquefaction 
11,225 6,952Total 265,224 49,046 33,996
3,339 29.75 4,408 63.41
0.13 8 0.12
Single Family 244,363 92.13 35,568 72.52 12,908 37.97
0.09 37 0.11 15Religion 153 0.06 44
7,667 68.31 2,463 35.43
0.16 4 0.06
Other Residential 19,050 7.18 12,739 25.97 20,458 60.18
0.11 55 0.16 18Industrial 118 0.04 55
12 0.11 6 0.09
0.02 1 0.02
Government 77 0.03 37 0.08 35 0.10
0.01 6 0.02 2Education 15 0.01 6
167 1.49 59 0.85
0.03 2 0.03
Commercial 1,422 0.54 586 1.20 486 1.43
Count (%)
Agriculture 25 0.01 11 0.02 11 0.03 4
Count (%) Count (%)Count (%) Count (%)
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
 
Table 71: Expected Building Damage by Occupancy, without Liquefaction 
12,008 2,854Total 265,938 50,252 35,392
3,698 30.79 1,258 44.09
0.13 5 0.18
Single Family 245,034 92.14 36,656 72.94 13,941 39.39
0.09 38 0.11 16Religion 154 0.06 45
8,084 67.32 1,543 54.08
0.16 3 0.11
Other Residential 19,091 7.18 12,850 25.57 20,810 58.80
0.11 56 0.16 19Industrial 118 0.04 55
12 0.10 5 0.17
0.02 1 0.03
Government 77 0.03 37 0.07 35 0.10
0.01 6 0.02 2Education 15 0.01 6
174 1.45 37 1.29
0.03 2 0.06
Commercial 1,424 0.54 591 1.18 495 1.40
Count (%)
Agriculture 25 0.01 11 0.02 11 0.03 4
Count (%) Count (%)Count (%) Count (%)
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
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6.5.2 Essential Facilities 
 
The expected damage to essential facilities when liquefaction was included and the 
case excluding liquefaction are shown in Tables 72 and 73, respectively.  The number 
of hospitals expected to be at least moderately damaged remained the same, while 
those expected to suffer at least moderate damage increased by 2 facilities when 
liquefaction was in included.  The number of emergency operation centers, police 
stations, and fire stations expected to be at least moderately damage remained the 
same when liquefaction was included in the analysis.  The number of schools, police 
station, and fire stations expected to suffer complete damage increased by 9 facilities, 
2 facilities, and 3 facilities, respectively, when liquefaction was added.   
 
Table 72: Expected Damage to Essential Facilities, with Liquefaction  
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 45 16 35.6 1 2.2 24 53.3
Schools 587 93 15.8 18 3.1 429 73.1
EOCs 26 5 19.2 2 7.7 20 76.9
PoliceStations 154 36 23.4 8 5.2 92 59.7
FireStations 188 37 19.7 10 5.3 118 62.8
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
 
 
Table 73: Expected Damage to Essential Facilities, without Liquefaction 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 45 16 35.6 1 2.2 24 53.3
Schools 587 91 15.5 9 1.5 431 73.4
EOCs 26 5 19.2 2 7.7 20 76.9
PoliceStations 154 36 23.4 6 3.9 93 60.4
FireStations 188 37 19.7 7 3.7 119 63.3
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
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The damage to essential 
facilities did not vary 
significantly when 
liquefaction was added to 
the analysis because 
many facilities were not 
located in a census tract 
that experienced severe 
liquefaction.  To illustrate 
this point, Figure 96 
shows the locations of 
essential facilities (hospitals and police stations) on a map of PGD.  The map of PGD 
is identical to that shown in Figure 94 previously in this section. 
 
6.5.3 Transportation Systems 
 
The expected damage to transportation systems, as estimated by HAZUS, is shown in 
Tables 74 and 75 for liquefaction and no liquefaction, respectively.   
Table 74: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems, with Liquefaction 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 816 0 0.0 0 0.0 807 98.9 807 98.9
Bridges 4,810 109 2.3 20 0.4 4,709 97.9 4,746 98.7
Railways Segments 1,658 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,658 100.0 1,658 100.0
Bridges 163 5 3.1 0 0.0 158 96.9 158 96.9
Facilities 55 5 9.1 0 0.0 52 94.5 54 98.2
Bus Facilities 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Port Facilities 92 11 12.0 0 0.0 81 88.0 86 93.5
Airport Facilities 81 3 3.7 0 0.0 79 97.5 80 98.8
Runways 99 0 0.0 0 0.0 99 100.0 99 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
 
Figure 96: Hospital and Police Station Locations with Respect 
to PGD Due to Liquefaction Spreading 
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Table 75: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems, without Liquefaction 
Locations/
System Component
Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 816 0 0.0 0 0.0 807 98.9 807 98.9
Bridges 4,810 66 1.4 6 0.1 4,750 98.8 4,769 99.1
Railways Segments 1,658 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,658 100.0 1,658 100.0
Bridges 163 0 0.0 0 0.0 163 100.0 163 100.0
Facilities 55 3 5.5 0 0.0 52 94.5 55 100.0
Bus Facilities 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Port Facilities 92 11 12.0 0 0.0 81 88.0 88 95.7
Airport Facilities 81 2 2.5 0 0.0 80 98.8 80 98.8
Runways 99 0 0.0 0 0.0 99 100.0 99 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
 
 
 
In both cases HAZUS predicted that no highway segments suffer moderate damage, 
however, this does not mean that there was no damage predicted for highway 
segments when liquefaction was included.  Figure 97 shows a map of the probability 
of highway segments reaching at least moderate damage in the case that liquefaction 
was included.   
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Figure 97: Highway Segment Damage, 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate, 
with Liquefaction 
Figure 98: Railway Segment Damage, 
Probability of Exceeding Moderate, 
with Liquefaction 
 
Similarly, in Table 74, the expected number of railway segments to suffer at least 
moderate damage is zero.  Once again, this does not mean that no damage was 
predicted for railway segments.  Figure 98 shows a map of the probability of 
exceeding moderate damage for the railway segments in the study region.  The 
probabilities were so low that no segment was expected to suffer at least moderate 
damage, hence the estimate of zero in Table 84.  For the case in which liquefaction 
was not included, the probability of damage to all highway segments is not calculated 
because highway segment damage is a function of PGD.   
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6.5.4 Utility Systems 
 
The expected damage to the utility system facilities is shown in Tables 76 and 77 for 
the cases with and without liquefaction, respectively.  The number of facilities in all 
utility systems expected to experience at least moderate damage did not change when 
liquefaction was added to the analysis.  The scenario without liquefaction had slightly 
higher estimates of waste water facility functionality.   
 
Table 76: Expected Damage to Utility Systems, with Liquefaction 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 50 5 10.0 0 0.0 44 88.0 50 100.0
Waste Water 233 17 7.3 0 0.0 202 86.7 225 96.6
Natural Gas 14 3 21.4 0 0.0 11 78.6 14 100.0
Oil Systems 12 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 12 100.0
Electrical Power 22 2 9.1 0 0.0 20 90.9 22 100.0
Communication 99 6 6.1 0 0.0 98 99.0 98 99.0
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With with Functionality > 50 %
 
 
Table 77: Expected Damage to Utility Systems, without Liquefaction 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 50 5 10.0 0 0.0 44 88.0 50 100.0
Waste Water 233 17 7.3 0 0.0 204 87.6 231 99.1
Natural Gas 14 3 21.4 0 0.0 11 78.6 14 100.0
Oil Systems 12 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 12 100.0
Electrical Power 22 2 9.1 0 0.0 20 90.9 22 100.0
Communication 99 6 6.1 0 0.0 98 99.0 99 100.0
With at Least With with Functionality > 50 %
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
 
 
 
 129
The damage to 
utility systems 
facilities did not 
vary significantly 
when liquefaction 
was added to the 
analysis because 
many facilities were 
not located in a 
census tract that 
experienced severe 
liquefaction.  To 
illustrate this point, 
Figure 99 shows the locations of utility system facilities (potable water, waste water, 
oil, natural gas, and electric power) with a map of PGD.  The map of PGD is identical 
to that shown in Figure 94 previously in this chapter. 
 
Tables 78 and 79 summarize the expected utility system performance for the potable 
water, waste water, and natural gas lifeline systems.  The performance estimates 
include the number of leaks and breaks within each utility system.  The number of 
leaks is significantly decreased, and the number of breaks more than doubled when 
liquefaction is included in the analysis.  These results are expected because the 
number of breaks is a function of PGD (which increases from zero when liquefaction 
is included) in HAZUS.   
 
Table 78: Expected Utility System Performance, with Liquefaction 
Natural Gas 22,945 2333 2820
Waste Water 34,418 2183 2638
Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 57,363 2760 3335
System Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
 
 
Figure 99: Utility System Facility Locations with Respect to PGD 
Due to Liquefaction Spreading 
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Table 79: Expected Utility System Performance, without Liquefaction 
Natural Gas 22,945 5210 1303
Waste Water 34,418 4874 1219
Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 57,363 6163 1541
System Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
 
 
The potable water and electric power system performance for the case in which 
liquefaction was included and the case in which liquefaction was not included is 
shown in Tables 80 and 81, respectively.  The number of households without potable 
water significantly increased when liquefaction was included in the analysis.  The 
reduced potable water service is largely due to the fact that pipelines are more 
severely damaged (i.e., suffer many more breaks) when liquefaction is included in the 
analysis.   
 
There is no damage in the electric power system that is analogous to the pipeline 
damage in the potable water systems.  HAZUS does not have the capability of 
calculating damage to electric power distribution lines, so the performance of the 
electric power systems depends only on the damage to the electric power facilities. 
 
Table 80: Expected Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance, 
with Liquefaction 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 32,215 7.3 27,959 6.4 23,766 5.4 5,327 1.2 0 0.0
438,310
Electric Power 11,049 2.5 7,235 1.7 3,736 0.9 1,248 0.3 15 0.0
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
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Table 81: Expected Potable Water and Electric Power System Performance, 
without Liquefaction 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 13,138 3.0 5,834 1.3 1,757 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0
438,310
Electric Power 10,754 2.5 6,474 1.5 2,540 0.6 495 0.1 15 0.0
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
 
 
6.5.6 Fire Following Earthquake 
 
The Fire Following Earthquake (FFE) model in HAZUS estimated that there would 
be 17 ignitions that would burn about 0.10 square mile of area due to the scenario 
earthquake in the case that liquefaction was included in the analysis.  In the case that 
liquefaction was not included, the same number of ignitions and burned area was 
estimated.  The number of ignitions is a function of building square footage and 
ground motion.  Because the building stock inventory and the ground motion 
parameters remained the same, the FFE estimates remained the same when 
liquefaction was included. 
 
6.6 Social Losses 
 
Social losses include the number of displaced households, people seeking public 
shelters, injuries, and casualties.  The social loss estimates from HAZUS are 
discussed in this section. 
 
6.6.1 Displaced Households 
 
HAZUS estimated that 7,662 households would be displaced by the scenario 
earthquake when liquefaction was included in the analysis.  Of the displaced 
households, 2,136 people were estimated to seek temporary shelter in public shelters.  
In the case that liquefaction was not included in the HAZUS analysis, it was 
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estimated that 2,875 households will be displaced and of these displaced households, 
859 people will seek temporary shelter in public shelters.   
 
The number of displaced households was estimated by the damage to the general 
building stock and the demographic data for the study region.  The demographic data 
is identical for the two study regions.  HAZUS estimates that a factor of 2.6 more 
people will seek public shelter because the number of buildings expected to suffer 
complete damage increases by a similar factor.  The number of people seeking public 
shelter is estimated using the demographic data in the study region, and for both 
regions, this estimate is about 11% of the total displaced people.  Note that a 
household in HAZUS is assumed to comprise of 2.5 people.     
 
6.6.2 Injuries and Casualties  
 
The injury and casualty estimates from HAZUS are shown in Tables 82 and 83 for 
the study region including liquefaction and the study region not including 
liquefaction, respectively.  The number of injuries and casualties increased at each 
time of earthquake occurrence when liquefaction is added to the analysis.  The 
increase in the injury and casualty estimates were due to the increased number of 
completely damaged buildings when liquefaction was added to the analysis.  The 
number of level 1 injuries was estimated to increase by 51.9%, 31.4%, and 39.8% at 2 
AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively, when the effects of liquefaction were considered.  
The number of level 2 injuries increased by 71.6%, 45.1%, and 60.7% at the 
earthquake occurrence times 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively.  The level 3 
injuries were estimated to increase by 62.2%, 51.4%, and 59% at 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 
PM, respectively.  Finally, the number of casualties (level 4 injuries) were estimated 
to increase by 61.4%, 48.5%, and 59.1% at the earthquake occurrence times 2 AM, 2 
PM, and 5 PM, respectively, when liquefaction was included in the loss estimation. 
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Table 82: Casualty Estimates, with Liquefaction 
34
Total 1,699 442 105 105
Single Family 564 146 19
4
Other-Residential 306 65 6 11
Industrial 63 15 2
2
Hotels 4 1 0 0
Educational 42 9 1
23 43
Commuting 22 36 53 11
5 PM Commercial 697 169
21
Total 1,663 405 56 101
Single Family 339 88 12
6
Other-Residential 180 39 4 7
Industrial 100 25 3
21
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 290 74 11
23 45
Commuting 1 2 3 1
2 PM Commercial 751 177
83
Total 2,262 537 60 113
Single Family 1,401 355 43
1
Other-Residential 824 172 15 28
Industrial 14 3 0
0
Hotels 14 3 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
0 1
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 9 2
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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Table 83: Casualty Estimates, without Liquefaction 
20
Total 1,215 275 54 66
Single Family 322 76 11
3
Other-Residential 242 46 4 8
Industrial 51 11 1
2
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 36 7 1
15 29
Commuting 10 13 21 4
5 PM Commercial 551 121
13
Total 1,266 279 37 68
Single Family 202 48 7
4
Other-Residential 143 28 3 5
Industrial 82 18 2
14
Hotels 2 0 0 0
Educational 230 53 7
16 31
Commuting 1 1 1 0
2 PM Commercial 607 130
49
Total 1,489 313 37 70
Single Family 804 183 25
1
Other-Residential 656 124 11 20
Industrial 11 2 0
0
Hotels 10 2 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
0 0
Commuting 0 0 0 0
2 AM Commercial 8 2
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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6.7 Direct Economic Losses 
 
The direct economic losses to the study region considering the effects of liquefaction 
and the same study region ignoring the effects of liquefaction were computed using 
HAZUS.  The losses are discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.7.1 Building-Related 
 
The building-related economic losses for the two studies are shown in Tables 84 and 
85.  The building-related economic loss estimates are higher for the study region 
including liquefaction for every category of loss in every occupancy class.  The total 
building-related economic losses increased by approximately 33% when liquefaction 
was included.  The increase in losses was expected because the number of buildings 
that were estimated to experience complete damage increased by more than a factor 
of two. 
 
Table 84: Building-Related Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), with Liquefaction 
Other
Residential
Single Family Others
73.09 130.93 2,312.88 
Total 1,204.03 595.24 639.86 78.75 144.96 2,662.85 
Subtotal 1,150.11 547.00 411.75 
19.70 31.45 407.85 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 3.76 4.31 0.74 8.80 
Content 199.94 67.94 88.81 
15.36 30.15 502.16 
Non_Structural 719.40 359.58 212.78 33.72 68.59 1,394.07 
Structural 230.76 119.48 106.40 
5.66 14.03 349.97 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 53.93 48.24 228.11 
0.96 3.45 135.64 
Relocation 5.38 1.51 2.82 0.11 1.09 10.90 
Rental 48.55 38.94 43.75 
115.17 
Capital-Related 0.00 2.38 81.91 1.80 2.18 88.26 
Income Loses
Wage 0.00 5.42 99.65 2.80 7.31 
Category Area Total Commercial Industrial
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Table 85: Building-Related Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), without Liquefaction 
61.80 108.86 1,700.55 
Total 774.83 484.07 560.03 67.23 121.71 2,007.88 
Subtotal 738.67 445.32 345.90 
16.06 24.52 295.70 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 2.95 3.51 0.60 7.07 
Content 134.62 50.90 69.60 
14.54 27.46 394.84 
Non_Structural 454.26 289.29 175.43 27.69 56.27 1,002.94 
Structural 149.79 105.12 97.92 
5.43 12.85 307.33 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 36.16 38.76 214.13 
0.93 3.15 109.62 
Relocation 3.62 1.32 2.70 0.11 0.99 8.73 
Rental 32.54 31.35 41.65 
107.00 
Capital-Related 0.00 1.85 76.44 1.73 1.96 81.98 
Others
Income Loses
Wage 0.00 4.24 93.34 2.66 6.76 
Single  
Family
Other
Residential
Category Area Total Commercial Industrial
 
 
6.7.2 Transportation Systems 
 
The estimated economic losses to the transportation system are shown in Tables 86 
and 87 for the study region including and excluding liquefaction, respectively.  In 
every transportation system the estimated losses were higher when liquefaction was 
included.  There was greater than zero economic loss to highway segments because 
damage to roadway segments were calculated.  When the effects of liquefaction were 
ignored, no damage to roadway segments was calculated because the estimated PGD 
in all tracts was zero; therefore, no economic loss was associated with roadway 
segment damage.   
 
Similarly, the economic losses associated with the railway transportation system and 
airport transportation system was higher when liquefaction was included because the 
damage to railway segments and runway segments was greater than zero because 
liquefaction was present.  In addition, the direct economic loss to facilities and 
bridges increased with the addition of liquefaction. 
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Table 86: Transportation System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), with Liquefaction 
Subtotal 3905.39 76.05 
30469.65 491.91 Total
9.57
Runways 3,415.38 $29.16 0.85
Airport Facilities 490.01 $46.89 
14.40
Subtotal 206.58 29.74 
Port Facilities 206.58 $29.74 
7.39
Subtotal 18.15 1.34 
Bus Facilities 18.15 $1.34 
Subtotal 2783.73 32.85 
Facilities 133.09 $11.69 8.78
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.79
Bridges 19.59 $0.42 2.13
Subtotal 23554.03 351.93 
Railways Segments 2,631.05 $20.74 
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.99
Bridges 4,117.78 $158.89 3.86
Highway Segments 19,436.25 $193.04 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%)
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Table 87: Transportation System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), without Liquefaction 
Subtotal 3905.39 44.51 
30469.65 187.62 
9.08
Runways 3,415.38 $0.00 0.00
Airport Facilities 490.01 $44.51 
12.79
Subtotal 206.58 26.43 
Port Facilities 206.58 $26.43 
7.37
Subtotal 18.15 1.34 
Bus Facilities 18.15 $1.34 
Subtotal 2783.73 10.66 
Facilities 133.09 $10.48 7.88
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.00
Bridges 19.59 $0.18 0.90
Subtotal 23554.03 104.68 
Railways Segments 2,631.05 $0.00 
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.00
Bridges 4,117.78 $104.68 2.54
Highway Segments 19,436.25 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%)
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6.7.3 Utility Systems 
 
The losses to the utility lifeline systems are shown in Tables 88 and 89 for the cases 
in which liquefaction was included and excluded, respectively.  The losses to all 
utility systems were estimated to be greater when liquefaction was included in the 
analysis.  The total losses to the utility system increased by approximately 16% when 
liquefaction was added to the analysis. 
 
Table 88: Utility System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), with Liquefaction 
Total 24,082.89 $1,285.91 
5.30
Subtotal 10.99 $0.58 
Communication Facilities 10.99 $0.58 
4.89
Subtotal 2,686.20 $131.37 
Subtotal 1.33 $0.01 
Electrical Power Facilities 2,686.20 $131.37 
0.00
Facilities 1.33 $0.01 0.76
Subtotal 475.84 $33.94 
Oil Systems Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 458.90 $32.86 7.16
0.00
Facilities 16.94 $1.08 6.38
Subtotal 17,913.11 $989.17 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 688.36 $30.74 4.47
0.00
Facilities 17,224.76 $958.43 5.56
Subtotal 2,995.41 $130.84 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution Lines 1,147.26 $38.87 3.39
0.00
Facilities 1,848.15 $91.97 4.98
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%) 
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Table 89: Utility System Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), without Liquefaction 
Total 24,082.89 $1,103.90 
4.52
Subtotal 10.99 $0.50 
Communication Facilities 10.99 $0.50 
3.58
Subtotal 2,686.20 $96.18 
Electrical Power Facilities 2,686.20 $96.18 
Subtotal 475.84 $24.42 
Distribution 458.90 $23.45 5.11
0.00
Facilities 16.94 $0.97 5.72
Subtotal 17,913.11 $873.11 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 688.36 $21.93 3.19
0.00
Facilities 17,224.76 $851.18 4.94
Subtotal 2,995.41 $109.69 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 1,147.26 $27.73 2.42
0.00
Facilities 1,848.15 $81.96 4.43
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% ) 
 
 
 
6.8 Summary of Losses 
 
The addition of the effects of liquefaction increased the number of buildings expected 
to experience complete damage by a factor of 2.4.  The number of essential facilities 
expected to be at least moderately damage was not significantly affected because the 
majority of the essential facilities were not located in census tracts that experienced 
liquefaction.   
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Similarly, the number of utility system facilities was not significantly affected 
because many of the facilities were not located in regions with a high liquefaction 
susceptibility index.  However, the number of pipeline breaks significantly increased 
due to the ground deformation due to liquefaction.  Because the number of estimated 
pipeline breaks more than doubled when liquefaction was included, the number of 
households without potable water increased by a factor of more than 2.5.   
 
The number of highway bridges expected to be at least moderately damaged nearly 
doubled when liquefaction was included in the analysis, but the other transportation 
system components were not significantly affected.   
 
The number of displaced households increased by a factor of approximately 2.6 
because the number of completely damage buildings more than doubled when 
liquefaction was included in the loss estimation.  The number of injuries and 
casualties increased between 50% and 70%.   
 
The total direct economic losses increased from approximately $3.3 billion to $4.44 
billion for the 30 counties in the liquefaction study region.  This represents a 35% 
increase in direct economic losses.   
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7. Improved Essential Facilities Inventory 
 
An inventory of essential facilities containing data for hospitals, schools, police 
stations, and fire stations was collected by French and Olshansky (2000).  This 
inventory is an improvement over the HAZUS default essential facilities inventory.  
The inventory is a detailed inventory for 31 counties in Illinois that is based on tax 
assessor’s data and telephone surveys (French and Olshansky, 2000).  The inventory 
contains more accurate building types than the HAZUS inventory, which assumes a 
single default building type for each essential facility class.  The HAZUS essential 
facility inventory for the 31 counties to study in detail contains 46 hospitals, 162 
police stations, 197 fire stations, and 617 schools for a total of 1022 essential 
facilities.  The essential facilities inventory from French and Olshansky contains 152 
hospitals, 185 police stations, 254 fire stations, and 965 schools for a total of 1556 
essential facilities.  The hospital inventory, school inventory, police station inventory, 
and fire station inventory are shown in Figures 100 through 103, respectively.  The 
improved essential facilities are indicated by a large green dot (labeled the MAEC 
inventory in the figures), and the HAZUS default essential facilities are indicated by a 
small pink dot.   
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Figure 100: Hospital Inventory 
 
Figure 101: School Inventory 
 
Figure 102: Police Station Inventory 
 
Figure 103: Fire Station Inventory 
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7.1 Essential Facility Inventory Classification 
 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the parameters that affect damage 
estimates to essential facilities in HAZUS.  It was determined that damage to essential 
facilities depends on the HAZUS model building type and design code level.   This 
result is consistent with the HAZUS Technical Manual.  An improved essential 
facilites inventory was provided by French and Olshansky (2000).  Therefore, only 
the building types and geographical locations of essential facilities were taken from 
the French and Olshansky (2000) essential inventory database and used in HAZUS. 
 
The improved essential facilities inventory was imported into HAZUS.  The majority 
of facilities were already assigned a building type in the improved inventory.  The 
distribution of each building type in each essential facility within the improved 
database was calculated.  This distribution was then used to assign building types to 
the remaining essential facilities.  The building type distribution for hospitals, 
schools, police stations, and fire stations are shown in Tables 90 through 93, 
respectively. 
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Table 90: Building Type Distribution used to Assign Building Types to Hospitals 
Building Type Percent Building Count
W2 13.42% 20
S1L 5.37% 8
S1M 2.68% 4
S1H 0.67% 1
S2L 3.36% 5
S2M 1.34% 2
S3 2.68% 4
C1L 4.03% 6
C1H 0.67% 1
C2M 0.67% 1
C3L 7.38% 11
C3M 3.36% 5
RML 1.34% 2
URML 44.30% 67
URMM 8.72% 13
Total 100.00% 152
Hospital Building Type Distribution
 
Table 91: Building Type Distribution used to Assign Building Types to Schools 
Building Type Percent Building Count
W2 16.65% 161
S1L 5.25% 51
S2L 2.68% 26
S3 2.68% 26
S4L 0.78% 8
S4M 0.45% 4
C1L 0.22% 2
C1M 0.22% 2
C2L 0.56% 5
C2H 0.34% 3
C3L 7.37% 71
C3M 0.89% 9
PC2L 0.11% 1
PC2M 0.11% 1
RML 1.34% 13
URML 51.96% 501
URMM 8.38% 81
Total 100.00% 965
School Building Type Distribution
 
 
 146
Table 92: Building Type Distribution used to Assign Building Types to Police Stations 
Building Type Percent Building Count
W2 19.16% 35
S1L 2.40% 4
S1M 0.60% 1
S2L 5.39% 10
C1L 1.20% 2
C1M 1.20% 2
C2L 1.80% 3
C3L 4.79% 9
RML 0.60% 1
URML 57.49% 106
URMM 5.39% 10
Total 100.00% 185
Police Station Building Type Distribution
 
 
Table 93: Building Type Distribution used to Assign Building Types to Fire Stations 
Building Type Percent Building Count
W2 23.65% 60
S1L 2.49% 6
S2L 0.41% 1
S3 11.62% 30
C1L 0.41% 1
C2L 0.41% 1
C3L 0.83% 2
RML 0.41% 1
URML 58.51% 149
URMM 1.24% 3
Total 100.00% 254
Fire Station Building Type Distribution
 
 
After the building types were assigned to the essential facilities in the database, they 
were imported into HAZUS, and damage was estimated. 
 
 147
7.2 Essential Facility Damage 
 
The damage to the new essential facilities was estimated using HAZUS once the 
inventory was imported into the loss estimation tool.  The expected damage is shown 
for the MAEC essential facility inventory and the HAZUS essential facility inventory 
in Tables 94 and 95, respectively.   
 
Although there were fewer hospitals in the HAZUS inventory than the improved 
inventory, three fewer hospitals were estimated to be at least moderately damaged 
when the new hospital inventory was used.  The improved essential inventory 
contains 348 more schools than the HAZUS inventory, and 79 more hospitals were 
estimated be at least moderately damaged by HAZUS.  HAZUS estimated that 40 
police stations in the new inventory and 30 police stations in the HAZUS inventory 
will suffer at least moderate damage.  It was estimated that 4 more fire stations would 
be at least moderately damaged when the improved essential facility inventory 
replaced the HAZUS inventory.  .  This difference in losses between the two 
databases is due to the fact that a specific building type was assigned to each essential 
facility in the new inventory.   
 
Table 94: Essential Facility Damage, MAEC Inventory 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 152 13 8.6 1 0.7 118 77.6
Schools 965 173 17.9 19 2.0 701 72.6
PoliceStations 185 30 16.2 7 3.8 126 68.1
FireStations 254 43 16.9 11 4.3 168 66.1
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
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Table 95: Essential Facility Damage, HAZUS Inventory 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 46 16 34.8 1 2.2 24 52.2
Schools 617 94 15.2 9 1.5 451 73.1
PoliceStations 162 40 24.7 6 3.7 97 59.9
FireStations 197 39 19.8 7 3.6 124 62.9
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
With at Least With  With Functionality
 
 
 
 
The probability of exceeding moderate damage for hospitals in the imported 
inventory is mapped in Figure 104, and the functionality of hospitals at day 1 is 
shown in Figure 105.   
 
Figure 104: Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Damage for Hospitals 
Figure 105: Hospital Functionality at Day 1 
 
 
The probability of exceeding moderate damage for schools in the new inventory is 
mapped in Figure 106, and the functionality of schools at day 1 is shown in Figure 
107.   
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The probability of exceeding moderate damage for police stations in the improved 
inventory is mapped in Figure 108, and the functionality of police stations at day 1 is 
shown in Figure 109.   
 
Figure 108: Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Damage for Police Stations 
Figure 109: Police Station Functionality at Day 1 
 
 
The probability of exceeding moderate damage for fire stations in the imported 
inventory is mapped in Figure 110, and the functionality of fire stations at day 1 is 
shown in Figure 111.   
 
 
Figure 106: Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Damage for Schools 
 
Figure 107: School Functionality at Day 1 
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Figure 110: Probability of Exceeding Moderate 
Damage for Fire Stations 
 
Figure 111: Fire Station Functionality at Day 1 
 
 
The essential facilities inventory presented in this chapter is an improvement over the 
HAZUS default essential facilities inventory.  The inventory is more detailed than the 
HAZUS inventory.  The essential facilities are for 31 counties in Illinois are based on 
tax assessor’s data.  The inventory contains real building type information and 
contains a larger number of essential facilities than the default HAZUS inventory.   
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8. Improved Bridge Inventory 
 
A database of state owned bridges was provided to this study by the Illinois 
Department of Transportation (IDOT) (Ahrens, 2006).  The database includes many 
bridge attributes, such as facility carried, features crossed, main structure type, deck 
width, number of spans, total length, skew angle, original construction year, 
reconstruction year, and much more. 
 
8.1 IDOT Bridge Classification 
 
Because the IDOT bridge inventory contained such a large number of bridge 
attributes, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the bridge characteristics 
that affect the estimated damage to bridges in HAZUS.  Liquefaction was not 
included in the sensitivity analysis.   According to the HAZUS Technical Manual, 
bridge length and skew angle only affect the damage estimate if liquefaction is 
included in the HAZUS analysis.  In the sensitivity analysis, changing the total bridge 
length and individual span length did not affect the damage results.  However, the 
bridge class did affect the damage results.  It was determined that when liquefaction 
is ignored, only the bridge class affects the damage estimates to bridges.  This 
conclusion is consistent with the HAZUS Technical Manual. 
 
Therefore, the information used from the IDOT bridge database was bridge location 
(latitude and longitude) and the bridge classification.  IDOT classifies bridge types 
differently than HAZUS, so the IDOT bridge types were manually matched to the 
HAZUS bridge types.  For cases in which an IDOT bridge type could correspond to 
more than one HAZUS bridge type, the most vulnerable of the HAZUS bridge type 
choices was assigned so that the damage results would be conservative.   
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Many of the bridges in the IDOT inventory fit the criteria for more than one HAZUS 
bridge type.  The definitions of the HAZUS bridge types can be found in Chapter 7 of 
the HAZUS Technical Manual.  A majority of the IDOT bridges could be assigned 
either to a specific HAZUS bridge type or HAZUS bridge type HWB1, which is a 
generic bridge type defined as a major bridge of length greater than 150 m.  In order 
to determine which bridge type is more vulnerable in HAZUS, Table 7.7 from the 
HAZUS Technical Manual was investigated.  The latter table gives the damage 
algorithms for bridges, which are in terms of the spectral acceleration for damage 
functions due to ground shaking and PGD damage functions due to ground failure.  
The latter damage functions are used only if liquefaction is included in the analysis.  
Table 96 gives the spectral acceleration for damage functions due to ground shaking 
for the bridge types that are applicable to Illinois.  Note that only the bridge types that 
are applicable to the State of Illinois are listed.  It was assumed that all existing 
bridges in the inventory for Illinois were not seismically designed, so all HAZUS 
bridges types specifying seismic design were ignored.  Assuming that no bridges in 
the Illinois inventory have seismic design may slightly overestimate the damage 
estimates and was conservative.   
 
Table 96 shows a comparison of the bridge vulnerabilities between the HAZUS 
bridge types and HAZUS bridge type HWB1.  The highlighted cells indicate the 
bridges that are more vulnerable than HWB1 (i.e., the threshold spectral acceleration 
values are smaller than those for HWB1, so they will reach any given limit state prior 
to HWB1).  The more vulnerable bridge type was assigned to the bridges that could 
be defined as either HWB1 or another bridge type.   
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Table 96: Bridge Types in Illinois and Corresponding Damage Functions 
CLASS Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
HWB1 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9
HWB3 0.8 1 1.2 1.7
HWB5 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.7
HWB8 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.8
HWB10 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5
HWB12 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.7
HWB15 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.1
HWB17 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.7
HWB20 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.8
HWB22 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5
HWB24 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.7
HWB26 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.1
HWB28 0.8 1 1.2 1.7
= more vulnerable than HWB1
Sa [1.0 sec in g’s] for Damage Functions due to Ground 
Shaking
 
 
 
After the HAZUS bridge types were assigned to the IDOT bridge inventory, the 
IDOT bridge database was imported with some difficulty.  The default bridges were 
deleted from the inventory in HAZUS and then the IDOT bridge database was 
imported.  The default bridges were no longer visible in the inventory menu within 
HAZUS, but still appeared on the map and in the attributes table for the bridge 
inventory layer when the imported bridge inventory was mapped in ArcMap.  
HAZUS only calculated damage for the newly imported bridges, so the remnants of 
the default bridge database did not affect the damage results.  The difficulties in 
importing the bridges are discussed further in Chapter 13 of this report. 
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8.2 IDOT Bridge Inventory 
 
Databases of state maintained and locally maintained highway bridges for the entire 
state of Illinois were provided by the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT).  
The database of state maintained highway bridges contained 7,659 records, and the 
database of locally maintained bridges contained a total of 18,871 records.  The 
inventory of state-maintained bridges is shown in Figure 112 and the inventory of 
locally-maintained bridges is shown in Figure 113 below. 
 
It was determined that HAZUS is not capable of importing such a large number of 
records, so the inventory of state maintained bridges for a set of critical counties to 
study in detail was imported into HAZUS.  There were far more locally-maintained 
bridges, and they could not be imported even into the set of critical counties, so the 
locally-maintained bridges were imported into Alexander County, Illinois for the 
purposes of illustration in this report. 
 
 
Figure 112: IDOT Inventory for State-
Maintained Bridges 
Figure 113: IDOT Inventory for Locally-
Maintained Bridges 
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8.3 State-Maintained Bridges 
 
 The critical counties for which the 
state-maintained bridges were 
imported are shown in yellow in 
114.  The inventory of state 
maintained bridges is shown in 
Figure 115 and the inventory of 
locally maintained bridges in the 
counties to study in detail is shown 
in Figure 116.  There are 
approximately 1,930 state-
maintained bridges and 4,020 
locally-maintained bridges in the set 
of critical counties.  It was determined that there are too many locally-maintained 
bridges in this southern region to import into HAZUS at once, so locally-maintained 
bridges were imported into a much smaller region, which is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 114: Counties in Detailed Study  
(Counties Shaded in Yellow) 
Figure 115: State-Maintained Bridges Inventory in 
Counties to Study in Detail 
Figure 116: Locally-Maintained Bridges Inventory in 
Counties to Study in Detail 
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8.4 Locally-Maintained Bridges 
 
The locally-maintained bridges were 
imported into only one county in the State 
of Illinois because there are an extremely 
large number of locally-maintained bridges 
in the State, and it was found that HAZUS 
is not capable of importing large databases.  
Chapter 13 of this report discusses this 
importing limitation of the loss estimation 
tool in more detail.  It was determined that 
HAZUS was able to import the locally-
maintained bridges for a study region the 
size of approximately one county.  
Therefore, the locally-maintained bridges were imported for only Alexander County 
in the State of Illinois.  There are 68 bridges in the locally-maintained bridge 
inventory for Alexander County.  Figure 117 shows the geographical location of 
Alexander County within the State.   
 
8.5 Damage Estimates  
 
The probability of exceeding moderate damage for the state-maintained bridges in the 
counties to study in detail is shown in Figure 118.   
 
 
Figure 117: Location of Alexander County 
in Illinois 
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Figure 118: Damage to State-Maintained Bridges in Southern Illinois 
 
The damage to the state-maintained bridges in the counties to study in detail is 
summarized in Table 97.   
 
Table 97: State-Maintained Highway Bridge Damage in Counties to Study in Detail 
After Day 1 After Day 7
Number of Bridges 1927 47 10 1,880 1,903
Percent % 2.4 0.5 97.6 98.8
Total With at Least 
Moderate Damage
With Complete 
Damage
With Functionality > 50%
 
 
HAZUS estimated that 47 state-maintained bridges would suffer at least moderate 
damage and 10 bridges would be damaged beyond repair if the scenario event were to 
occur.  It does not make sense to compare these damage results with those to the 
bridges in the default HAZUS inventory because the default HAZUS inventory 
includes both state-maintained and locally-maintained bridges. 
 
Figure 119 illustrates the locations of locally-maintained bridges in the IDOT 
inventory in Alexander County, Illinois, and Figure 120 shows the damage, as 
estimated by HAZUS, to the IDOT bridges in Alexander County.   
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The bridge damage estimated by HAZUS is summarized in Table 98.   
 
Table 98: Locally-Maintained Bridge Damage in Alexander County 
After Day 1 After Day 7
Number of Bridges 68 58 0 10 10
Percent % 3.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Total With at Least 
Moderate Damage
With Complete 
Damage
With Functionality > 50%
 
 
 
HAZUS estimated that 58 of the 68 locally-maintained bridges in Alexander County 
would suffer at least moderate damage and no bridges would be completely damaged 
due to the scenario event.  It was also estimated that 10 of the highway bridges would 
have functionality greater than 50 percent on the day of the earthquake, and still only 
10 of the bridges would be greater than 50 percent functional one week after the 
earthquake.  The reason that such a large portion of the highway bridge inventory 
would be significantly damaged is that Alexander County, being at the southern tip of 
Illinois, is very close to the epicenter of the earthquake.  Direct economic losses 
caused by bridge damage were not estimated because bridge replacement costs were 
not provided by IDOT. 
 
 
Figure 119: Location of Locally-Maintained Bridges 
in Alexander County 
 
 
Figure 120: Highway Bridge Damage  
Probability of Exceeding Moderate Damage  
(IDOT Bridge Inventory) 
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8.6 Verification of Highway Bridge Damage Estimates 
 
The highway bridge damage estimates from HAZUS were verified using an analysis 
in which all bridges in the IDOT bridge inventory were assigned the HAZUS bridge 
type HWB5.  When liquefaction is not included, the only bridge characteristic that 
affects damage probability is the bridge type.  Therefore, it was expected that if all 
bridges were assigned to a single type, the damage probabilities would follow the 
hazard.  Figure 121 shows the ground motion (peak ground acceleration) in the four 
census tracts in Alexander County, and Figure 122 illustrates the corresponding 
bridge damage probabilities.  The damage probabilities follow the hazard, as 
expected. 
 
Figure 121: Ground Motion in Alexander County 
(PGA) 
 
Figure 122: Damage to Highway Bridges 
(All HWB5 Bridge Type) 
 
 
8.7 Summary 
 
The bridge inventories presented in this chapter are significant improvements over the 
default HAZUS bridge inventory, both in number, accuracy, and detail.  However, the 
large number of records, especially for the locally-maintained bridge inventory, 
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prevents successful implementation into HAZUS.  The loss estimation tool is capable 
of only importing only approximately 2,000 bridge records into a region.  To estimate 
losses to the locally-maintained bridges, the inventory must be input into study 
regions the size of two or three counties, depending on the density of the bridges.  
Once the loss estimation performed for every subset of the total study regions, the 
results for the individual study regions must be aggregated.  This would prove to be 
very time consuming, especially for very large regions containing multiple states.  It 
is recommended that the importing capabilities be improved by the developers to 
facilitate such large projects. 
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9. Improved Pipelines Inventory 
 
The default utility systems inventory in HAZUS does not contain pipeline inventory 
based on data about any real pipelines.  The default pipeline length estimates are 
simply based on the road length within the study region.  If damage for specific 
pipelines is desired, the user must supply pipeline data to the loss estimation tool.  
HAZUS supports importing user-supplied pipelines for the oil, natural gas, potable 
water, and wastewater utility systems.  In this study, oil and natural gas utility 
pipelines were imported into HAZUS.  The pipelines were obtained from FEMA’S 
HSIP Gold Dataset (Office of Americas/North America & Homeland Security 
Division, 2005).   
 
9.1  HSIP Gold Dataset Pipeline Inventory 
 
The improved pipeline inventory was obtained from FEMA’S HSIP Gold Dataset.  
The HAZUS pipeline class (brittle pipes or ductile pipes) could not be determined 
from the information provided in the HSIP Gold Dataset, so the classes “ODFLT” (oil 
default) and “GDFLT” (natural gas default) were assigned to all oil pipelines and all 
natural gas pipelines, respectively.  These pipeline classes are consistent with a 
HAZUS analysis that that was provided by FEMA which included oil and natural gas 
pipelines from the HSIP Gold Dataset (FEMA, 2006c).   
 
The pipeline database in the HSIP Gold Dataset specifies the commodity carried by 
each pipeline.  The commodities include crude, LPG/NGL, natural gas, 
petrochemical, refined products, and miscellaneous.  The miscellaneous category 
includes commodities such as acetylene, ammonia, carbon dioxide, fiber optic, 
helium, hydrogen, methanol, nitrogen, oxygen, product gas, and others.  It was 
assumed that the oil and natural gas system pipelines carried the following 
commodities. 
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Oil pipeline (ODFLT) commodities: 
• Crude 
• Refined products 
• Petrochemical 
Natural gas pipeline (GDFLT) commodities: 
• Natural gas 
• LPG/NGL 
 
The HSIP Gold Dataset 
database contained many 
pipelines with a diameter 
specified to be zero.  The 
pipeline diameters for the 
pipelines with a diameter of 
zero were calculated using 
the average non-zero 
diameter for the given line 
type.  The average 
diameters for each line type 
are as listed below.  These 
diameters were used to 
replace every zero diameter pipeline in the database.   
• Transmission/trunk line: 17 inches 
• Gathering system main line: 8 inches 
• Gathering system field line: 6 inches 
• Local distribution: 7 inches 
 
 
 
Figure 123: Natural Gas Pipelines and Oil Pipelines HSIP 
Gold Dataset Inventory 
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9.2 Pipeline Damage 
 
The pipelines were imported (shown in Figure 123), a HAZUS analysis was run, and 
the damage to pipelines was estimated.  The break rate for pipelines and natural gas 
pipelines is illustrated in Figure 124 and Figure 125, respectively.  The break rates for 
oil pipelines and natural gas pipelines range from no breaks to about 0.005 breaks/km 
and from no breaks to about 0.015 breaks/km.  These very low break rates are in part 
due to the fact that liquefaction was not included in this analysis. 
 
 
 
It was determined that there is an error in the HAZUS calculations for total pipeline 
damage.  The leak, break, and repair rates for the pipelines were greater than zero, but 
HAZUS incorrectly estimated that the total leaks, breaks, and repairs were equal to 
zero.  The corrected number of leaks, breaks, and repairs were computed by 
multiplying each leak, break, and repair rate, which are in units of  leaks/km, 
breaks/km, and repairs/km of pipe, by the corresponding pipeline length outside of 
HAZUS.  The pipeline distances were measured in decimal degrees by default in 
ArcMap, so it was necessary to re-project the pipelines into a projection that using a 
metric unit for distance.  The total leaks, breaks, and repairs were summed for all 
pipelines in the region, and these results are shown in Table 99.   
 
 
Figure 124: Oil Pipeline Break Rate Figure 125: Natural Gas Pipeline Break Rate 
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Table 99: Pipeline Damage, HSIP Gold Dataset Pipeline Inventory 
System Total Pipeline Length (km)
Number of 
Leaks
Number of 
Breaks
Number of 
Repairs
Natural Gas 25,712 17 4 21
Oil 11,832 8 2 9  
 
Table 100 shows the estimated damage to natural gas and oil pipelines using the 
HAZUS default pipeline inventory.  HAZUS does not estimate any pipeline length or 
damage to oil pipelines by default.  HAZUS estimates a greater pipeline length, and 
therefore a greater number of leaks and breaks using its default inventory than using 
the HSIP Gold Dataset inventory.  The HSIP Dataset contains major distribution 
pipelines but does not include smaller, local distribution pipelines.  Therefore, using 
the HSIP Dataset is only beneficial in estimating the damage to these larger pipelines. 
 
Table 100: Pipeline Damage, HAZUS Default Pipeline Inventory 
System Total Pipeline Length (km)
Number of 
Leaks
Number of 
Breaks
Natural Gas 106,159 6616 1654
Oil 0 0 0  
 
 
9.3 Pipeline Functionality 
 
A sensitivity test was performed to determine how pipeline diameter affects damage 
results.  The test was performed by changing the diameters of the pipelines imported 
into HAZUS and comparing the resulting damage results from the loss estimation 
tool.  The sensitivity test determined that the pipeline diameter has no effect on the 
pipeline damage estimates.  This result agrees with the HAZUS Technical Manual.  
Table 101 shows the damage algorithms used in HAZUS, where "R.R." is the repair 
rate or number of repairs for km of pipe.  The pipeline damage depends only on the 
peak ground velocity or the peak ground deformation and the type of pipeline (brittle 
or ductile). 
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Table 101: Damage Algorithms for Oil Pipelines in HAZUS 
 
 
 
However, the pipeline diameter affects the restoration functions, which are used to 
calculate the functionality of pipelines at given intervals after the earthquake.  The 
restoration functions for oil pipelines are shown in Table 102.   
 
Table 102: Restoration Functions for Oil Pipelines 
 
 
 
The number of leaks and breaks for small and large pipelines is tabulated in Table 
103.  A small pipeline is a pipeline with a diameter smaller than 20 inches, and a 
large pipeline is any pipeline with a diameter of 20 inches or larger.  The pipeline size 
(large or small) affects the time required to repair the pipeline, as shown in Table 102 
and the equation above. 
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Table 103: Breaks and Leaks in Small and Large Pipelines 
System
Small Pipeline 
Leaks
Small Pipeline 
Breaks
Large Pipeline 
Leaks
Large Pipeline 
Breaks
Natural Gas 11 3 6 1
Oil 5 1 3 1  
 
As stated previously, the total leaks, breaks, and repairs, as estimated HAZUS, were 
equal to zero.  Because HAZUS estimated zero leaks, breaks, and repairs, the 
program always estimated that the pipeline functionality was 100%.  To remedy this 
error, the time required to repair the pipelines was calculated outside of HAZUS 
using the following equation from Section 8.1.7 from the HAZUS Technical Manual. 
 
Days needed to repair pipelines = 
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The time required to repair the natural gas and oil pipelines was calculated for the 
cases that 10, 20, 30, or 40 workers are available to repair the pipelines.  It is 
estimated that if 40 workers are available, it would take slightly over one day to repair 
all pipeline damage that was estimated by HAZUS. 
 
Table 104: Number of Days Required to Repair Pipelines 
Natural Gas Oil Total
10 3.0 1.4 4.3
20 1.5 0.7 2.2
30 1.0 0.5 1.4
40 0.7 0.3 1.1
Number of Available 
Workers
Days to Repair Pipelines
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9.4 Summary 
 
This section provides a basis for importing pipelines into HAZUS and calculating 
total damage outside of the loss estimation tool.  Oil and natural gas utility pipelines 
from FEMA’S HSIP Gold Dataset were used to improve the HAZUS utility systems 
inventory.  The HSIP Dataset contains major distribution pipelines but does not 
include smaller, local distribution pipelines.  The use of the default HAZUS inventory 
provided a more realistic damage and loss estimates for the total pipeline system (i.e., 
major distribution pipelines and local pipelines).  The use of the HSIP Dataset 
pipelines was beneficial in estimating the damage to the major distribution pipelines.   
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10. Improved Building Fragilities 
 
The methods for developing structural fragility curves vary in current research.  
Fragility curves can be developed using empirical results, expert judgment, analytical 
results, or a combination of these.  Each methodology has inherent advantages and 
disadvantages.  The fragility curves used in HAZUS and curves using the 
Parameterized Fragility Analysis Method (PFM) used to improve the HAZUS 
damage results are discussed in this chapter.  The advantages of the PFM are that the 
reliability of the parameters is quantifiable, the fragility parameters can be developed 
for any magnitude of earthquake, there is no opportunity for the results to contain 
bias, and the probabilistic fragility curves can be developed relatively quickly (Jeong, 
2006).   
 
 
10.1 HAZUS Building Fragility Parameters 
 
The fragility curves in HAZUS were developed using expert judgment and from past 
earthquakes (FEMA, 2006b).  Because the fragility recommendations depend on the 
individual experience of the experts, it is not possible to quantify the uncertainty in 
the fragility parameters.  Earthquakes of large magnitude occur relatively 
infrequently, so the empirical data available from past events is very limited to small 
events.  For these reasons, it is believed that the HAZUS default fragility parameters 
should be replaced by fragility parameters developed using more reliable means. 
 
The form of the fragility curves in HAZUS is shown in the equation below.  The 
fragilities are in terms of spectral displacement. 
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10.2 PFM Building Fragility Parameters 
 
A set of fragility curves for the 36 building types in HAZUS were developed using 
PFM (Jeong, 2006).  The fragility curve parameters are provided in the file 
“Parameterized Fragilities Using HAZUS Pushover and LSs.xls” on the CD provided 
in Appendix A of this report.   
 
The capacity for the development of the PFM fragility parameters were provided by 
default pushover curves in HAZUS for the 36 building types, and the HAZUS limit 
states were used.  The demand was developed by simulation of single degree of 
freedom inelastic structures, which is an improvement over the expert opinion used in 
the HAZUS fragilities.  Simulation was used to calculate the maximum response of 
inelastic SDOF structures based on dynamic analysis using real earthquake scenarios 
for the Memphis, Tennessee Lowlands.  Three earthquake scenarios were used: 7.5M 
event at Blytheville, AR, 6.5M event at Marked Tree, AR, and a 5.5M event at 
Memphis, TN.  The fragility curves were developed for the three intensity measures 
of PGA, Sa at 0.2 second, and Sa at 1.0 second.   
 
The equation below describes the fragility curves developed.  The fragility curve 
parameters (λ and β) are provided in the file “Parameterized Fragilities Using 
HAZUS Pushover and LSs.xls” on the CD provided in Appendix A of this report.   
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 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ= β
λ)ln()/( eeLSP  
where: 
)e/(LSP   = Probability of exceeding a limit state at a given 
earthquake intensity 
Φ  = Standard normal cumulative distribution function 
e  = Spectral acceleration 
βλ,  = Modification parameters 
 
 
The PFM fragility curves are not in a form that can be directly input into HAZUS 
because they are in terms of spectral acceleration, and the HAZUS fragility curves are 
in terms of spectral displacement.  There is not a simple method of converting the 
fragility curves in terms of one response parameter to be in terms of the other 
response parameter.  Instead of replacing the fragility curves in HAZUS with the 
improved fragility curves, an analysis was run using the HAZUS default fragility 
curves, and the damage estimates were multiplied by modification factors.  The 
development of the damage modification factors is described in the following section. 
 
10.3 Conversion from HAZUS to PFM Damage 
 
First, HAZUS was run using a region consisting of one census tract near Memphis, 
Tennessee, and the probability of reaching the each limit state (Slight, Moderate, 
Extensive, and Complete) were tabulated for every building type and for every design 
level.  The results were tabulated as shown in Table 105.  A census tract near 
Memphis was used because the PFM fragility curves used in this study were 
developed for the Memphis area. 
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Table 105: Probability of Reaching or Exceeding the Limit States by the HAZUS Analysis 
 LS #1 LS #2 LS #3 LS #4 
W1-H     
W1-M     
W1-L     
W1-P     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
  
 
Next, the probability of damage was calculated using the fragility curves from the 
parameterized fragility analysis curves.  The fragility equation used by Jeong, shown 
below, was used to calculate the probability of damage for every building type and 
for every design level.  The parameter e was set equal to the spectral acceleration in 
the census tract near Memphis described above.  The parameters λ and β were 
provided in a collection of parameterized fragility curves for the 36 HAZUS building 
types. 
 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ= β
λ)ln()/( eeLSP  
where: 
)e/(LSP   = Probability of exceeding a limit state at a given earthquake 
intensity 
Φ  = Standard normal cumulative distribution function 
e  = Spectral acceleration, taken as the spectral acceleration in 
the census tract studied near Memphis 
βλ,  = Modification parameters 
 
 
The equation above was used to calculate the probability of reaching or exceeding 
each limit state for every building type and for every design level.  The probabilities 
were tabulated as shown in Table 106.   
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Table 106: Probability of Reaching or Exceeding the Limit States using the MAEC Fragility 
Equation 
 LS #1 LS #2 LS #3 LS #4 
W1-H     
W1-M     
W1-L     
W1-P     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
  
 
Last, the probability values in Tables 105 and 106 were compared.  The damage 
conversion factors were calculated by calculation the ratio of the PFM probability 
divided by the HAZUS probability for each limit state for each building type and for 
each design level.  The ratios were tabulated as shown in Table 107.    
 
Table 107: Conversion factors for the HAZUS probabilities to be the Parameterized Fragility 
Analysis results (PFM probability/HAZUS probability) 
 LS #1 LS #2 LS #3 LS #4 
W1-H     
W1-M     
W1-L     
W1-P     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
· · · ·     
  
 
The development of the conversion factors are provided in the file “GBS HAZUS to 
PFM Damage Conversion Factors.xls” provided on the CD in Appendix A of this 
report.  The ratios of PFM probability to HAZUS probability were finally multiplied 
with the HAZUS probabilities of reaching each limit state for each building type and 
each design level.  The product is a converted probability of reaching or exceeding a 
limit state from the HAZUS fragility to the PFM fragility.  The application of the 
conversion factors is included in the file “GBS HAZUS to PFM Damage 
Conversion.xls” provided on the CD in Appendix A of this report.  The resulting 
damage is an estimate of what the PFM fragility curves would produce if they were 
used to perform the loss estimation.  The main improvement over the HAZUS 
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fragilities is that the procedure above includes estimating the demand points by 
inelastic dynamic analysis. 
 
10.4 Converted Damage Estimates 
 
The following tables show the number of buildings expected to reach or exceed each 
limit state for the 36 HAZUS building types.  The top portion of each table shows the 
number of buildings expected to reach or exceed each limit state from the HAZUS 
analysis, and the lower portion shows the improved, or PFM damage estimate.  Only 
the buildings that are in the HAZUS default inventory for the State of Illinois are 
shown in the tables. 
 
Table 108: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Wood (W1) Buildings 
W1 - Pre Code W1 - Low Code W1 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 0 2334020 7065
At Least Slight 24916 5697
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate No 3536 2927
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive Inventory 176 546
Complete 3 51
At Least Slight 26295 6938
Improved Damage At Least Moderate No 4036 4801
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive Inventory 220 546
Complete 5 146  
 
 
Table 109: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Wood (W2) Buildings 
W2 - Pre Code W2 - Low Code W2 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 8871 3197 13
At Least Slight 242 46 12
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 78 8 5
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 8 0 0
Complete 1 0 0
At Least Slight 218 43 11
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 59 8 5
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 4 0 0
Complete 0 0 0  
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Table 110: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Steel (S1) Buildings 
S1L - Pre Code S1L - Low Code S1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 931 47 0
At Least Slight 16 0
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 8 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 1 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0
At Least Slight 14 0
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 6 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 1 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0  
 
 
Table 111: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Steel (S2) Buildings 
S2L - Pre Code S2L - Low Code S2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 1667 248 2
At Least Slight 41 1 2
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 27 0 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 7 0 0
Complete 1 0 0
At Least Slight 34 1 2
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 19 0 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 3 0 0
Complete 0 0 0  
 
Table 112: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Steel (S3) Buildings 
S3 - Pre Code S3 - Low Code S3 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 4213 1381 3
At Least Slight 174 20 3
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 125 12 3
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 50 3 1
Complete 8 0 0
At Least Slight 163 19 3
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 110 12 3
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 36 3 1
Complete 3 0 0  
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Table 113: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Steel (S4) Buildings 
S4L - Pre Code S4L - Low Code S4L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 1902 846 1
At Least Slight 37 5 1
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 25 2 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 8 0 0
Complete 1 0 0
At Least Slight 31 4 1
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 19 2 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 4 0 0
Complete 0 0 0  
 
 
Table 114: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Steel (S5) Buildings 
S5L - Pre Code S5L - Low Code S5L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 2616 888 2
At Least Slight 50 6 2
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 26 2 2
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 8 0 1
Complete 1 0 0
At Least Slight 45 5
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 20 2 Not
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 5 0 Available
Complete 0 0  
 
Table 115: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Concrete (C1) Buildings 
C1L - Pre Code C1L - Low Code C1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 338 22 0
At Least Slight 3 0
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 2 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 1 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0
At Least Slight 3 0
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 2 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0  
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Table 116: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Concrete (C2) Buildings 
C2L - Pre Code C2L - Low Code C2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 30336 1180 91
At Least Slight 1644 12 86
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 880 4 64
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 231 1 21
Complete 27 0 2
At Least Slight 1450 11 80
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 682 4 55
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 136 1 16
Complete 9 0 2  
 
 
Table 117: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Concrete (C3) Buildings 
C3L - Pre Code C3L - Low Code C3L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 192 0 0
At Least Slight 1
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 1 No No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 Inventory Inventory
Complete 0
At Least Slight 1
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 1 No No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 Inventory Inventory
Complete 0  
 
Table 118: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Precast Concrete (PC1) Buildings 
PC1 - Pre Code PC1 - Low Code PC1 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 3309 1389 6
At Least Slight 107 14 6
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 71 7 5
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 30 2 2
Complete 4 0 0
At Least Slight 98 13 6
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 62 7 5
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 22 2 1
Complete 2 0 0  
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Table 119: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Precast Concrete (PC2) Buildings 
PC2L - Pre Code PC2L - Low Code PC2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 264 7 0
At Least Slight 3 0
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 2 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 1 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0
At Least Slight 2 0
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 2 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 1 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0  
 
 
Table 120: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Reinforced Masonry (RM1) Buildings 
RM1L - Pre Code RM1L - Low Code RM1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 5691 0 2
At Least Slight 51 2
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 32 No 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 10 Inventory 0
Complete 0 0
At Least Slight 46 2
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 27 No 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 7 Inventory 0
Complete 0 0  
 
Table 121: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Reinforced Masonry (RM2) Buildings 
RM2L - Pre Code RM2L - Low Code RM2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 24 3 2
At Least Slight 0 0 2
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 0 0 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 0 0
Complete 0 0 0
At Least Slight 0 0 2
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 0 0 1
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 0 0
Complete 0 0 0  
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Table 122: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Unreinforced Masonry (URM1) Buildings 
URML - Pre Code URML - Low Code URML - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 442609 245434 1563
At Least Slight 20352 6708 1554
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 8511 2273 1462
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 2697 457 991
Complete 718 40 452
At Least Slight 19440 6515
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 7681 2273 Not
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 2190 457 Available
Complete 509 40  
 
 
Table 123: HAZUS/PFM Damage Comparison for Manufactured Housing (MH) Buildings 
MH - Pre Code MH - Low Code MH - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 95343 48729 2266
At Least Slight 34468 8917 2256
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 24186 4240 2112
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 7674 551 1188
Complete 1258 0 229
At Least Slight 32963 9142 2313
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 21446 4240 2255
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 5206 551 1388
Complete 580 0 316  
 
 
 
10.5 Summary 
 
 
The damage for wood buildings (W1) increased when the PFM damage conversion 
factors were applied.  The number of manufactured housing units (MH) increased for 
the at least moderate damage state for pre-code structures.  The number of structures 
estimated to be in every damage state increased for the moderate-code mobile homes.  
The damage for every other building type and design level decreased when the PFM 
damage conversion factors were applied.   
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PFM fragility curves are more rigorous than the type in HAZUS with demand points 
based on simulation data rather than expert opinion.  Therefore, their use is an 
improvement over the HAZUS damage results.  The process of calculating the 
damage conversion factors and converting the HAZUS damage proved to be very 
time consuming.  It would be advantageous to develop fragility curves in terms of 
spectral acceleration for the 36 HAZUS building types and input them directly into 
the loss estimation tool.   
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11. Improved Highway Bridge Fragilities 
 
The HAZUS default highway bridge fragilities were replaced by fragilities that were 
developed using a component level approach (Nielson and DesRoches, 2006).  The 
bridge fragilities were developed as a study for the Mid-America Earthquake Center 
(MAEC), so the fragilities from Nielson and DesRoches (2006) are referred to as the 
“MAEC fragilities” in this report.  The file “MAEC Bridge Fragility Parameters.xls” 
on the CD in Appendix A of this report contains the MAEC-developed bridge 
fragility parameters. The improved fragilities and results are discussed in the 
following sections.   
 
11.1 Highway Bridge Fragility Parameters 
 
The MAEC fragilities were developed using an analytical methodology using a 
component level approach described in Nielson and DesRoches (2006).  The 
methodology takes into account the fragilities of the individual bridge components, 
such as columns, bearing, abutments, etc., and statistically combines the fragilities 
into an overall fragility for the bridge considered.  Nielson and DesRoches state that 
fragility curves developed using just one bridge component can contain errors up to 
50% due to simplification and neglect of the other bridge components (Nielson and 
DesRoches, 2006). 
 
The bridge types with MAEC-defined fragilities include Simply-Supported Concrete 
(SS_Concrete), Multi-Span Simply-Supported Concrete (MSSS_Concrete), Multi-
Span Simply-Supported Concrete Box Girder(MSSS_ConcBox), Multi-Span 
Continuous Concrete (MSC_Concrete), Simply-Supported Steel (SS_Steel), Multi-
Span Simply-Supported Steel (MSSS_Steel), and Multi-Span Continuous Steel 
(MSC_Steel).  The mapping of HAZUS bridge class to MAEC bridge type is shown 
in Table 124.  Dashes in the MAEC bridge type column indicate that there was not an 
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equivalent MAEC bridge type for the listed HAZUS bridge class.  The default 
HAZUS fragilities were used for such bridge classes. 
 
Table 124: HAZUS Bridge Class to MAEC Bridge Type Mapping 
MAEC Bridge Type
HWB1 Major Bridge - Length > 150m, Conventional Design --
HWB3 Single Span, Conventional Design SS_Concrete
HWB4 Single Span, Seismic Design --
HWB5 Concrete, Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Conventional Design MSSS_Concrete
HWB7 Concrete, Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Seismic Design --
HWB10 Continuous Concrete, Conventional Design MSC_Concrete
HWB11 Continuous Concrete, Seismic Design --
HWB12 Steel, Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Conventional Design MSSS_Steel
HWB14 Steel, Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Seismic Design --
HWB15 Continuous Steel, Conventional Design MSC_Steel
HWB16 Continuous Steel, Seismic Design --
HWB17 PS Concrete Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Conventional Design MSSS_Concrete
HWB219 PS Concrete Multi-Column Bent, Simple Support, Seismic Design MSSS_Conc Box
HWB22 Continuous PS Concrete, Conventional Design MSC_Concrete
HWB23 Continuous PS Concrete, Seismic Design --
HWB24 Same definition as HWB12 except that the bridge length is less than 20 meters MSSS_Steel
HWB26 Same definition as HWB15 except that the bridge length is less than 20 meters MSC_Steel
HWB28 All other bridges that are not classified, including wooden bridges --
HAZUS Bridge Classes in Illinois Inventory
 
 
The MAEC fragility curve parameters that were used to replace the default HAZUS 
values are shown in Table 125.   
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Table 125: New Fragility Curve Parameters (PGA) 
HAZUS Bridge Class Median Beta Median Beta Median Beta Median Beta
HWB1 * * * * * * * *
HWB3 0.35 0.9 1.33 0.9 1.83 0.9 2.5 0.9
HWB4 * * * * * * * *
HWB5 0.2 0.7 0.63 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.28 0.7
HWB7 * * * * * * * *
HWB10 0.16 0.7 0.53 0.7 0.75 0.7 1.01 0.7
HWB11 * * * * * * * *
HWB12 0.24 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.85 0.5
HWB14 * * * * * * * *
HWB15 0.19 0.5 0.32 0.5 0.41 0.5 0.51 0.5
HWB16 * * * * * * * *
HWB17 0.2 0.7 0.63 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.28 0.7
HWB219 0.22 0.8 0.69 0.8 1.31 0.8 3.39 0.8
HWB22 0.16 0.7 0.53 0.7 0.75 0.7 1.01 0.7
HWB23 * * * * * * * *
HWB24 0.24 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.85 0.5
HWB26 0.19 0.5 0.32 0.5 0.41 0.5 0.51 0.5
HWB28 * * * * * * * *
* Indicates a HAZUS bridge class that does not have a corresponding MAEC bridge class, so default HAZUS fragility parameters were used.
Complete DamageSlight Damage Moderate Damage Extensive Damage
 
 
A comparison of the MAEC and HAZUS highway bridge fragility parameters was 
conducted.  The comparison is shown in Table 126.  The median PGA from the 
MAEC fragilities for all bridge classes for the Slight damage state are smaller than 
the median PGA for the HAZUS fragilities, therefore, the bridges are more vulnerable 
to the Slight damage state when using the MAEC fragilities.  This is not true for the 
Moderate, Extensive, or Complete damage states.  For these latter damage states, the 
MAEC fragility curves lead to lower damage than the HAZUS fragilities for the 
bridge classes of HWB3, HWB5, HWB12, HWB17, and HWB26.  The opposite is 
true for HWB10, HWB15, HWB22, and HWB24, that is the MAEC fragilities 
indicate a more vulnerable bridge than the HAZUS fragilities. 
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Table 126: Comparison of MAEC and HAZUS Highway Bridge Fragility Parameters 
HAZUS Bridge Class Median Beta Median Beta Median Beta Median Beta
HWB3 0.35 0.9 1.33 0.9 1.83 0.9 2.5 0.9
HWB5 0.2 0.7 0.63 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.28 0.7
HWB10 0.16 0.7 0.53 0.7 0.75 0.7 1.01 0.7
HWB12 0.24 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.85 0.5
HWB15 0.19 0.5 0.32 0.5 0.41 0.5 0.51 0.5
HWB17 0.2 0.7 0.63 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.28 0.7
HWB219 0.22 0.8 0.69 0.8 1.31 0.8 3.39 0.8
HWB22 0.16 0.7 0.53 0.7 0.75 0.7 1.01 0.7
HWB24 0.24 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.85 0.5
HWB26 0.19 0.5 0.32 0.5 0.41 0.5 0.51 0.5
HWB3 0.8 0.6 1 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.7 0.6
HWB5 0.25 0.6 0.35 0.6 0.45 0.6 0.7 0.6
HWB10 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.5 0.6
HWB12 0.25 0.6 0.35 0.6 0.45 0.6 0.7 0.6
HWB15 0.75 0.6 0.75 0.6 0.75 0.6 1.1 0.6
HWB17 0.25 0.6 0.35 0.6 0.45 0.6 0.7 0.6
HWB19 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.6
HWB22 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.5 0.6
HWB24 0.25 0.6 0.35 0.6 0.45 0.6 0.7 0.6
HWB26 0.75 0.6 0.75 0.6 0.75 0.6 1.1 0.6
HWB3 -56.3 50.0 33.0 50.0 52.5 50.0 47.1 50.0
HWB5 -20.0 16.7 80.0 16.7 102.2 16.7 82.9 16.7
HWB10 -73.3 16.7 -41.1 16.7 -31.8 16.7 -32.7 16.7
HWB12 -4.0 -16.7 28.6 -16.7 28.9 -16.7 21.4 -16.7
HWB15 -74.7 -16.7 -57.3 -16.7 -45.3 -16.7 -53.6 -16.7
HWB17 -20.0 16.7 80.0 16.7 102.2 16.7 82.9 16.7
HWB219 -56.0 33.3 -13.8 33.3 19.1 33.3 99.4 33.3
HWB22 -73.3 16.7 -41.1 16.7 -31.8 16.7 -32.7 16.7
HWB24 -4.0 -16.7 28.6 -16.7 28.9 -16.7 21.4 -16.7
HWB26 -74.7 -16.7 -57.3 -16.7 -45.3 -16.7 -53.6 -16.7
MAEC Bridge Fragility 
Parameters            
(used to replace HAZUS 
parameters in this 
section)
HAZUS Default Bridge 
Fragility Parameters
Percent Difference     
(%)
Slight Damage Moderate Damage Extensive Damage Complete Damage
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11.2 Highway Bridge Damage Results 
 
The HAZUS highway bridge fragility parameters were replaced using the MAEC 
bridge fragility parameters shown in Table 125.  The HAZUS default highway bridge 
inventory was used in the analysis.  The probability of exceeding moderate damage 
for highway bridges in Illinois using the MAEC fragility parameters was mapped and 
is shown in Figure 126.   
 
Figure 126: Highway Bridge Damage using MAEC Fragilities 
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The probability of exceeding moderate damage, when using the default HAZUS 
fragility parameters is shown in Figure 127.  The high probabilities are more 
concentrated near the earthquake epicenter in the analysis using the improved bridge 
fragilities, but there are nearly two times as many bridges with high probabilities of 
experiencing at least moderate damage.   
 
Figure 127: Highway Bridge Damage using Default Fragilities 
 
The highway bridge damage results for both the MAEC and HAZUS fragility 
parameters are summarized in Table 127.  HAZUS estimates that approximately 
twice as many bridges will be damaged when using the MAEC fragilities as 
compared to using the HAZUS fragility parameters.  It was also estimated that about 
33 highway bridges would suffer complete damage when using the MAEC fragility 
parameters, which is approximately five times more than the number that was 
estimated when using the HAZUS fragility parameters.   
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Table 127: Highway Bridge Damage Results 
Count % Count % Count % Count %
MAEC 121 0.53 33 0.14 22,713 99.38 22,790 99.72
HAZUS 66 0.29 6 0.03 22,794 99.74 22,813 99.82
Number of 
Bridges
22,854
With at Least 
Moderate 
Damage
With Complete 
Damage
Fragility 
Parameters After Day 1 After Day 7
With Functionality > 50%
 
 
 
Because there are many bridges in the State of Illinois that are predicted to remain 
undamaged due to the scenario event, the number of operational bridges was 
predicted to be very high.  The large number of bridges with no damage overpowers 
the small number of bridges that have varying damage due to the different fragility 
models, therefore, the overall state functionality estimates appear to be relatively 
similar between the bridges using the MAEC fragility parameters and the bridges 
using the HAZUS fragility parameters. 
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12. Comparison with CUSEC HAZUS Analysis 
 
A HAZUS analysis for the region including and surrounded by the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone (NMSZ) was conducted by the Central US Earthquake Consortium – 
CUSEC.  This HAZUS analysis (Blake, 2006) will be referred to as the “CUSEC run” 
or the “CUSEC analysis” from this point forward.  The following sections describe 
the CUSEC analysis and discuss the results. 
 
12.1 Overview of CUSEC HAZUS Analysis 
 
The CUSEC region included portions of the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Tennessee.  The 
CUSEC analysis was 
completed using HAZUS-MH 
MR1 default inventories, 
parameters, and calculations.  
The scenario earthquake was of 
magnitude 7.7 and located on 
the southwest segment of the 
theoretical fault in the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone.  The 
theoretical fault locations are 
shown in Figure 128.  The 
ground motions were input in 
the form of user-defined ground motion maps for Peak Ground Acceleration, Peak 
Ground Velocity, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second. 
 
 
 
Figure 128: New Madrid Seismic Zone Theoretical Fault 
Locations 
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The CUSEC analysis report 
provided a list of 40 counties 
that were included in the 
HAZUS analysis.  The study 
region is shown in Figure 
129.  The same study region 
was recreated and run in this 
study for comparison of 
results. 
 
 
 
 
The CUSEC results were compared with the results from this study.  The main 
difference in the damage and loss estimates was due to a difference in ground motion.  
The ground motion differs for the two analyses because the earthquake epicenters are 
assumed to be in different locations.  There may be subtle differences between the 
results of the two studies because the HAZUS-MH MR1 was used in the CUSEC 
study, and HAZUS-MH MR2 was used in this study. 
 
12.2 Damage Estimates 
 
The damage estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, 
transportation systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
12.2.1 General Building Stock 
 
Tables 128 and 129 show the expected building damage by occupancy for the 
CUSEC HAZUS analysis and the HAZUS analysis in this study.  Approximately 
 
Figure 129: Census Tracts Studied in CUSEC Analysis 
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38.6%, 86.5%, 70.8%, and 52.9% fewer buildings were expected to be completely 
damaged, extensively damaged, moderately damaged, and slightly damaged, 
respectively, in the CUSEC study when compared to this study.  The number of 
building estimated to be undamaged increased by 19.3% in the CUSEC study.  The 
increase in damage to the general building stock was due to the fact that the 
earthquake epicenter in the MAEC study was much closer to Illinois than that in the 
CUSEC study. 
 
Table 128: Expected Building Damage by Occupancy, CUSEC 
4,267Total 402,264 24,818 10,204
933 61.3266.10 4,992 48.92
1,521
3,147 73.75
0.14 4 0.10
Single Family 339,820 84.48 16,405
0.08 9 0.09 2Religion 269 0.07 20
560 36.80 1,082 25.36
0.16 2 0.05
Other Residential 58,602 14.57 8,135 32.78 5,080 49.79
0.08 10 0.10 2Industrial 327 0.08 20
2 0.11 2 0.06
0.01 1 0.02
Government 167 0.04 14 0.06 8 0.07
0.01 1 0.01 0Education 26 0.01 2
21 1.41 28 0.65
0.04 1 0.02
Commercial 2,940 0.73 217 0.87 100 0.98
Count (% )
Agriculture 114 0.03 5 0.02 3 0.03 1
Count (% ) Count (% )Count (% ) Count (% )
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
 
 
Table 129 : Expected Building Damage by Occupancy, MAEC 
11,245 6,953Total 337,247 52,669 34,960
3,343 29.73 4,409 63.40
0.13 8 0.12
Single Family 307,533 91.19 36,963 70.18 13,049 37.32
0.09 37 0.11 15Religion 197 0.06 47
7,683 68.33 2,464 35.43
0.16 4 0.06
Other Residential 27,140 8.05 14,906 28.30 21,266 60.83
0.12 58 0.17 18Industrial 218 0.06 64
12 0.11 6 0.09
0.02 1 0.02
Government 100 0.03 40 0.08 35 0.10
0.01 6 0.02 2Education 15 0.00 6
167 1.49 59 0.85
0.04 2 0.03
Commercial 1,956 0.58 627 1.19 496 1.42
Count (% )
Agriculture 89 0.03 17 0.03 12 0.03 4
Count (% ) Count (% )Count (% ) Count (% )
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
 
 
 
 
12.2.2 Essential Facilities 
 
The expected damage to essential facilities is shown in Tables 130 and 131 for the 
two studies.  This study estimated that many more of each class of essential facility, 
except emergency, operation centers would suffer at least moderate damage than the 
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CUSEC study estimated.  The number of facilities estimated to be at least moderately 
damaged decreased by about 94% for medical facilities, 85% for schools, 83% for 
police stations, and 86% for fire stations.  The CUSEC study also estimated that no 
essential facilities were completely damaged; however, this study does estimate that 
some essential facilities suffer damage beyond repair.  The smaller damage estimates 
of the CUSEC study are due to the fact that the earthquake epicenter location is 
relatively distant from the State of Illinois.   
 
Table 130: Expected Damage to Essential Facilities, CUSEC 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 53 1 1.9 0 0.0 52 98.1
Schools 727 14 1.9 0 0.0 696 95.7
EOCs 33 5 15.2 0 0.0 27 81.8
PoliceStations 202 6 3.0 0 0.0 187 92.6
FireStations 242 5 2.1 0 0.0 225 93.0
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
 
 
 
Table 131: Expected Damage to Essential Facilities, MAEC 
Classification Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count %
Hospitals 53 16 30.2 1 1.9 32 60.4
Schools 727 91 12.5 9 1.2 571 78.5
EOCs 33 5 15.2 2 6.1 27 81.8
PoliceStations 202 36 17.8 6 3.0 141 69.8
FireStations 242 37 15.3 7 2.9 173 71.5
With at Least With  With Functionality
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage  > 50% on day 1
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12.2.3 Transportation Systems 
 
The damage estimates for the transportation systems are shown in Tables 132 and 133 
for the CUSEC study and this study, respectively.  This study estimates that 104 more 
highway bridges will be at least moderately damaged than the number of bridges 
estimated by the CUSEC study.  The CUSEC study and this study estimated that the 
same number of ferry facilities would be damaged.  The CUSEC study estimated that 
no remaining transportation system components would be at least moderately 
damaged, but it was estimated that 5 railway bridges, 5 railway facilities, 11 port 
facilities, and 2 airport facilities would be at least moderately damaged in this study.  
The increased damage to facilities in this study is due to the fact that the earthquake 
epicenter is closer to the State of Illinois than in the CUSEC study.  
 
Table 132: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems, CUSEC 
Locations/
System Component Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 1,099 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,088 99.0 1,088 99.0
Bridges 6,554 5 0.1 0 0.0 6,549 99.9 6,554 100.0
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Railways Segments 2,023 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,023 100.0 2,023 100.0
Bridges 197 0 0.0 0 0.0 197 100.0 197 100.0
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 60 0 0.0 0 0.0 60 100.0 60 100.0
Light Rail Segments 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Bridges 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Bus Facilities 16 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 100.0 16 100.0
Ferry Facilities 2 2 100.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Port Facilities 94 0 0.0 0 0.0 94 100.0 94 100.0
Airport Facilities 122 0 0.0 0 0.0 122 100.0 122 100.0
Runways 145 0 0.0 0 0.0 145 100.0 145 100.0
With at Least With Complete With Functionality > 50 %
Mod. Damage Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
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Table 133: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems, MAEC 
Locations/
System Component Segments
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Highway Segments 1,099 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,088 99.0 1,088 99.0
Bridges 6,554 109 1.7 20 0.3 6,453 98.5 6,490 99.0
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Railways Segments 2,023 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,023 100.0 2,023 100.0
Bridges 197 5 2.5 0 0.0 192 97.5 192 97.5
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 60 5 8.3 0 0.0 57 95.0 59 98.3
Light Rail Segments 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Bridges 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Tunnels 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Facilities 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Bus Facilities 16 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 100.0 16 100.0
Ferry Facilities 2 2 100.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Port Facilities 94 11 11.7 0 0.0 83 88.3 88 93.6
Airport Facilities 122 3 2.5 0 0.0 120 98.4 121 99.2
Runways 145 0 0.0 0 0.0 145 100.0 145 100.0
With Functionality > 50 %
After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least
Mod. Damage
With Complete
Damage
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12.2.4 Utility Systems 
 
The expected damage to utility system facilities is summarized in Tables 134 and 135 
for both studies.  The CUSEC study estimated that no utility system facilities would 
be more than moderately damaged, however, this study estimated that 5 potable water 
facilities, 17 waste water facilities, 3 natural gas facilities, 2 electrical power 
facilities, and 6 communication facilities would suffer at least moderate damage.  The 
difference in damage estimates was due to the difference in ground motion.  The 
ground motions in this study were stronger than those in the CUSEC study.  Neither 
study estimated that any utility system facilities would suffer complete damage. 
 
Table 134: Expected Damage to Utility Systems, CUSEC 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 74 0 0.0 0 0.0 74 100.0 74 100.0
Waste Water 300 0 0.0 0 0.0 282 94.0 300 100.0
Natural Gas 16 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 100.0 16 100.0
Oil Systems 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Electrical Power 28 0 0.0 0 0.0 26 92.9 28 100.0
Communication 122 0 0.0 0 0.0 122 100.0 122 100.0
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least With with Functionality > 50 %
 
 
 
Table 135: Expected Damage to Utility Systems, MAEC 
System Total 
# of Facilities Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable 74 5 6.8 0 0.0 68 91.9 74 100.0
Waste Water 300 17 5.7 0 0.0 269 89.7 292 97.3
Natural Gas 16 3 18.8 0 0.0 13 81.3 16 100.0
Oil Systems 15 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 15 100.0
Electrical 28 2 7.1 0 0.0 26 92.9 28 100.0
Communicati 122 6 4.9 0 0.0 121 99.2 121 99.2
With with Functionality > 50 %
 Moderate Damage Complete Damage After Day 1 After Day 7
With at Least
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The estimated damage to utility system pipelines for the CUSEC study and this study 
are shown in Tables 136 and 137, respectively.  The number of leaks in the potable 
water, waste water, and natural gas pipelines are greatly increased by the increased 
ground motion in this study, as compared to the CUSEC study.  The estimated 
number of leaks increased by a factor of approximately 4.8 for all three types of 
pipelines, compared to the CUSEC study.  The number of breaks increases by a factor 
of about 2.26.  The increased damage is due to the higher ground motion.   
 
Table 136: Expected Utility System Pipeline Damage, CUSEC 
Total Pipelines Number of Number of 
System Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 79,646 610 1491
Waste Water 47,788 483 1179
Natural Gas 31,858 516 1260  
 
 
Table 137: Expected Utility System Pipeline Damage, MAEC 
Total Pipelines Number of Number 
System Length (kms) Leaks Breaks
Potable Water 79,646 2925 3376
Waste Water 47,788 2313 2670
Natural Gas 31,858 2473 2855  
 
 
 
The expected performance of the potable water and electrical power systems for the 
CUSEC study and this study are presented in Tables 138 and 139, respectively.  This 
study estimated that more 58.3% more households would be without potable water on 
the day of the earthquake than the CUSEC study.  In addition, this study estimated 
that a higher number of households would be without potable water on 3, 7, and 30 
days after the earthquake.  The CUSEC study estimated that no households would be 
without electric power at any time period after the earthquake.  There was likely an 
error in the CUSEC analysis of electric power system performance.  It is possible that 
the module that calculates the performance of the electric power system was not 
included in the HAZUS loss estimation or that the electric power system inventory 
was removed for the analysis.   
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Table 138: Potable Water and Electrical Power System Performance, CUSEC 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 20,357 3.9 17,003 3.2 10,781 2.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
524,859
Electric Power 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
 
 
 
Table 139: Potable Water and Electrical Power System Performance, MAEC 
Total # of 
Households Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Potable Water 32,215 6.1 27,959 5.3 23,766 4.5 5,328 1.0 0 0.0
524,859
Electric Power 11,049 2.1 7,235 1.4 3,736 0.7 1,248 0.2 15 0.0
At Day 7 At Day 30
Households without Service
At Day 90At Day 1 At Day 3
 
 
 
 
 
12.2.5 Fire Following Earthquake 
 
The CUSEC study estimated that will be 16 fire ignitions and they will burn about 
0.25 square miles of the study region, and this study estimated that there will be 21 
fire ignitions that will burn about 0.18 square miles of the study region area.  The 
increase in ignitions is due to the increased ground motion.  The number of ignitions 
and burned area are based on the building square footage and ground motion intensity 
in the study region.  There are also random factors included in the Fire Following 
Earthquake Module.  The difference in burned area between the two HAZUS 
analyses is due to the fact that random factors are included in the module or the fact 
that two different versions of HAZUS were used to complete the two studies. 
 
12.2.6 Debris 
 
The CUSEC study estimated that no debris would be generated, but this study 
estimated that approximately 1 million tons of debris will be generated.  The debris 
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estimates are also based on the building square footage and ground motion intensity 
in the study region.  The debris estimates are smaller for the CUSEC analysis because 
the ground motion is smaller in that analysis. 
 
12.3 Social Losses 
 
Social losses include the number of displaced households, people seeking public 
shelters, injuries, and casualties.  The social loss estimates from HAZUS are 
discussed in this section. 
 
12.3.1 Displaced Households 
 
The CUSEC study estimated that 5,041 households would be displaced due to the 
earthquake, and this study estimated that 7,663 households would be displaced.  The 
number of displaced households is based on the portion of buildings in the general 
building stock that suffer significant damage.  The CUSEC study estimated that 
approximately 1.5 times more buildings will suffer complete damage (due to 
liquefaction effects) than this study estimated.  Therefore, more households were 
estimated to be displaced is higher in the CUSEC because of the increased number of 
buildings suffering complete damage. 
 
12.3.2 Injuries and Casualties 
 
The injury and casualty estimates for the three earthquake occurrence times in 
HAZUS for the CUSEC study and this study are shown in Tables 140 and 141, 
respectively.  This study estimated more casualties and injuries than the CUSEC 
study for nearly every category of injury, every time of earthquake occurrence, and 
every general occupancy class.  The injury and casualty estimates depend on 
structural damage to buildings and structural damage to bridges, so the increased 
building damage and bridge damage, which is due to higher ground motion, in this 
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study causes increased injury and casualty estimates.  The number of level 1 injuries 
was estimated to increase by 2.1, 2.5, and 2.4 at 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively, 
in this study due to increased ground motion parameters.  The number of level 2 
injuries increased by factors of 1.9, 2.2, and 2.2 at the earthquake occurrence times 2 
AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively.  The level 3 injuries were estimated to increase 
by factors of 2.0, 2.2, 2.3 at 2 AM, 2 PM, and 5 PM, respectively.  Finally, the 
number of casualties (level 4 injuries) was estimated to increase by a factor of 2.0 at 
the earthquake occurrence time of 2 AM and the number of casualties was estimated 
to increase by a factor of 2.1 at both 2 PM and 5 PM in this study because the ground 
motion increased due to the nearer earthquake epicenter.   
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Table 140: Casualty Estimates, CUSEC 
49
5
Single Family 314 84 10 18
0
Industrial 26 7 1 2
21 4
Educational 9 2 0 1
47
5 PM Commercial 251 70 10 20
3
Single Family 188 50 6 11
0
Industrial 42 12 2 4
0
Educational 103 30 5 9
Commuting 0 1 1
56
2 PM Commercial 265 72 11 21
12
Single Family 780 205 23 43
0
Industrial 6 2 0 0
2 AM Commercial 3 1 0 0
Hotels 6 2 0
Other-Residential 280 68 7
Total 1,074 277 30
Hotels 1 0 0
Other-Residential 64 16 2
Total 663 182 26
Commuting 8 15
Hotels 2 0 0
Other-Residential 105 26 3
Total 716 205 46
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commuting 0 0 0 0
Educational 0 0 0 0
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Table 141: Casualty Estimates, MAEC 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
2 AM Commercial 10 2 0 1
Commuting 0 0 0 0
0
Hotels 14 3 0 1
Educational 0 0 0
1
Other-Residential 831 173 15 28
Industrial 14 3 0
83
Total 2,273 538 60 113
Single Family 1,404 356 43
2 PM Commercial 754 178 23 45
Commuting 1 2 3 1
21
Hotels 3 1 0 0
Educational 291 74 11
6
Other-Residential 181 39 4 7
Industrial 101 25 3
21
Total 1,671 406 56 101
Single Family 339 88 12
5 PM Commercial 700 169 23 43
Commuting 22 37 54 11
2
Hotels 4 1 0 0
Educational 42 9 1
4
Other-Residential 309 65 6 11
Industrial 63 15 2
34
Total 1,706 443 105 105
Single Family 565 146 19
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12.4 Economic Loss Estimates 
 
The loss estimates for the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation 
systems, and utility systems are discussed in the following sections.   
 
12.4.1 General Building Stock 
 
Tables 142 and 143 show the building-related economic losses for the two studies.  
This study estimated greater economic losses to buildings for every type of loss and 
general occupancy class.  The increased losses are due to the increased building 
damage estimated by this study, as compared to the CUSEC study.  The total income 
losses reduced by approximately 71% and the total capital stock losses reduced by 
approximately 51% in the CUSEC study when compared to the results of this study. 
 
Table 142: Building-Related Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), CUSEC 
Category Area Commercial IndustrialSingle  
Family
Other
Residential
Total Others
30.56 45.87 1,141.50 
Total 757.90 215.72 189.74 31.75 49.45 1,244.56 
Subtotal 729.15 197.49 138.43 
9.53 13.04 211.36 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 1.52 2.02 0.27 3.81 
Content 121.44 30.10 37.25 
4.01 8.09 219.55 
Non_Structural 460.97 132.78 73.56 15.00 24.47 706.78 
51.31 
Structural 146.74 34.61 26.10 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 28.75 18.23 
0.02 0.28 3.97 
1.19 3.58 103.06 
Relocation 2.66 0.43 0.58 
0.38 0.59 20.54 
Rental 26.09 14.84 9.61 0.18 0.83 51.55 
Capital-Related 0.00 0.88 18.69 
22.43 0.61 1.88 27.00 Wage 0.00 2.08 
Income Loses
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Table 143: Building-Related Economic Losses (Millions of Dollars), MAEC 
Category Area Single 
Family
Other
Residential
Total Commercial Industrial Others
Wage 0.00 5.44 100.52 2.84 7.38 
Income Loses
116.18 
Capital-Related 0.00 2.38 82.64 1.83 2.19 89.05 
Rental 48.74 39.09 44.14 0.97 3.46 136.40 
Relocation 5.40 1.52 2.84 0.11 1.09 10.96 
5.76 14.12 352.59 
Capital Stock Loses
Subtotal 54.13 48.43 230.15 
Structural 232.15 120.81 107.47 15.63 30.59 506.64 
Non_Structural 724.96 362.45 215.48 34.57 69.27 1,406.73 
Content 202.67 68.48 90.38 20.28 31.88 413.69 
Inventory 0.00 0.00 3.83 4.43 0.78 9.03 
Subtotal 1,159.78 551.74 417.15 74.91 132.51 2,336.09 
Total 1,213.91 600.17 647.30 80.67 146.63 2,688.68  
 
 
 
12.4.2 Transportation Systems 
 
The economic losses to the transportation systems are shown in Tables 144 and 145 
for the two studies.  In all cases, the economic losses to highway systems are 
estimated to be higher by this study than by the CUSEC study.  The losses were 
greater in this study than in the CUSEC study because of the higher ground motions 
in this study. 
 
The losses to highway systems, railway systems, bus facilities, port facilities, and 
airport systems are approximately 78%, 120%, 40%, 66%, and 88% higher in this 
study than the CUSEC study.  The increased transportation system economic losses 
are due to increased damage to the transportation system components which is due to 
the nearer earthquake epicenter location to Illinois in this study as compared to the 
CUSEC study. 
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Table 144: Transportation System Economic Loss (Millions of Dollars), CUSEC 
Loss Ratio (% )
40087.67 Total
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss
Subtotal 5740.37 43.30 
278.47 
4.37
Runways 5,002.33 $11.05 0.22
Airport Facilities 738.04 $32.25 
8.48
Subtotal 211.07 17.89 
Port Facilities 211.07 $17.89 
100.00
Subtotal 2.42 2.42 
Ferry Facilities 2.42 $2.42 
5.27
Subtotal 19.36 1.02 
Bus Facilities 19.36 $1.02 
Subtotal 3469.13 15.05 
Facilities 145.19 $7.84 5.40
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.21
Bridges 22.90 $0.27 1.18
Subtotal 30643.56 198.79 
Railways Segments 3,301.04 $6.94 
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
0.47
Bridges 4,992.46 $79.47 1.59
Highway Segments 25,651.10 $119.32 
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Table 145: Transportation System Economic Loss (Millions of Dollars), MAEC 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% )
Highway Segments 25,651.10 $193.04 0.75
Bridges 4,992.46 $160.28 3.21
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Subtotal 30643.56 353.32 
Railways Segments 3,301.04 $20.76 0.63
Bridges 22.90 $0.42 1.83
Tunnels 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Facilities 145.19 $11.84 8.15
Subtotal 3469.13 33.02 
Bus Facilities 19.36 $1.37 7.09
Subtotal 19.36 1.37 
Ferry Facilities 2.42 $2.42 100.00
Subtotal 2.42 2.42 
Port Facilities 211.07 $29.82 14.13
Subtotal 211.07 29.82 
Airport Facilities 738.04 $52.37 7.10
Runways 5,002.33 $29.16 0.58
Subtotal 5740.37 81.53 
40087.67 501.48 Total  
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12.4.3 Utility Systems 
 
The losses to the utility systems are shown in Tables 146 and 147 for the CUSEC 
study and this study, respectively.  The losses estimated by the CUSEC study are 
lower than the losses estimated by this study because the ground motion parameters 
are lower.  The economic loss to the utility system decreased in the CUSEC study by 
about 51% for the potable water system, 48% for the waste water system, 59% for the 
natural gas system, 46% for the electric power system, and 44% for the 
communication system when compared to the utility system economic loss in this 
study. 
Table 146: Utility System Economic Loss (Millions of Dollars), CUSEC 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% ) 
Total 31,552.27 $678.44 
2.44
Subtotal 13.54 $0.33 
Communication Facilities 13.54 $0.33 
2.11
Subtotal 3,418.80 $72.23 
Subtotal 1.67 $0.01 
Electrical Power Facilities 3,418.80 $72.23 
0.00
Facilities 1.67 $0.01 0.66
Subtotal 656.53 $14.13 
Oil Systems Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 637.17 $13.63 2.14
0.00
Facilities 19.36 $0.50 2.58
Subtotal 23,133.55 $526.41 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 955.75 $12.75 1.33
0.00
Facilities 22,177.80 $513.66 2.32
Subtotal 4,328.18 $65.33 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
Distribution 1,592.92 $16.13 1.01
0
Facilities 2,735.26 $49.20 1.80
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 
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Table 147: Utility System Economic Loss (Millions of Dollars), MAEC 
System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (% ) 
Potable Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Facilities 2,735.26 $94.93 3.47
Distribution Lines 1,592.92 $39.61 2.49
Subtotal 4,328.18 $134.55 
Waste Water Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Facilities 22,177.80 $977.37 4.41
Distribution Lines 955.75 $31.33 3.28
Subtotal 23,133.55 $1,008.70 
Natural Gas Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Facilities 19.36 $1.09 5.62
Distribution Lines 637.17 $33.49 5.26
Subtotal 656.53 $34.58 
Oil Systems Pipelines 0.00 $0.00 0.00
Facilities 1.67 $0.01 0.66
Subtotal 1.67 $0.01 
Electrical Power Facilities 3,418.80 $133.94 3.92
Subtotal 3,418.80 $133.94 
Communication Facilities 13.54 $0.59 4.37
Subtotal 13.54 $0.59 
Total 31,552.27 $1,312.38  
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12.5 Summary of Losses 
 
The HAZUS loss estimation study performed by CUSEC had an earthquake epicenter 
that was much farther from the region of interest (Illinois) than in the earthquake 
epicenter location used for all studies in this report.   
 
The number of general buildings estimated to be damaged significantly increased in 
this study due to the higher ground motion parameters.  As a result of the increase in 
completely damaged buildings, this study estimated that about 52% more households 
would be displaced.  The total economic loss to the buildings in the study region was 
estimated to be approximately 2.16 times higher in this study than in the CUSEC 
study because of the increased ground motions.  The damage to essential facilities 
was drastically smaller in the CUSEC study because the magnitude of the ground 
motion parameters was smaller in the CUSEC study.  This study estimated increased 
damage to the transportation system components. The total economic loss to the 
transportation system was estimated to be increase by 80% in this study.   
 
The estimated damage to utility system components increased due to the increased 
ground motion in this study, as well.  The number of utility system pipeline leaks 
increased by a factor of approximately 4.8 in this study due to the higher seismic 
hazard.  The total economic losses to the utility system were estimated to increase by 
94% in this study because of the increased damage and ground motion. 
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13. Assessment of HAZUS Loss Assessment 
Capabilities 
 
During the course of this study, problems and shortcomings in the HAZUS loss 
estimation tool were discovered.  This chapter describes such issues with the HAZUS 
program.   
 
13.1 Importing Bridge Data  
 
Several issues were encountered in HAZUS when importing the bridge inventory that 
was provided by IDOT.  These issues are described in the following sections. 
 
13.1.1 Remnants of HAZUS Default Bridge Inventory 
 
First, the default bridge records were deleted and replaced with the IDOT bridges 
within HAZUS, as shown in Figure 130.   
 
 
Figure 130: IDOT Bridge Inventory in HAZUS with No Default Records Present 
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Although no records for the HAZUS default bridge inventory remain in the 
Transportations Systems Inventory window pictured in Figure 130, remnants of the 
default bridges remained.  Both the IDOT bridges and the HAZUS default bridges 
displayed on the map of the study region when the bridge inventory was mapped 
within HAZUS.  A close-up of the study region with the mapped bridge locations is 
shown in Figure 131.  The circled bridges are those that have records both in the 
IDOT inventory and the HAZUS inventory.  Two bridge symbols are displayed for 
the bridges that are in both inventories. 
 
= Duplicate Bridge
 
Figure 131: Highway Bridges in Both the HAZUS Inventory and the IDOT Inventory 
 
 
After the HAZUS analysis was run, and damage was calculated for highway bridges, 
the damage was mapped.  The attributes table of the mapped bridge damage 
contained records for both the HAZUS bridge inventory and the IDOT bridge 
inventory; even though the HAZUS bridge inventory was deleted before the IDOT 
bridge inventory was imported.  The attributes table for bridge damage is shown in 
Figure 132.  Two characteristics distinguish the two sets of inventories.  First, the 
IDOT bridge identifiers begin with the letters “US”, and the HAZUS bridge 
identifiers begin with the letters “IL”.  Second, the fields for all hazard and damage 
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parameters for the HAZUS inventory are filled with the value “<Null>”.  Damage 
probabilities are not calculated for the deleted HAZUS bridge inventory.  Both of 
these characteristics can be seen in the attributes table in Figure 132.  
 
IDOT Bridges
HAZUS Bridges
 
Figure 132: Attributes Table with Imported IDOT and Default HAZUS Bridge Records 
 
Other errors in replacing the bridge inventory in HAZUS were noted during this 
study.  For example, a set of test bridges were added to the inventory manually after 
deleting the HAZUS bridge inventory.  The process of deleting the old records and 
inserting the new records needed to be repeated multiple times before the new 
highway bridges correctly displayed in the Transpiration Systems Inventory window 
and the bridge locations mapped correctly on the study region. 
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13.1.2 Database Selection Prompt Bypassed 
  
Another error that occurred when importing a bridge inventory was that HAZUS 
skipped the prompt to select the file in which the bridge inventory is contained.  
When “Import” was selected, as shown in Figure 133, the option to select a source 
file was not given.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The window shown in Figure 134 allows the user to select a file to import and should 
appear when importing a database, but it often this step was skipped by HAZUS, and 
the filed mapping window, shown in Figure 135, immediately appeared.   
 
Figure 133: Import a New Inventory Database 
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Figure 134: Dialog to Select Source File (Often bypassed by HAZUS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The source and target fields could not be mapped unless HAZUS gave the option to 
choose a source file.  If the file selection dialog was skipped, the source field list 
appeared empty. This error in HAZUS was overcome by closing the mapping dialog 
box, and choosing “Import” again.  In most cases, this needed to be repeated several 
times before HAZUS prompted for a source file.  There were other cases in which 
 
Figure 135: Dialog to Map Source to Target Database Fields 
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repeating these steps many times did not result in a prompt to select the input file, so 
a new study region was created, and the importing process was attempted again.  
These importing errors occurred when importing pipelines as well.   
 
13.1.3 Bridge Inventory Size Limitations 
 
Lastly, it was determined that HAZUS is not capable of importing more than 
approximately 2,000 bridge records into one study region.  The large number of 
IDOT bridge records (explained in Chapter 8 of this report), especially for the locally-
maintained bridge inventory, prevents successful implementation into HAZUS.  To 
estimate losses to the locally-maintained bridges, the inventory must be input into 
study regions the size of two or three counties, depending on the density of the 
bridges.  Once the loss estimation performed for every subset of the total study 
regions, the results for the individual study regions must be aggregated.  This would 
prove to be very time consuming, especially for very large regions containing 
multiple states.  It is recommended that the importing capabilities be improved by the 
HAZUS developers to facilitate such large projects. 
 
 
13.2 Importing Pipelines 
 
Errors in importing pipelines have been noted as well.  The pipeline inventory did not 
always appear in the Utility Systems Inventory window in HAZUS until they were 
imported into HAZUS, the program was restarted, and the pipelines were imported 
again.  In some instances, this importing-restarting process needed to be repeated 
many times before the pipeline inventory correctly displayed in the inventory window 
and mapped on the study region.   
 
As discussed in the Pipelines section of this report, the leak, break, and repair rates, as 
estimated by HAZUS, were greater than zero, but the total leaks, breaks, and repairs 
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were equal to zero.  As a result, the pipeline damage was calculated outside of 
HAZUS.  These damage calculations are discussed in the Pipelines section of this 
report.   
 
When importing pipelines, HAZUS did not always prompt the user to select the file 
containing the new pipeline inventory.  This issue is analogous to that when bridges 
are imported and is discussed thoroughly in the Importing Bridges section of this 
chapter. 
 
13.3 Ground Motion and Liquefaction 
 
Several problems with the calculations by the Potential Earth Science Hazards 
(PESH) module in HAZUS were identified during this study.  These problems are 
described in the following sections. 
13.3.1 Attenuation Cutoff 
 
HAZUS automatically cut off the ground motion parameters (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 
second, and Sa at 1.0 second) to zero in all census tracts that are farther than 200 km 
from the earthquake epicenter in any deterministic event.  This cutoff does not follow 
the true behavior of the attenuation relationships.  In addition, all census tracts with 
the zeroed ground motion parameters showed incorrect random damage to essential 
facilities.  This issue is discussed and illustrated in the Hazard Definition Chapter of 
this report. 
 
To remedy the ground motion cutoff errors in HAZUS, user-defined ground motions 
were used in all sections of this study.  The attenuation cutoff and user-defined 
ground motions are discussed further in the Hazard Definition chapter of this report. 
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13.3.2 Campbell Attenuation Relationship in HAZUS 
 
In addition to the attenuation cutoff described in the previous section, it the Campbell 
attenuation relationship embedded in HAZUS is believed to contain errors.  The 
following figures show a comparison between the ground motions produced using the 
Campbell relationship embedded in HAZUS and the Campbell relationship in the 
ground motion program that was developed.  The plots show that the ground motion 
predicted by HAUS does not produce a smooth curve, in the way the same 
attenuation relationship outside of HAZUS does.  This is especially apparent in the 
PGV and Sa comparisons. 
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Figure 136: Comparison of Campbell Attenuation (PGA) from HAZUS vs. Ground Motion 
Program 
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Figure 137: Comparison of Campbell Attenuation (PGV) from HAZUS vs. Ground Motion 
Program 
 
Sa at Short Periods (Campbell Attenuation)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Distance (km)
S a
 (g
) HAZUS - Sa at 0.3 Sec
Program - Sa at 0.2 Sec
 
Figure 138: Comparison of Campbell Attenuation (Sa at Short Periods) from HAZUS vs. Ground 
Motion Program 
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Figure 139: Comparison of Campbell Attenuation (Sa at 1.0 Second Period) from HAZUS vs. 
Ground Motion Program 
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13.3.3 Liquefaction Calculations for Very Low Susceptibility 
 
Liquefaction is computed correctly for all but the “very low” liquefaction 
susceptibility category.  The expected permanent ground displacement (PGD) was 
computed outside of HAZUS for a set of census tracts.  The calculations were done 
six times.  First it was assumed that all tracts had soil with a liquefaction 
susceptibility of “none”.  Then “very low” was assumed, followed by “low”, 
“moderate”, “high”, and “very high”.   The estimated PGD was calculated six times 
using HAZUS by assuming that every census tract in the region be uniform 
liquefaction susceptibility.   
 
The calculations within HAZUS and outside of HAZUS were compared, and it was 
determined that the permanent ground displacement due to liquefaction is calculated 
correctly by HAZUS for all liquefaction susceptibility indices except “very low”.  For 
this index, HAZUS incorrectly estimates a permanent ground displacement of zero 
for any PGA value.  To remedy this issue, all census tracts with a liquefaction 
susceptibility index of “very low” were assigned an index of “low”.  The liquefaction 
calculations are also discussed in the Hazard Definition chapter of this report. 
 
13.3.4 Ground Motion when Liquefaction is Included 
 
 
In several HAZUS analyses, the Potential Earth Science Hazards (PESH) module 
incorrectly modified not only the ground deformation but also the ground motion 
parameters.  The input ground motion was calculated using the user-supplied ground 
motion maps that were developed using the ground motion program as described in 
the Hazard Definition chapter of this report.  The ground motion maps and the 
liquefaction susceptibility map were imported into HAZUS and the analysis was run.   
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The PESH module reduced the ground motion parameters (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 
second, and Sa at 1.0 second) for 162 of the 279 census tracts in the Southern Illinois 
study region.  According to Chapter 4 of the HAZUS Technical Manual, the PGA is 
used to calculate the permanent ground deformation due to liquefaction, but the 
liquefaction susceptibility should have no effect on the ground motion parameters.    
 
None of the 162 census tracts with reduced ground motion were predicted to have 
ground failure in the form of liquefaction.  The PESH module increased the ground 
motion parameters for 61 of the census tracts in the study region.  These 61 census 
tracts were each predicted to have ground deformation due to liquefaction.  The 
PESH module in HAZUS did not change the ground motion parameters for the 
remaining 56 census tracts.   
 
The census tracts with 
reduced ground 
motion suffered 
reduced damage.  The 
green areas in the map 
in Figure 140 indicate 
the census tracts for 
which the ground 
motion was reduced, 
and the red areas 
indicate the census 
tracts for which the 
ground motion is 
increased when 
liquefaction is included in the analysis.  The ground motion in the yellow census 
tracts remains the same.   
 
Figure 140: Ground Motion Change in Study Region Census 
Tracts 
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Because approximately 60% of the census tracts in the study region experienced no 
liquefaction and reduced ground motion, and an additional 20% of the census tracts 
experienced unchanged ground motion and no liquefaction, many of the aggregate 
loss estimates for the entire region were actually reduced in the case that liquefaction 
was included.  The reduced damage results due to decreased ground motion 
overpowered the increased results due to liquefaction.  The ground motion parameters 
PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 second, and Sa at 1.0 second are shown in the following figures. 
 
The PGA predicted by the PESH module in HAZUS is shown for the case including 
liquefaction and the case without liquefaction in Figures 141 and 142, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 141: PGA with Liquefaction 
 
Figure 142: PGA without Liquefaction 
 
The PGV, as predicted by HAZUS for both cases is shown in Figures 143 and 144. 
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Figure 143: PGV with Liquefaction 
 
Figure 144: PGV without Liquefaction 
 
The spectral acceleration at 0.3 second predicted by the PESH module is shown in 
Figures 145 and 146 for the study region including and excluding liquefaction, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 145: Sa at 0.3 Sec with Liquefaction Figure 146: Sa at 0.3 Sec without Liquefaction 
 
The spectral acceleration at 1.0 second, as predicted by HAZUS, is shown for the 
case with liquefaction and the case without liquefaction in Figures 147 and 148, 
respectively. 
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Figure 147: Sa at 1.0 Sec with Liquefaction 
 
Figure 148: Sa at 1.0 Sec without Liquefaction 
 
 
 
13.4 General Building Stock Replacement Costs 
 
In HAZUS, the default replacement costs for residential, commercial, industrial, and 
institutional buildings were derived from Means Square Foot Costs 2002 for (HAZUS 
TM Section 5.1.12.2).  The HAZUS Technical Manual states that building costs from 
the most current Means Square Foot Costs document can replace those from the 2002 
document in the HAZUS replacement cost database.  Changing the replacement costs 
for the general building stock in the program is not as simple as updating the costs in 
the database table that contains the replacement costs and then re-creating the study 
region using the new costs. 
 
The replacement costs for the general building stock can be found in the table 
“hzReplacementCost” which is located in the “HzAnalParams.mdb” database in the 
“DATA” folder that is supplied with HAZUS.  A sensitivity test was performed to 
determine the effect of changing the values in the hzReplacementCost table on the 
direct loss estimates for the general building stock in which the values in the table 
were all changed to very high values and in which all values in the table were 
changed to zero.  The study region was re-created after the costs were changed to 
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ensure the new replacement costs would be used in every case.  Neither of these 
scenarios produced loss estimates that differed from the loss estimate using the 
default replacement costs.  It was concluded that changing the values in the 
hzReplacementCost table does not affect the loss estimates.   
 
It was determined by reading the documentation for the hzReplacementCost table that 
the replacement cost parameters are multiplied by the square footage values for each 
census tract for each occupancy class (hzSqFootageOccupB table) to create a table of 
exposed value for each occupancy class in each census tract (hzExposureOccupB 
table).  Instead of taking the replacement costs from the hzReplacementCost table, 
HAZUS uses the values from the exposed value table, which gives total replacement 
cost for every census tract in Illinois for every occupancy class.  Because the 
hzExposureOccupB table includes every census block in the state of Illinois for every 
occupancy class, so there are over 10 million cells in the table.  This is much larger 
than what can be readily worked with to update replacement costs.  It was decided 
that applying a cost inflator to the final direct loss value for the general building stock 
may be a better solution than changing individual replacement costs. 
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14. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
A seismic loss assessment was conducted for the State of Illinois for the purposes of 
determining the vulnerable infrastructure elements, prioritizing mitigation efforts in 
the state, quantifying damage in economic terms, and aiding in the development of 
public awareness projects.  The study was performed using FEMA’s HAZUS loss 
estimation software, and included several levels of analysis.  First, a level 1 loss 
estimation was conducted using HAZUS default inventories and loss parameters but 
with user-supplied ground motion.  Additional loss estimations were performed using 
site class maps to refine the ground motion, liquefaction susceptibility maps to 
estimate the effects of liquefaction, pipeline inventories from FEMA’s HSIP Gold 
Dataset, improved essential facilities inventories, bridge inventories provided by 
IDOT, and improved building and highway bridge fragilities. 
 
14.1 HAZUS Level 1 Analysis 
 
The level 1 HAZUS analysis estimated that there would be over 12,000 buildings 
suffering extensive damage and 2,800 suffering complete damage in the general 
building stock.  Approximately 7% of hospitals, 2% of schools, 4% of police stations, 
and 4% of fire stations were estimated to suffer at least moderate damage. A 
relatively small number of utility system facilities—less than five percent of any 
given utility inventory—were estimated to suffer at least moderate structural damage, 
and no facilities were estimated to be damaged beyond repair.  It was estimated that 
over 10,700 households would be without electric power and over 13,000 households 
would be without potable water on the day of the event.   Each of these totals was less 
than 1% of the total households in the state.  HAZUS estimated that the total 
economic loss to buildings would be $2.06 billion, the total to transportation systems 
would be $211 million, and the loss to utility systems would be $1.16 billion for a 
total direct economic loss of approximately $3.4 billion.   
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14.2 Local Site Class Effects 
 
A study was conducted in which site class effects were included for the southern 
portion of Illinois.  The results were compared with those from an analysis of the 
same region with uniform site class D.  The site effects caused the ground motion to 
decrease for a majority of census tracts in the state, so in general, the damage and loss 
estimates were reduced.  The estimated damage to essential facilities decreased for 
hospitals, schools, emergency operation centers, police stations, and fire stations.  The 
direct economic loss for the general building stock was estimated to be $2.01 billion 
for a uniform site class D soil condition and $1.68 billion for the southern portion of 
Illinois when the site class effects were included.  The total economic losses to the 
transportation systems for the study region increased from $187 million to $207 
million when site class effects were included.  The transportation economic losses 
increased because many highway bridges and railway components lie in census tracts 
where the ground motion increased with site effects.  The loss to the utility systems 
decreased for the study region decreased from $1.10 billion to $915 million.  The 
total direct economic losses for southern Illinois assuming uniform soil D was 
estimated to be $3.30 dollars, and the loss including site class effects was estimated to 
be $2.80 billion.  This represents an 18% decrease in direct economic losses.  The 
effects of site classes were estimated for Massac County to illustrate that when the 
soil causes an increase in ground motion, the damage and losses also increase. 
 
14.3 Liquefaction Effects 
 
The effects of liquefaction on the damage and loss estimates for southern Illinois 
were studied.  Liquefaction caused the number of general buildings estimated to 
suffer extensive damage to increase by a factor of 2.4.  It did not significantly affect 
the damage to essential facilities because the majority of the facilities were not 
located in liquefied zones.  The direct economic losses increased from $2.00 billion to 
 225
$2.66 billion for the general building stock, from $188 million to $492 million for the 
transportation system, and from $1.10 billion to $1.29 billion for the utility systems in 
the study region when liquefaction was included.  The total direct economic losses for 
southern Illinois increased from $3.30 billion to $4.44 billion when the effects of 
liquefaction are added to the analysis. 
 
14.4 Improved Inventories and Parameters 
 
Studies were performed in which the HAZUS default inventories were improved.  
Improved essential facilities inventories, improved bridge inventories, and natural gas 
and oil pipeline inventories were imported into the loss estimation tool.  Damage 
estimates were produced for these inventories, but dollar loss estimates were not 
because replacement costs were not provided in the inventory databases.  In addition 
to improved inventories, the damage results were refined for buildings and bridges.  
For the general building stock, damage conversion factors were used to relate the 
damage probabilities output by HAZUS to estimated damage that would be produced 
if fragility curves using PFM (Jeong, 2006) directly replaced the HAZUS fragilities.  
Highway bridge fragilities developed by Nielson (2005) were directly imported into 
HAZUS, replacing the default HAZUS highway bridge fragility curves.  The use of 
the bridge fragilities by Nielson significantly increased the estimated damage to 
highway bridges. 
 
14.5 CUSEC Study Comparison 
 
A HAZUS analysis for the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) region was conducted 
by the Central US Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) (Blake, 2006).  The CUSEC 
study was compared with results from this study.  The differences in damage and loss 
estimates were due to the fact that different earthquake epicenter locations were used 
in the two studies and the CUSEC study was conducted using HAZUS-MH MR1 
(this study was conducted using HAZUS-MH MR2).  The CUSEC study estimated 
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that the direct economic losses would be $1.24 billion for the general building stock, 
$278 million for the transportation systems, and $678 million for the utility systems.  
This study estimated that the losses would be $2.69 billion for the general building 
stock, $501 million for the transportation systems, and $1.31 billion for the utility 
systems.  The losses increase for this study because the ground motion parameters are 
higher in magnitude due to the nearer earthquake epicenter location.   
 
14.6 Comparison of Losses 
 
Table 148 tabulates the study region characteristics, hazard characteristics, and direct 
economic losses for the loss estimation studies discussed in this report.  The level 1 
HAZUS analysis for the entire State of Illinois with default inventory and parameters, 
but with user-defined ground motion, estimated that the total direct economic losses 
are expected to be approximately $3.4 billion.   
 
The southern Illinois study region of 30 counties was used to study the effects of site 
classes and liquefaction on the damage and loss estimates.  The direct economic 
losses for the region, not including the effects of liquefaction or site effects, were 
estimated to be approximately $3.3 billion.  This estimate was reduced to $2.8 billion 
with the addition of soil site effects because the ground motion was reduced in most 
census tracts by the site effects.  The estimate increased to $4.4 billion when 
liquefaction was included.  The Massac County study was performed to illustrate that 
in locations that the ground motion increases, the estimated losses will also increase. 
 
Lastly, the results of this study were compared with a study performed by CUSEC.  
The study region was a portion of southern Illinois containing 40 counties.  The 
earthquake epicenter for this study was much closer to Illinois than the epicenter 
location used in the CUSEC study, so the losses increased from $2.2 billion to $4.5 
billion. 
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Table 148: Overall Comparison of the Studies 
Study Name Region 
Number 
of 
Counties
Ground 
Motion 
Devoloped By
Site Class 
Map
Liquefaction 
Susceptibility
Building 
Loss
Transportation 
System Loss
Utility 
System 
Loss
Total 
Loss
Level 1 Analysis
Entrire State of 
Illinois 102 MAEC
None, 
Uniform D None $2.06 B $211 M $1.16 B $3.4 B
Southern IL    
Level I
Southern 
Illinois 30 MAEC
None, 
Uniform D None $2.01 B $188 M $1.10 B $3.3 B
Southern IL with 
Soil Site Effects
Southern 
Illinois 30 MAEC
ISGS 
(Bauer, 
1999)
None $1.68 B $208 M $915 M $2.8 B
Southern IL with 
Liquefaction
Southern 
Illinois 30 MAEC
None, 
Uniform D
FEMA 
(2006c) $2.66 B $492 M $1.29 B $4.4 B
Massac County 
Default
Massac 
County 1 MAEC
None, 
Uniform D None $239 M $20 M $79 M $338 M
Massac County 
Add  Site Effects
Massac 
County 1 MAEC
ISGS 
(Bauer, 
1999)
None $376 M $39 M $92 M $507 M
CUSEC Analysis 
by FEMA
Southern 
Illinois 40 FEMA
FEMA-
defined
FEMA 
(2006c) $1.24 B $278 M $678 M $2.2 B
MAEC Analysis of 
CUSEC Counties
Southern 
Illinois 40 MAEC
None, 
Uniform D
FEMA 
(2006c) $2.69 B $501 M $1.31B $4.5 B
 
 
 
 
14.6 Issues in HAZUS 
 
Lastly, issues in the HAZUS loss estimation software were discovered during this 
study and are reported in Chapter 13 of this report.  The problems with the loss 
estimation tool include issues and bugs when importing bridges and pipelines, ground 
motion calculations, and the ability to update the general building stock replacement 
costs.   
 
14.7 Future Work 
 
There is still much more work for the loss assessment for the State of Illinois to be 
performed.  The hazard will be improved by importing inundation maps that will be 
used to estimate effects of flooding due to dam failure.  Improved site class maps will 
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be provided by the Illinois State Geological Survey and will be used to refine the 
ground motion estimates.  Liquefaction susceptibility maps that will be more accurate 
than those used in this study are currently in development in the Mid-America 
Earthquake Center and will be used to better study the effects of liquefaction.   
Additional inventory improvements will be made to the HAZUS default inventory.  
Levee, prison, military facility, and telephone facility inventories will be imported 
into HAZUS, and damage and losses will be estimated with these inventories.  The 
improved hazard, inventory, and parameters to be implemented into HAZUS in future 
work are: 
• MAEC-developed liquefaction maps 
• Refined ISGS site class maps 
• Telephone facilities inventory 
• Prison inventory 
• Military facilities inventory 
• Levee inventory and fragilities 
• Inundation maps 
• Estimate effects of flooding due to dam failure 
• MAEC social and economic impact models  
 
Individual counties that were determined to 
be critical by the Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency (IEMA) will be 
studied individually.  These counties are   
pictured in yellow in Figure 149.  HAZUS 
will be used to produce damage and loss 
estimates for each individual county.  The 
individual county studies will aid in the 
determination of which counties IEMA 
should focus on when completing 
mitigation and earthquake response plans.    
Figure 149: Counties to Study in Detail 
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16. Appendix A: CD of Hazard, Inventory, and 
Parameter Files 
 
 
16.1 Hazard 
 
• FEMA Liquefaction Susceptibility Map.mdb: This geodatabase contains 
the liquefaction map extracted from the study region provided by FEMA 
(2006c). 
• Illinois Ground Motion Uniform Soil D.mdb:  This geodatabase contains 
the ground motion parameters (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.2 second, and Sa at 1.0 
second) in the form of ground motion maps.  A uniform site class D was 
assumed.   
• Southern IL Ground Motion w ISGS Site Classes.mdb:  This geodatabase 
contains the ground motion parameters (PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.2 second, and Sa 
at 1.0 second) in the form of ground motion maps.  The ISGS-provided site 
class map was used for soil site class effects.   
• Southern IL ISGS Site Class Map.mdb:  This geodatabase contains the soil 
site classes for the southern one-third of Illinois.  It was provided by ISGS 
(Bauer, 1999). 
 
 
16.2 Inventory 
 
• Essential Facilities 
o MAEC Essential Facilities Inventory Final.mdb:  This geodatabase 
contains the final data for the essential facilities for the southern 
portion of Illinois that was used in this loss assessment study.   
o MAEC Essential Facilities Inventory Raw Data.mdb:  This 
database contains the raw data for the essential facilities for the 
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southern portion of Illinois. The inventory was provided by study 
performed within the MAE Center (French and Olshansky, 2000).   
 
• IDOT Bridges 
o IDOT Bridge Inventory Final.mdb:  This geodatabase contains the 
final bridge data for locally and state maintained bridges that were 
used in the study. 
o IDOT Locally Maintained Bridge Inventory Raw Data.xls:  This 
workbook contains the raw locally maintained bridge inventory data, 
as provided by IDOT (Ahrens, 2006).   
o IDOT State Maintained Bridge Inventory Raw Data.xls:  This 
workbook contains the raw state maintained bridge inventory data, as 
provided by IDOT (Ahrens, 2006).   
 
• Pipelines 
o Illinois Pipelines Inventory Final.mdb:  This geodatabase contains 
the natural gas and oil pipelines for the State of Illinois.  The pipelines 
were taken from FEMA’s HSIP Gold Dataset (Office of 
Americas/North America & Homeland Security Division, 2005).   
 
16.3 Fragility Parameters 
 
• Bridge Fragilities 
o MAEC Bridge Fragility Parameters.xls: This worksheet contains 
bridge fragilities developed by the MAE Center.  The parameters were 
input directly into HAZUS.   
 
• Building Fragilities 
• GBS HAZUS to PFM Damage Conversion Factors.xls:  This workbook 
calculates the probability of exceeding a given limit state as calculated 
using PFM divided by the probability calculated by HAZUS for the 
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general building stock.  These ratios were used to modify the damage 
probabilities output by HAZUS. 
 
• GBS HAZUS to PFM Damage Conversion.xls: This workbook 
multiplies the GBS fragility conversion factors, which are calculated in 
"GBS HAZUS to PFM Fragility Conversion Factors.xls" by the 
probabilities of damage output by HAZUS for the general building stock 
in the State of Illinois.  The result is modified damage estimates to better 
reflect PFM fragilities. 
 
• Parameterized Fragilities Using HAZUS Pushover and LSs.xls:  This 
workbook contains the fragility parameters (λ and β) for the PFM 
fragilities derived in the MAE Center. 
 
